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ABSTRACT 
This research aims to understand the transition of established 
entrepreneurial firms into sustainable entrepreneurship 
ventures in Malaysia using a competency based perspective. 
The research considers established entrepreneurial firms 
attempts to acquire green technology financing. By observing 
a green technology financing scheme (GTFS) a competency 
trap is identified that constrains established entrepreneurial 
firms, regardless of their excellent financing track record and 
previous business success in other ventures. Utilising 
Rasmussen et al.’s (2011, 2014) evolutionary entrepreneurial 
competency framework, the research examines how 
established entrepreneurial firms develop the entrepreneurial 
competencies to overcome this trap and acquire green 
technology financing. By comparing different established 
entrepreneurial firms during the process to acquire financing, 
the research examined the GTFS contextual influence on the 
deployment of competencies, revealing the multi-faceted 
nature of the competency trap. In order to acquire GTFS 
financing the research identified two sets of entrepreneurial 
necessary competencies; (i) opportunity refinement 
competencies (ii) resource acquisition competencies. However, 
development of these competencies is influenced by the 
established entrepreneurial firms’ paths and the competency 
trap. Four different pathways to address the competency trap 
are highlighted. This emphasizes the need for more contextual 
based research at multiple levels of analysis to understand 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Developing countries are the most vulnerable to climate change 
impacts because they have fewer resources to adapt: socially, 
technologically and financially (United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, (2007:5). 
The overarching frame of this research is climate change 
mitigation efforts in developing countries. Today, the global 
community is confronted with various environmental 
challenges (e.g. floods, drought and violent weather changes) 
related to the environment and climate change. Analysis by 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and development 
(OECD) (2009) shows that ambitious policy action is needed to 
address climate change and suggests that inaction could incur 
greater future costs to both the economy and the 
environment.  
As a result, many countries are promoting sustainable 
development initiatives. In addition, numerous academics in 
sustainability and climate change are considering the concept 
of sustainable entrepreneurship and are suggesting it is part of 
the solution for the troubles caused by climate change (Hall, 
Daneke, and Lenox, 2010). The aim of this research is to 
explore and understand the conditions and the policies that 
will facilitate sustainable entrepreneurship activity among 
established entrepreneurial firms. It does so by focusing on 
the context of an alternative financing scheme for climate 





1.2 Research Context: GTFS in Malaysia 
In 1972, Edward Lorenz presented a paper entitled 
“Predictability: Does the Flap of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil 
set off a Tornado in Texas?” wherein he articulated how small 
errors in weather prediction could bring disastrous results 
(Lorenz, 2001). Here the research aligns itself with this view 
that the global environment is interconnected: undeniably no 
country stands alone against climate change issues.  
Climate change represents an extraordinary challenge to policy 
making (Gough, 2011). This in turn requires extraordinary 
solutions therefore policy makers need to be innovative in 
their initiatives and policy prescriptions (Gough, 2011).  
One of the most significant international environmental 
initiatives is the Kyoto Protocol. According to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
(2011) the major feature of the Kyoto Protocol is that it sets 
and commits developed countries (37 industrialized countries 
and the European Community) to binding targets for reducing 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Under the principle of 
“common but differentiated responsibilities” (United Nations, 
1992:1), the protocol places a heavier burden on developed 
nations. In respect of these, there has been a flurry of 
activities and environmental initiatives by national 
governments (OECD, 2009) (e.g. infrastructure for electric and 
hybrid cars). Here, York and Venkataraman (2010) assert that 
environmental degradation is often too serious for most 
conservation practices alone to solve.  
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To further our understanding of climate mitigation in a 
developing country context, the research selected Malaysia as 
the setting for the case study.  
Malaysia gained independence in 1957 from Great Britain, and 
whilst it was formerly an agriculture based economy it slowly 
transformed into an industrial nation with a GDP growth of 
6.2% per annum since 1970. Setting its sights to evolved into 
an advanced economy by 2020, Malaysia aims to achieve this 
target in a “resilient, low-carbon, resource-efficient, and 
socially-inclusive manner” (Malaysia Economic Planning Unit, 
2015:6-2). 
Malaysia is similar to many other developing countries in 
terms of GDP as outlined in the World Banks economic outlook 
report 2014. However, it is one of the developing countries to 
pledge to reduce its’ carbon reduction in Conference of Parties 
(COP) 15 in Copenhagen. The pledge in 2009 by the Hon. 
Prime Minister of Malaysia was to reduce Malaysia’s carbon 
intensity by 40% against the business as usual (BAU)1 levels 
of 2005 by the year 2020 upon the assistance of ANNEX I 
                                   
 
1 Business as usual (BAU) levels is the level of carbon emissions without taking any 
intervention or mitigation initiatives. 
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countries2(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, 2014) 
Another reason Malaysia was selected is because, according to 
the World Bank and the United Nations, Malaysia can be 
considered a role model for other developing nations34. As the 
world turns its focus towards climate change mitigation, 
Malaysia might be well-placed to again function as a role 
model for other developing nations. Indeed, to that end the 
Malaysian government has put various initiatives and policy 
prescription into place (e.g. National Climate Policy, 2009, 
Feed in-Tariff Act 2011 etc.) 
The Malaysian National Green Technology Policy was 
envisioned as a mechanism to support this voluntary pledge. 
This resonates with Kivimaa and Mickwitz (2006) which 
outlined a role of integrating environmental policy with 
innovation and technology policy to achieve environmental 
goals. They suggest that by integrating environmental 
objectives into innovation and technology policies, both the 
                                   
 
2 According to the Kyoto Protocol, ANNEX I countries are classified as industrialized 








negative effects of new technology development could be 
forecasted and together bring about sustainable economic 
development. 
According to policy documents from UNFCC (2013)5, financing 
remains one of the key challenges for climate mitigation in 
developing countries. Currently, climate mitigation in 
developing countries is financed by funds from developed 
countries through UNFCCC programs such as Global 
Environmental Fund (GEF) 6  and Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM)7. In terms of the amount needed for climate 
mitigation and adaptation, in the Asia Pacific region alone it is 
estimated to be “US$500-800 billion for climate change 
mitigation and renewable energy” (United Nations 
Environment Programme, 2015:6). Specifically in the Asia 
Pacific region there are also national green financing initiatives 
such as enCON (energy conservation) fund in Thailand, while 
in China, Bangladesh, Indonesia these green financing 











initiatives are spearheaded by state owned banks (United 
Nations Environment Programme, 2015).  
Taking into consideration of these financing challenges, under 
the National Green Technology Policy, one of the key 
initiatives under this policy is a RM3.5 billion 8  (GBP 700 
million) alternative financing scheme known as the Green 
Technology Financing Scheme (GTFS) launched by the 
Government in 2010 to encourage participation in green 
technology-related business.  
This fund provides alternative financing to firms that supply 
and utilize green technology. According to the National Green 
Technology Policy, the basic definition of green technology is 
technology that will reduce environmental degradation. Under 
the GTFS, for green technology producers (e.g. renewable 
energy producers), the maximum available financing is RM50 
million, with consumer firms (e.g. energy efficiency) capped at 
RM10 million. Under the scheme the Government bears 2% of 
the total interest rate charged, and provides a guarantee on 
60% of the loan.  
Four sectors are eligible to receive GTFS financing: energy, 
water and waste management, transportation, and building 
and townships. The qualifying criteria according to the GTFS 
for these ventures are to:  
                                   
 




minimise degradation of the environment; produce zero or low 
greenhouse gas emissions; be safe to use; promote a healthy and 
improved environment for inhabitants; conserve the use of energy and 
natural resources; and promote the use of renewable energy 
resources. (Malaysian Green Technology Corporation, 2012) 
To acquire GTFS funding there are two phases of evaluation. 
The first is the technical evaluation conducted by technical 
experts appointed by the programme administrator. The first 
phase of evaluation also includes a business presentation 
review, akin to a pitching session where the entrepreneurial 
firm presents to a panel of bankers their projects. An 
entrepreneurial firm that fulfils the criteria in both of these 
phases of evaluation will be awarded a GTFS certificate, and is 
eligible to progress its GTFS application. The second phase of 
evaluation is when entrepreneurial firms apply for project 
finance. The process is managed by the financial institutions 
and they decide upon financing decisions. If rejected at this 
stage the entrepreneurs can also apply for a final pitching 
session with the banks through the program administrators.  
However the GTFS also faces challenges. In a cross-country 
study by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Maksimovic 
(2006), on determinants of financing obstacles indicates that 
financing obstacles in Malaysia are low, which means access to 
financing in the country is above average compared to world 
benchmarks. However, in the case of green technology, a 
recent study from Malaysia by Tan, Ang, Chung and Pek 
(2013) suggests that in general, renewable or green energy 
projects face difficulty to acquire financing and bank loans 
because of the high risk involved. According to them this 
difficulty is attributed to the lack of technical knowledge 
among the financiers to evaluate this high risk ventures. These 
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studies suggest there are contextual differences between 
access to regular project finance and the green technology-
financing environment in Malaysia. 
In order to address such issues, the GTFS has put in place 
technical evaluation mechanisms, government guarantees and 
interest rebates (Hansen and Nygaard, 2014; Wong, Ngadi, 
Abdullah, and Inuwa, 2015). However despite these efforts, 
access to the funds has been “slow and restrictive” (Maulud 
and Saidi, 2012:91). Moreover, it appears the firms 
experiencing difficulty accessing green technology financing 
are not simply nascent entrepreneurs but include well 
established entrepreneurial firms. 
In relation to this problem, a detailed exploration of the GTFS 
scheme could provide key insights into the interplay between 
government, banks and sustainable entrepreneurs in climate 
change mitigation initiatives. Especially in other “bank-
oriented countries” (Vanacker & Manigart, 2008:58) in the 
developing world. As it is the role of banks as financial 
intermediaries in the Asia-Pacific region is dominant compared 
to the US and Europe (UENEP,2015), here the lessons learned 
from the GTFS can be disseminated to be shared with other 
countries in the region to contribute to the region’s financial 
and capital markets to fulfil the financing needs of sustainable 
development. Furthermore, by focusing on established 
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entrepreneurial firms transitioning into the green technology 
space, it is in line with current global developments on climate 
mitigation with initiatives such as the RE1009 whose focus is 
on established firms. 
Therefore research on established entrepreneurial firms within 
the GTFS scheme may enable a better understanding of the 
challenges faced by green technology firms attempting to 
finance sustainable entrepreneurship ventures specifically in 
developing countries with similar context as Malaysia. While 
the findings (e.g. bank knowledge asymmetry) can also 
provide insights for other developing countries that are “bank-
oriented countries” (Vanacker & Manigart, 2008:58) in 
financing climate change mitigation.  
1.3 Research Background 
There are various definitions and terminologies associated with 
the concept of sustainable development and sustainable 
entrepreneurship (Dean and McMullen, 2007; Shepherd and 
Patzelt, 2011). In this research, sustainable development is 
defined according to the World Commission on Environment 
                                   
 
9  The RE100 is made up of global established firms that have given their 




and Development also known as the Brundtland Report, 
whereby  
sustainable development is to ensure that development meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.(United Nations, 1987:16) 
The concept of sustainable entrepreneurship is defined by 
Dean and McMullen (2007:58) as 
the process of discovering, evaluating, and exploiting economic 
opportunities that are present in market failures which detract from 
sustainability, including those that are environmentally relevant.  
This definition is further elaborated according to Linnanen's 
(2002) typology of sustainable entrepreneurship (Please see 
section 2.2.2). 
There are numerous sustainability initiatives by governments 
all over the world to address climate change challenges (i.e. 
carbon emissions). For example, governments are investing in 
green technology such as energy efficiency, renewable energy, 
low-carbon transport and energy systems, and research and 
development on green technology (OECD,2009). According to 
(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change,2007b) the estimated financing needed to mitigate the 
effects of climate change in 2030 will be around $220 billion 
per annum by 2030 and this is projected to rise. This estimate 
is based only on mitigation and not adaptation figures.  
The emphasis on climate change mitigation and large sums of 
money targeted towards such initiatives presents opportunities 
for entrepreneurs, and such opportunities are inherent to 
market failure (Cohen and Winn, 2007; Dean and McMullen, 
2007). Indeed environmental degradation is considered to be 
a market failure in environmental economics (Dean and 
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McMullen, 2007). In this context, market failure would cause 
externalities such as pollution. The synthesis of both 
entrepreneurship and environmental degradation shows that 
the common denominator is market failure, which offers 
opportunities for the entrepreneur to generate profit at the 
same time solving environmental degradation (Dean and 
McMullen 2007). These two interconnected outcomes suggest 
sustainable entrepreneurship activity offers a win-win in terms 
of innovation, creativity, positive financial and environmental 
outcomes. 
To understand venture creation in the context of sustainable 
entrepreneurship is especially critical (Hall et al., 2010; 
Shepherd and Patzelt, 2011) due to the adverse effects of 
climate change (Stern, 2008) and the need to mitigate these 
effects under high levels of uncertainty (York and 
Venkataraman, 2010). Therefore this research seeks to 
address the call by Hall et al. (2010) to explore and 
understand the conditions and policies under which sustainable 
entrepreneurship will thrive.  
Established entrepreneurial firms transitioning to sustainable 
entrepreneurship will face financing difficulties. This is 
suggested by York and Venkataraman (2010) as they argued 
that established entrepreneurial firms will have difficulties 
embarking on sustainable entrepreneurship ventures due to 
organizational inertia. Hockerts and Wüstenhagen (2010) 
support this suggestion, however, they assert that once 
established entrepreneurial firms have decided on sustainable 
entrepreneurship ventures, they will outpace nascent firms 
because of their “superior market power”, “financial resources” 
and “process innovation capabilities” (pg.487). In support of 
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Hockerts and Wüstenhagen (2010), studies in 
entrepreneurship financing have highlighted that established 
entrepreneurial firms will more easily acquire financing 
because of their excellent track record and experience 
(Colombo & Grilli, 2006; Parker, 2013; Rasmussen & Sørheim, 
2012; T. Vanacker, Manigart, & Meuleman, 2014).  
To shed light onto this financing quagmire which is 
represented in the GTFS, it is useful to consider a study by 
Cassar (2004) that suggests the root cause may be contextual 
differences between sector financing requirements. Parrish 
(2010:521) suggests there is a need for “distinct 
competencies” to overcome organizing tensions (e.g. 
financing) in sustainable entrepreneurship ventures. The 
organizing tension alludes to a new skill set for designing 
sustainable entrepreneurship ventures. Worthington and 
Patton (2005) also argues the need for new competencies in 
the context of established entrepreneurial firms in transiting 
from conventional to sustainable based ventures to gain 
competitive advantage. Taken together this seems to point to 
a contextual difference in financing requirements. The 
contextual difference stems from the different type of business 
that the established entrepreneurial firms were involved before 
this (e.g. retail to manufacturing of green technology 
products) which entails a different set of competencies. 
Understanding how these competencies are developed within 
specific context will contribute to the knowledge base on the 
conditions and policies for sustainable entrepreneurship to 
thrive from a competency based approach. 
Thus, this research builds upon an emerging stream of 
literature on evolutionary entrepreneurial competencies 
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development (Ahuja and Katila, 2004; Rasmussen, Mosey, and 
Wright, 2011; Rasmussen et al., 2014) to understand the 
development of entrepreneurial competencies for established 
entrepreneurial firms to acquire green technology financing in 
Malaysia. 
1.4 Research aims 
The research aims to explore and understand the conditions 
and policies which enable established entrepreneurial firms to 
acquire green technology financing in the GTFS context. Here, 
the research focuses on the early years of the fund (2010-
2015). As the research is exploratory in nature, the definition 
of established entrepreneurial firms in this research is broad. 
Therefore for the purposes of this doctoral research, the 
following definition of established entrepreneurial firms is 
given: In the context of Malaysia an established 
entrepreneurial firms are understood to be firms that have 
been established by experienced entrepreneurs or experienced 
entrepreneurial teams and are in business for more than three 
years (Hall, G and Wahab,K.A., 2007) and continue to place 
the pursuit of new entrepreneurial opportunities (Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000) at the heart of their operations. This 
pursuit of new opportunities might be in the form of a new 
venture. 
Such established firms would be expected to have 
accumulated sufficient entrepreneurial competencies (Autio et 
al, 2000) so as to be able to acquire financing (Brinckmann, 
Salomo, & Gemuenden, 2009). However as discussed in 
section 1.2, being an “established entrepreneurial firm” is 
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necessary but not sufficient to acquire government guaranteed 
funds from banks.  
Therefore the research question asks “How do established 
entrepreneurial firms develop the entrepreneurial 
competencies necessary to acquire green technology financing 
in the GTFS context?” This research question has been divided 
into three sub-questions. 
(i) How does the GTFS context influence the 
deployment of competencies by established 
entrepreneurial firms? 
(ii) What entrepreneurial competencies are necessary 
for established entrepreneurial firms to acquire 
green technology financing in this context?  
(iii) How are these competencies developed? 
 
1.5 Motivation 
The motivations for the research are four-fold. 
(i) Sustainable development is said to be the most 
prominent topic of our time (Shepherd and Patzelt, 
2011). In relation to this, sustainable 
entrepreneurship activity is one part of the solution 
for climate change (Hall et al., 2010). Examining 
and understanding the conditions and policies 
facilitating and/or hindering sustainable 
entrepreneurship, will help to expand our knowledge 
of this emerging field. 
(ii) Financing is critical for any new ventures (Colombo 
and Grilli, 2006; Van Auken, 2001). Therefore to 
increase the scope of sustainable entrepreneurship 
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ventures, a deeper understanding of how financing 
is acquired in various contexts is vital.  
(iii) Like other developing countries, Malaysia aspires to 
be a developed nation, however with the effects of 
climate change becoming more prevalent, there is 
need to mitigate climate change globally and locally. 
Therefore, this research aims to share its findings 
for use by other developing nations.  
(iv) Finally, it aims to explore the application of the 
evolutionary entrepreneurial competency framework 
(Rasmussen et al., 2011, 2014) in another context. 
Doing so will expand our understanding of 
competency development (i.e. in green technology 




Employing a qualitative approach, the research utilised a 
multiple case study research strategy which comprised of six 
cases studies of established entrepreneurial firms in the GTFS 
setting. To support these six case studies, additional data was 
collected from GTFS programme administrators, banks and 
consultants. The qualitative data collected included interviews, 
document collection and non-participant observations. The 
data analysis was guided by Miles and Huberman's (1994) 
steps for qualitative data analysis. 
1.7 Key findings 
The research has identified three key findings as detailed 
below. 
1.7.1 Financing Competence Gap 
The first key finding answers the first sub-question, “How does 
the GTFS context influence the deployment of competencies 
by established entrepreneurial firms?” 
The research has identified a “financing competence gap” as 
one of the manifestations of the GTFS context. The financing 
competence gap consists of three elements: the different 
financing priorities of the stakeholders, bank knowledge 
asymmetry and financial criteria for green technology. In 
addition to this three elements there are two other interlinked 
GTFS contextual influence: (i) perceived ease of acquiring 
finance and (ii) the competency trap. These two effects have a 
high degree of influence to certain established entrepreneurial 
firms. The perceived ease of acquiring finance influences the 
deployment of competencies by giving the impression that to 
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acquire green technology financing is easy, which leads the 
established entrepreneurial firms to deploy under-developed 
competencies to acquire green technology financing, 
ultimately leading them to a competency trap. Being caught in 
the competency trap hinders the development of the 
necessary competencies to acquire financing.  
1.7.2 Entrepreneurial Competencies 
The second key finding answers the second sub-question, 
“What entrepreneurial competencies are necessary for 
established entrepreneurial firms to acquire green technology 
financing in this context?” 
The research draws on entrepreneurial competencies based on 
Parrish's (2010) and Worthington and Patton's (2005) 
suggestion that “distinct competencies” are necessary for 
sustainable entrepreneurship ventures. The concept of 
entrepreneurial competencies is also taken as a means of 
explaining the differences between York and Venkataraman 
(2010) and Hockerts and Wüstenhagen (2010) on established 
entrepreneurial firms embarking on sustainable 
entrepreneurship ventures.  
Following Rasmussen's et al. (2011, 2014) evolutionary 
entrepreneurial competency framework, the research has 
identified two sets of entrepreneurial competencies necessary 
to acquire financing. The first is “opportunity refinement 
competencies” and the second is “resource acquisition 
competencies”.  
1.7.3 Competency development path 
The third key finding addresses the third sub-question, “How 
are these competencies developed?” 
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The established entrepreneurial firms possess existing 
entrepreneurial competencies that have proven relevant in 
achieving previous business success. However, they are 
entering into a new environment (i.e. a new financing 
context). Therefore instead of a need to develop new “distinct 
competencies” (Parrish, 2010:521), there is a need to 
reconfigure (Karim and Mitchell, 2000) the existing 
competencies to “distinct competencies” in order to make the 
sustainable entrepreneurship venture a success.  
The previous financing and business experience makes up the 
existing path of the established entrepreneurial firms. This 
existing path will influence the ability of those firms to fully 
reconfigure their existing entrepreneurial competencies. This is 
because their existing path has a causal relationship with the 
competency trap (Liu, 2006). Therefore, depending on either 
their existing path or exogenous intervention (or shocks), the 
established entrepreneurial firms will either remain in the 
competency trap or develop new pathways to reconfigure their 
existing entrepreneurial competencies to acquire green 
technology financing. The research has identified these four 
pathways and has listed them in Table 1. 
Table 1 Pathways and competency trap (from the researcher) 
Pathways Competency trap 
Entrapped Remained in the competency trap 
Diverted Diverted from the competency trap with external resources and 
acquired financing from other sources 
Escaped Escaped the competency trap with external resources to acquire 
GTFS financing 






1.8 Research Contribution  
This research offers the following contributions to theory and 
practice. 
The research contributes primarily to the nascent sustainable 
entrepreneurship literature by answering Hall et al.’s (2010) 
call to unpack the conditions and policies under which 
sustainable entrepreneurs are able to pursue sustainable 
entrepreneurship ventures. This research does so in the 
context of the GTFS by focusing on established entrepreneurial 
firms (Hockerts and Wüstenhagen, 2010; York and 
Venkataraman, 2010) transition to sustainable 
entrepreneurship ventures (Worthington and Patton, 2005). 
Here, the research proposes that established entrepreneurial 
firms ability to acquire green technology financing, is 
contingent on their ability to reconfigure their existing 
competencies into “distinct competencies” according to green 
technology financing under the conditions of a competency 
trap.  
Secondly, the research extends our knowledge on the 
influence of context on competency development (Barney et 
al., 2011; Rasmussen et al., 2014; Zahra and Wright, 2011). 
This in turn adds on the existing knowledge on competency 
development for sustainable entrepreneurs (Parrish, 2010; 
Worthington & Patton, 2005). Under the GTFS context, the 
research has observed the variation in financing performance 
of established entrepreneurial firms. The variation of their 
financing performance is due to certain contextual factors that 
effects and influences on certain established entrepreneurial 
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firms more than the rest. However this might be limited to the 
Malaysia/ GTFS context only. 
The research also contributes to the entrepreneurial 
competencies literature by extending Rasmussen et al.'s 
(2011,2014) evolutionary competency framework to a 
different context: established entrepreneurial firms in a 
developing country. This furthers the utility of the framework 
and highlights the contextual difference influencing 
competency development in the form of a financing 
competence gap.  
The research also identifies multiple pathways to develop the 
necessary entrepreneurial competencies to acquire financing, 
consistent with Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) conceptualisation 
of equifinality in competency development (Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000). From these multiple pathways the research has 
also illustrated that through path breaking strategies the 
environmental context (i.e. alternative financing) can be 
changed and that the chosen route and speed of 
reconfiguration influences competency development and the 
acquisition of green technology financing. 
Finally, the research contributes practical insights that are 
useful as a basis of a full review of GTFS by suggesting the 
need for a focus on entrepreneurial competency development 
for both the entrepreneurs and the bankers. 
32 
 
1.9 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. The second chapter 
gives a review of the relevant academic literature. The 
literature review begins with a general overview of the 
entrepreneurship literature followed by a section on 
sustainable entrepreneurship. The review highlights the 
synergistic value of the field of entrepreneurship within the 
sustainability domain and secondly covers the current 
discussions in this underdeveloped sub-field (Cohen and Winn, 
2007; Dean and McMullen, 2007; Shepherd and Patzelt, 
2011). Among the key questions posed is an enquiry into the 
conditions and the policies that are useful for propagating 
sustainable entrepreneurship (J. K. Hall et al., 2010). In 
relation to this, one of the opportunities that the research 
points to is the intersection between sustainable 
entrepreneurship and financing. The review of the financing 
literature reveals that technology financing and green 
technology financing are almost similar during nascent stage. 
This can be explained because of the usage of technology as a 
main component for these ventures. 
Chapter two also integrates the literature on sustainable 
entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship financing revealing 
contradictions between and across these streams of literature. 
The literature review then introduces the theoretical lens to be 
utilised, starting with a review of the Resource Based View 
(RBV), followed by the corporate entrepreneurship literature 
before delving into the entrepreneurial competencies literature 
and the evolutionary entrepreneurial competency framework 
(Rasmussen et al., 2011, 2014) which is explained as the 
framework for this research. 
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Chapter three discusses the research methodology of the 
study. A qualitative approach was adopted for the research. 
The chapter also discusses the research design and 
justification for choosing the case study research strategy, 
determining the unit of analysis, the process of case selection, 
and issues of reliability and validity within qualitative research. 
The data collection strategy and the research tools used (e.g. 
semi-structured interviews, observation, documentation) to 
generate the data are explained. Ethical considerations and a 
section on researcher reflexivity are followed by an illustration 
of the data analysis method.  
Chapter four introduces the GTFS context and the cases. The 
first section of this chapter gives an account of the financing 
mechanism of the GTFS from the perspective of the program 
administrators, bankers etc. The next section introduces the 
cases and their GTFS financing. The last two sections in the 
chapter summarises the cases and analysis. 
Chapter five of the thesis presents the cross –case analysis 
and the findings of the analysis. In the first section it gives an 
overview of the cross-case analysis, and followed by a 
description of the findings. This shows evidence of the 
financing competence gap and its myriad complexities, 
comprising the multiple stakeholder financing priorities, bank 
knowledge asymmetry, green technology financing criteria and 
the contextual influence of the GTFS. Next, the findings 
chapter highlights the necessary entrepreneurial competencies 
needed to acquire financing and followed by the development 
paths based on the evolutionary competency framework. 
In chapter six, the findings are discussed in light of existing 
literature. This leads to a discussion of the proposed 
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contribution of the research. The main contribution of the 
research answers Hall et al.'s (2010) question about 
identifying what conditions and policies are necessary for 
sustainable entrepreneurship to thrive. The second is about 
the financing competency gap and the competency 
development. Next is the equifinality of the competency 
development paths, which suggests there is no single definite 
way to develop the entrepreneurial competencies that are 
necessary for established entrepreneurial firms to acquire 
green technology financing.  
Chapter seven concludes the thesis by summarizing the key 
findings and contributions including the policy 
recommendations, research limitations and finally lists 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to review the concept of sustainable 
entrepreneurship and unpack the fundamental issues 
underpinning this concept. The chapter also seeks to explain 
the suitability of entrepreneurial competencies as the 
theoretical lens for the research. The section begins with the 
literature on sustainable entrepreneurship. This is followed by 
the literature on entrepreneurship financing in order to explore 
and highlight the contextual similarities and dissimilarities 
between technology financing and green technology financing. 
The last section discusses the Resource Based View and 
entrepreneurial competencies literature. A chapter summary 
and conclusion is provided. 
2.2 Entrepreneurship and Sustainable Entrepreneurship 
The literature review begins by detailing seminal and 
contemporary articles in the field of entrepreneurship. This 
provides a definition of entrepreneurship, outlines the core of 
entrepreneurship research as being the study of opportunity 
exploitation, and details the legitimacy now attributed to the 
field of entrepreneurship. Subsequently, this review discusses 
the relationship between entrepreneurship and sustainable 
development. The research then expands the review further 
with a discussion of sustainable entrepreneurship specifically 





The field of entrepreneurship primarily sits at a “nexus of 
interlocking opportunities, enterprising individuals or teams, 
and mode of action within the overall context of dynamic 
environments” (Busenitz et al., 2003:28). This is depicted in 
Figure 1. 
In their seminal article, ‘The Promise’, Shane and 
Venkataraman (2000) outline three reasons why there is a 
need to study entrepreneurship. Firstly, they argue that 
through entrepreneurship, technical information can be 
converted into products and services. Secondly, through 
entrepreneurship market failures are discovered and can be 
mitigated. Finally, entrepreneurship drives innovation in 
products and processes and can be viewed as the engine 
driving the process of change.  
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Figure 1 Conceptual domain of entrepreneurship as a field (adapted from 
Busenitz et.al, 2003:297) 
 
However the study of entrepreneurship has not been without 
difficulties. Generally the literature reviewed argues that an 
agreed definition of entrepreneurship among scholars is 
missing (Busenitz et al., 2003; Low, 2001; Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000; Ucbasaran, Westhead, and Wright, 
2001). Furthermore it suggests that data is difficult to obtain, 
theory is underdeveloped and there is a tendency for findings 
to be similar to other fields of research (e.g. strategy) (Shane 
and Venkataraman, 2000). This is not surprising because the 
field of entrepreneurship is multi-disciplinary in nature and 
have applied various popular theories to the study of 
entrepreneurship phenomena (Zahra, 2007).  
More recently, entrepreneurship has been firmly recognised as 
a legitimate research field (Shepherd, 2015; Zahra and 
Wright, 2011). However, having achieved this legitimacy, 
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Shepherd (2015) reminds us of a need for entrepreneurship to 
prepare itself for threats and new opportunities to the field, 
including grand societal challenges such as climate change 
(Shepherd and Patzelt, 2011).  
In light of this opportunity it is argued that the field of 
entrepreneurship has a pivotal role to play in climate change 
mitigation by developing new and innovative business 
applications for the future (Cohen and Winn, 2007; Dean and 
McMullen, 2007; Hall et al., 2010; Shepherd and Patzelt, 
2011). According to Hall et al. (2010), there are numerous 
calls by scholars in sustainable development and climate 
change who look to entrepreneurship as a means to contribute 
solutions to environmental degradation. Taken together, this 
call has manifested itself as the emerging sub-field of 
sustainable entrepreneurship (Cohen and Winn, 2007; Dean 
and McMullen, 2007; Hall et al., 2010; Shepherd and Patzelt, 
2011). 
Sustainable entrepreneurship is a concept that champions 
entrepreneurship as a means to help to resolve environmental 
degradation and generate profit from it (Dean and McMullen, 
2007; Hall et al., 2010; Parrish, 2010), while also merging the 
various “social value” topics in relation to entrepreneurship 
(e.g.social entrepreneurship, environmental entrepreneurship) 
into one (Hockerts and Wüstenhagen, 2010). There are 
numerous definitions and terminologies for sustainable 
entrepreneurship, however, in sum sustainable 
entrepreneurship is about the reconfiguration of economic, 
social and environmental to a new value chain (Hockerts and 
Wüstenhagen, 2010) by infusing innovation, creativity 
(Kivimaa and Mickwitz, 2006) and creating new ventures to 
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solve the uncertainty surrounding environmental degradation 
(York and Venkataraman, 2010). These kind of integrated 
views are beginning to appear and adopted, this is evident 
from more recent studies (Hockerts and Wüstenhagen, 2010).  
A key review paper in this area of research is Hall, Daneke, & 
Lenox (2010) as it summarises extant sustainable 
entrepreneurship contributions whilst also detailing future 
research directions. In their assessment, Hall and colleagues 
(2010) highlighted the importance of sustainable 
entrepreneurship as part of the solution to solve sustainability 
issues (e.g. climate change) which they have coined as the 
“panacea hypothesis” (Thompson, Kiefer, & York, 2011). They 
do admit that this hypothesis is idealistic (Hall & Wagner, 
2012). Here they suggest that sustainable entrepreneurs are 
individuals and firms that through their core business enable 
both environmental and social progress (Schaltegger, Lu deke-
Freund, & Hansen, 2016). However the business case for of 
these entrepreneurial ventures is still important for the 
survival of those ventures (Majid & Koe, 2012). 
According to Hall and colleagues (2010) the area of 
sustainable entrepreneurship is still nascent but its importance 
for helping to tackle some of the pressing sustainability 
challenges of our times makes it critical. However other than 
its apparent appeal, there is still much to be understood about 
on the nature of sustainable entrepreneurship (Hall et al. 
2010). Hall et al. (2010) also notes that there are still major 
gaps on how the process of sustainable entrepreneurship will 
unfold as they argued below, 
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we have little understanding of how entrepreneurs will discover and 
develop these opportunities that lay beyond the pull of existing 
markets (Hall, Daneke and Lenox, 2010: 439) 
This paper highlights the central gaps in the sustainable 
entrepreneurship literature by outlining the future direction of 
sustainable entrepreneurship. Here Hall et al. (2010) poses 
five fundamental questions. The first is “under what conditions 
do we expect to see entrepreneurial ventures rather than 
incumbent firms provide sustainable products and services?” 
The second is “under what conditions do we expect to see 
entrepreneurs pursue sustainable ventures?” The third is 
“under what conditions can entrepreneurship simultaneously 
create economic growth, while advancing social and 
environmental objectives?” The fourth, related to the last 
question, under what conditions is entrepreneurship welfare-
creating versus welfare-destroying, especially once all 
externalities are factored in?” Finally the fifth “under what 
conditions does public policy positively influences the incidence 
of sustainable entrepreneurship?” 
According to Cohen and Winn (2007:31) there are “four types 
of market imperfections, (i.e., inefficient firms, externalities, 
flawed pricing mechanisms and information asymmetries) 
contributing to environmental degradation.” These market 
imperfections present numerous opportunities for 
entrepreneurs and the economy for example innovation in new 
technologies, business applications, and new job creation 
(Cohen and Winn, 2007; Dean and McMullen, 2007; Shepherd 
and Patzelt, 2011). 
Sustainable entrepreneurs who are able to identify these 
numerous opportunities (Cohen and Winn, 2007; Dean and 
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McMullen, 2007) will be able through specialised knowledge 
(Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001; Kuckertz and Wagner, 2010) and 
competencies (Parrish, 2010; Worthington and Patton, 2005) 
to exploit these opportunities (Shepherd and Patzelt, 2011) 
and fulfil the triple-bottom line (Elkington, 2004). 
Drilling down to conceptualise the essence of sustainable 
entrepreneurs, Linnanen (2002) is able to suggest a typology 
of sustainable entrepreneurs as depicted in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 Sustainable entrepreneurship typology (adopted from Linnanen, 
2002:78) 
 
Here Linnanen (2002) divides sustainable entrepreneurs into 
four categories. The first is the “self-employer”. Self-
employers are described as people diverging from the 
capitalistic path. They are satisfied with a minimum income 
level to sustain a reasonable level of living and are identified 
as being involved in nature-orientated business. The second 
type is “non-profit business”; they are more interested in 
influencing society towards protecting the environment without 
the financial performance objectives. The third type is the 
“opportunist” that views sustainable entrepreneurship 
ventures purely on economic consideration with a tendency to 
be involved in environmental technology. The last one is the 
successful idealist; they aspire to strike a balance between 




The idea that sustainable entrepreneurs have a definite role in 
climate mitigation has been well argued by scholars such as 
Cohen and Winn (2007); Dean and McMullen (2007); York and 
Venkataraman (2010) and Shepherd and Patzelt (2011), 
however is there a difference between sustainable 
entrepreneurs and conventional entrepreneurs? Parrish (2010) 
and Meek, Pacheco, and York (2010) seem to suggest there is 
a divergence between conventional entrepreneurship and 
sustainable entrepreneurship.  
Alluding to this notion, Parrish (2010) suggests that the source 
of this divergence is based on the reason the enterprise is 
created. In his study he takes the assumption that sustainable 
entrepreneurs put more emphasis on preserving nature than 
maximizing profits (Choi and Gray, 2008; Muñoz and Dimov, 
2014; Shepherd and Patzelt, 2011). Here he distinguishes 
sustainable entrepreneurs further by introducing a new type of 
reasoning; “perpetual reasoning” and “five principles of 
organisation design principles of resource perpetuation, benefit 
stacking, strategic satisficing, qualitative management, and 
worthy contribution” (pg.511). Parrish argues further that 
“distinct competencies” (pg.521) were needed to develop 
these design principles, maintain the original values and 
motives of the enterprise, and attain venture success.  
Another viewpoint that contributes to this notion of divergence 
is from Meek et al. (2010), which asserts that homogeneity 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) in certain societies will deter the 
creation of environmentally sustainable ventures. Therefore 
building on Parrish’s (2010) claim of divergence, sustainable 
entrepreneurship might be different from conventional 
entrepreneurship, and may be perceived as outliers in highly 
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conforming societies (Meek et al., 2010). Indeed this 
institutionalisation presents higher barriers for sustainable 
entrepreneurship (e.g. in financing), increasing the difficulty 
for entrepreneurs to exploit opportunities to address 
environmental challenges (Meek et al., 2010).  
According to York and Venkataraman (2010:450) the efforts to 
address environmental degradation have generally gathered 
around four reasons: “1) governmental regulations and control 
(the visible hand), 2) stakeholder action (activism in the form 
of non-governmental organisations and consumers), 3) ethical 
motivation (corporate social responsibility), 4) competitive 
advantage (efficiency and wealth generation through 
environmental innovations).” Elaborating on the role of 
sustainable entrepreneurs to address these environmental 
challenges, York and Venkataraman (2010:449) outlines a 
framework for entrepreneurship to “complement regulation, 
corporate social responsibility and activism in resolving 
environmental problems.” The main idea in the framework is 
for entrepreneurs to innovatively complement incumbent firms 




Figure 3 The opportunity space for sustainable entrepreneurship (adopted 
from York and Venkataraman, 2010:452) 
 
 
York and Venkataraman further argued that for-profit and 
nascent entrepreneurs will be more suited to exploit these 
opportunities with incumbents or established entrepreneurial 
firms lagging behind because of their organizational inertia. 
In an effort to conceptualize how sustainable entrepreneurship 
will thrive, Shepherd and Patzelt (2011) suggested the 
concept of feasibility and desirability to determine to act (or 
not to act) on sustainable entrepreneurship opportunities. 
Shepherd and Patzelt explain the concept of desirability 
centres around the notion of the motivation in preserving 
nature. While they define the concept of feasibility as the 
assessment of one’s competencies to exploit an opportunity 
based on sustainability ideals. They suggest that to develop 
these competencies might be harder because of the need to 




The idea of competencies development for established 
entrepreneurial firms to embark on sustainable 
entrepreneurship ventures had its origins in Hart's (1995) 
seminal article “Natural Resource Based View”. Here he 
proposed that established entrepreneurial firms need to 
develop the competencies to adhere to environmental 
regulations to maintain competitive advantage. Worthington 
and Patton (2005) took this work further in looking at 
established entrepreneurial firms transitioning to sustainable 
entrepreneurship ventures. They pointed to a need for 
behavioural change or development of organizational 
competencies to follow the environmental path. 
In an effort to further the understanding of the development of 
sustainable entrepreneurship ventures, Muñoz and Dimov 
(2014) propose two opportunity development pathways; the 
conformist and the insurgent. The conformist is someone who 
“operates in an enabling supporting context, characterised by 
dominance of supporting social context in the formulation of 
ideas, of value creation and an enabling business context in 
the deliberation of actions, and of intention and enabling 
business context in the pursuit of exchange relationships” 
(Muñoz and Dimov, 2014: 2). While the insurgent is someone 
whose “path operates against an establishment that is not 
conducive to sustainability ideals and is characterised by lack 
of explicit consideration of sustainability ideas and dominated 
by the absence of supportive social context in the deliberation 
of actions, and by intention and the absence of supporting 
context in the pursuit of exchange relationships” (Muñoz and 
Dimov, 2014: 3). Even though there is a stark difference 
between them, both of these conceptions suggest that 
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sustainability ideals are the main drivers of sustainability 
change.  
Although the literature on sustainable entrepreneurship is 
emerging, there are contradictions. Even though most of the 
studies in sustainable entrepreneurship are on nascent 
entrepreneurs, one such contradiction is the question of 
established entrepreneurial firms venturing into sustainable 
entrepreneurship ventures. Hockerts and Wüstenhagen (2010) 
suggest that established entrepreneurial firms would be able 
to venture into sustainable ventures faster due to their 
superior resources (e.g. financial and human capital). York and 
Venkataraman (2010) suggest otherwise, pointing to an 
element of inertia or a competency trap (Levitt and March, 
1988) making it difficult for established entrepreneurial firms 
to move into sustainable ventures. This contradiction has also 
manifested itself empirically in the context of established 
entrepreneurial firms trying to acquire green technology 
financing in the GTFS. 
The contradictions indicate that there is a divergence in the 
way sustainable entrepreneurs need to run their business, 
which points to “distinct competencies” for sustainable 
entrepreneurship venture success (Hart, 1995; Parrish, 2010; 
Worthington and Patton, 2005). In this case what is missing is 
the development of these new competencies in the context of 
sustainable entrepreneurship in a developing country (Jamali 
and Mirshak, 2007). 
Together these issues point to the direction of Hall et al.’s 
(2010) call to ask fundamental questions about research in 
sustainable entrepreneurship. This is the focus here: under 
what conditions and policies would sustainable 
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entrepreneurship thrive? Specifically, under what conditions 
would established entrepreneurial firms be able to acquire 
green technology financing in the context of the GTFS?  
The next section will look at this question from the perspective 
of entrepreneurship financing,  
2.3 Sustainable entrepreneurship and financing 
In this second part of the literature review, the focus is turned 
to relevant articles on sustainable entrepreneurship and 
resource acquisition with a particular focus on financing. To 
fortify this discussion further, the research reviewed below is 
expanded to technology financing (focusing on green related 
technologies). The contextual differences from one industry to 
another industry are also explored in this part of the literature 
review. The articles selected are based on seminal articles on 
entrepreneurship financing and the articles discussed in 
section 2.2 
One of the key resources required for venture creation and 
operation is financial capital (Brinckmann, Salomo, and 
Gemuenden, 2009; Cassar, 2004). The importance of 
entrepreneurship financing is all encompassing and cuts across 
various fields of operation. The significance of research on 
entrepreneurship financing has been given much attention 
over the years (Kuratko, 2006) with the traditional research 
focus being on the aspect of obtaining financing (Brinckmann 
et al., 2009). 
Current literature on entrepreneurship financing suggest that 
one of the biggest obstacle to venture creation and growth is 
access to financial capital (Cassar, 2004; Colombo and Grilli, 
2006; Kerr and Nanda, 2011; Van Auken, 2001; Zhang, 
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Souitaris, Soh, and Wong, 2008). Resolving financing 
constraints for entrepreneurs is an important agenda for policy 
makers worldwide (Kerr and Nanda, 2011). This is also 
reflected in the academic literature on entrepreneurship 
financing, with the topic of financing constraints being 
combined with policy components in them (e.g. Cassar, 2004; 
Kerr and Nanda, 2011; Van Auken, 2001), which resonate with 
the context of this research.  
In a cross-country study by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and 
Maksimovic (2006) on determinants of financing obstacles, 
empirical data has shown that financing obstacles in Malaysia 
are low, which means access to financing in the country is 
above average in terms of world benchmarking. However, in 
the case of green technology, a recent study from Malaysia by 
Tan, Ang, Chung and Pek, (2013) suggests that in general, 
renewable or green energy projects face difficulty to acquire 
financing and bank loans because of the high risk involved. 
According to them this difficulty is because of the lack of 
technical knowledge among the financiers to evaluate this high 
risk ventures. This indicates some evidence of contextual 
difference in terms of the green technology financing 
environment in terms of evaluation. 
In addressing these issues, the GTFS has put in place technical 
evaluation mechanisms, government guarantees and interest 
rebates (Hansen and Nygaard, 2014; Wong et al., 2015). 
However in spite of these efforts, the funds have been slow 
and restrictive (Maulud and Saidi, 2012). This dilemma has not 
only afflicted nascent entrepreneurs but also established 




This might be explained by building on Parrish’s (2010) claim 
of divergence, in which sustainable entrepreneurship might be 
different from conventional entrepreneurship, and sustainable 
entrepreneurs may be perceived as outliers in highly 
conforming societies (Meek et al., 2010) as increasing the 
difficulty for entrepreneurs to exploit opportunities to address 
environmental challenges (Meek et al., 2010). This is also 
supported by Linnanen (2002) and Choi and Gray (2008) who 
argue that conventional and sustainable entrepreneurs are not 
on equal footing in respect of barriers to finance. 
In an attempt to understand these financing challenges to 
sustainable entrepreneurship, this research studies whether 
the notion of financing requirements are specific according to 
sectors or context as suggested by Cassar (2004); if so, the 
question is what precisely is different? The research 
approaches this by reviewing the entrepreneurship financing 
literature on technology financing to discover dissimilarities 
with green technology financing.  
The literature on technology financing, technology based firms 
(TBFs) and new technology based firms (NTBFs) is well 
documented (e.g. Van Auken, 2001, 2005; Westhead et.al, 
1997; Westhead, et al., 2011). The benefits that technology-
based firms bring to the development of the economy and 
their difficulty to acquire financing is also well researched. 
However there are arguments that the stakes for sustainable 
entrepreneurship compared to technology based firms are 
much higher with the spectre of climate change and its effects 
becoming more prevalent (Stern, 2008). 
Looking at technology-based firms, according to Van Auken 
(2001:241) owners of technology-based firms face more 
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constraints due to “high risk, apprehension of investors, and 
the limited financial experience of the owner”, in other words 
insufficient financing skills. This concurs with Westhead et al.'s 
(1997) assertion that technology small firms will be viewed as 
a higher risk compared to small firms in general.  
Potential investors especially traditional financial institutions 
like banks (Kerr and Nanda, 2011) will have difficulty in 
evaluating the feasibility and viability of new ventures, 
primarily because of the lack or no track record, and the 
seemingly high risk of the technology or products (Kerr and 
Nanda, 2011; Zhang et al., 2008). This is further compounded 
by the presence of information asymmetry (Westhead, Wright, 
and McElwee, 2011) between the potential investors and the 
entrepreneurs, especially for high- tech firms (Baum and 
Silverman, 2004; Van Auken, 2001; Zhang et al., 2008).  
Studies by Praag, Wit, and Bosma (2005) and Colombo and 
Grilli (2006) provide yet more evidence of the existence of an 
information asymmetry between financiers and owners of 
small technology-based firms. According to Praag et al. 
(2005), the information asymmetry centres on unobservable 
and unverifiable information such as profit margins, 
technology feasibility. The risk to finance NTBFs is attributed 
to this information asymmetry (Westhead, Wright and 
McElwee, 2011).  
Van Auken (2005:95) argues that the risk of the firm is one of 
the most important contributing factors influencing both the 
“availability” and “potential sources of capital”. He suggests 
that the potential sources and the availability of financing will 
be lower if the risk of the firm is higher (Van Auken, 2005). 
Concerns about cash flow problems combined with limited 
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experience of raising capital by the owners of technology-
based firms (Van Auken, 2001, 2005) contribute to magnify 
the risk. 
Wiser and Pickle's (1998) research on financing investments in 
renewable energy suggest that policy will have implications on 
the risk of financing renewable energy. As an example a short 
feed in tariff contract will raise the risk of the renewable 
energy project. The other notion that Wiser and Pickle (1998) 
illustrated in their study is a supply side problem, with the 
renewable energy project risks were perceived as very high 
and that the financial community did not have the 
competencies (Meuleman, Amess, Wright et al., 2009) to 
evaluate renewable energy resource risks (e.g. wind, 
biomass). Looking at the supply side of financing, Bonnet and 
Wirtz (2012) suggest that rather than an information 
asymmetry problem the dilemma is a knowledge asymmetry 
between the banks and the entrepreneurs. Thus, even if the 
entrepreneur is telling the whole story the banks are not able 
evaluate the facts because of the deep knowledge asymmetry. 
This corresponds to Meek et al.'s (2010) notion of institution 
as barriers in sustainable entrepreneurship ventures, in this 
case the financial institutions act as barriers.  
These risks and the knowledge asymmetry inadvertently 
results in more costly financing compared to traditional 
generation sources (Wiser and Pickle, 1998). In a more recent 
study by Kerr and Nanda (2011), extremely capital-intensive 
and new technologies like clean energy projects (e.g. wind 
turbines, biofuel refineries) would lie in the top right-hand 
corner of Figure 4.  
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Figure 4 Two dimensional space for entering businesses (adopted from 
Kerr and Nanda, 2011:97) 
 
Therefore in the case of entrepreneurship financing we can 
draw similarities between the barriers faced by sustainable 
entrepreneurship ventures and TBFs/NTBFs, such as high risk, 
low confidence of investors because of information and 
knowledge asymmetry, and the perceived inexperience of the 
entrepreneurs in financial management (Linnanen, 2002; Van 
Auken, 2001). Resembling TBFs/NTBFs, most sustainable 
entrepreneurship ventures also rely on technological 
innovations (e.g. renewable energy, water purification) to 
address environmental degradation which brings with it 
financing challenges. In light of these similarities, one might 
wonder if there is no difference between TBF/NTBF ventures 
and sustainable entrepreneurship technology financing.  
However, the conclusion is based on nascent entrepreneurs; 
the context of this research is established entrepreneurial 
firms. In the case of established entrepreneurial firms, their 
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excellent track record and management are important aspects 
of financing which would suggest that obtaining financing 
would be easier for them (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Van 
Auken, 2001; Zhang et al., 2008). A recent study by Parker 
(2013) also suggests that based on established 
entrepreneurial firms’ performance trajectory, financing risk to 
financial institutions would be less than expected even when 
they switch industries. 
Further to this, the GTFS context might contribute to the 
financing differences because of the social and institutional 
context (Rasmussen et al., 2014). Research into this 
contextual difference corresponds to Zahra and Wright's 
(2011) suggestion of the importance to understand the 
contextual influences on the process of new venture creation 
and development. By gaining this understanding, will lead to 
better and accurate policies to support new (sustainable) 
entrepreneurship ventures. 
These contradictions and contextual differences highlight a 
knowledge gap, not only on the financing differences but also 
to what kind of competencies (Parrish, 2010; Worthington and 
Patton, 2005) are necessary to acquire financing because of 
these differences? The GTFS mirrors these contradictions, with 
mixed success for established entrepreneurial firms in 
acquiring green technology financing. Therefore the GTFS 
context is fertile ground for answering Hall et al.'s (2010:445-
446) fundamental questions, “under what conditions do we 
expect to see entrepreneurs pursue sustainable ventures?” 
and “under what conditions does public policy positively 
influence the incidence of sustainable entrepreneurship?” 
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In the next section, the research reviews the Resource Based 
View (RBV) as a potential theoretical lens to investigate these 
questions.  
2.4 Resource Base View Theory (RBV) 
In this third part of the literature review applicability of the 
RBV as the potential theoretical lens was explored. The idea of 
the RBV as the theoretical lens came about from the second 
part of literature review with the idea that to acquire financing 
in the context of the GTFS becomes a competitive advantage 
for firms. 
Since Penrose’s “Theory of the Growth of the Firm” publication 
in 1959, there has been a plethora of discussion pertaining to 
the relationship between RBV and the firm. However it was 
Barney (1991) that contrasted the difference of assumptions 
between Porter’s firm competitive position and the RBV. Here, 
the key assumption of firm resource heterogeneity and 
immobility (Barney,1991;Wernerfelt,1984) defines the 
theoretical framework of the resource based view theory 
(RBV), which will result in the sustainable competitive 
advantage of the firm. 
It is a manifestation of these assumptions which, according to 
Barney (1991), results in the firm resources being (i) valuable 
(rising of revenues or lowering of costs); (ii) rare (it is unique 
among firms in that market); inimitable (it cannot be copied); 
and (iv) non-substitutable (other resources do not provide the 
same functionality). The firm’s resources are the fundamental 
elements of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 
1984). Barney (1991:101) defines firm resources to include 
“all assets, capabilities, organisational processes, firm 
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attributes, and knowledge”. He groups them into three main 
categories: “physical capital resources, human capital 
resources and organisational capital resources” (pg.101). This 
is also echoed by Mahoney and Pandian (1992) and Amit and 
Schoemaker (1993). Therefore, according to the RBV, a 
resource encompasses “anything which could be thought of as 
a strength or weakness of a given firm” (Wernerfelt, 1984: 
192). 
Over the years the RBV has evolved. In an effort to expand 
the RBV, Amit and Schoemaker (1993) introduced the concept 
of strategic industry factor at the industry level and strategic 
assets at the firm level, both of which are comprised of 
resource and capabilities. They also suggested and expanded 
the original attributes of valuable, rare, inimitable and non-
substitutable to complementarity, scarcity, low tradability, 
inimitability, limited substitutability, appropriability, durability 
and overlap in strategic industry factors.  
Mahoney and Pandian (1992) coined RBV as a useful 
conversation because it reconciled various strategic 
management literatures (e.g. Barney, Ketchen, and Wright, 
2011; Wright and Marlow, 2012). One of the reasons for this is 
that, as Peteraf (1993) argues, RBV has explanatory powers 
as a corporate theory in terms of range diversification from 
related constrained and conglomerate form. This was further 
strengthen by Amit and Schoemaker (1993), who added 
behavioural decision-making biases and organisational 
implementation in the context of the firm’s resources and 
capabilities, making RBV more robust. In further fortifying the 
argument for a RBV model for sustainable competitive 
advantage, Peteraf (1993), building on the two original key 
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assumptions of resource heterogeneity and immobility, 
proposed a RBV model with heterogeneity as the cornerstone 
of RBV while adding on two new elements which are ex-ante 
limits competition and ex-post limits competition.  
As the potential theoretical lens for this research, RBV and 
entrepreneurship share the same unit of analysis which is the 
resources (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001). The ability of 
acquiring resources and managing existing resource is by itself 
an important resource for entrepreneurial firms and is 
considered heterogeneous (Barney, 1991; Alvarez and 
Busenitz, 2001). This heterogeneity relates to the fact that in 
order to configure these resources to exploit these 
opportunities, it is the entrepreneurial specialist knowledge 
that gives them the competency to exploit these opportunities 
(Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001; Man, Lau, and Chan, 2002). 
Therefore by adopting the RBV, the research would be able to 
identify the resources needed for established entrepreneurial 
firms to acquire green technology financing. This is further 
complemented by Wernerfelt's (1995) suggestion to look at 
resources in detail, with the notion that strategy should be 
based on differences between firms.  
In assessing the RBV after 20 years, the critical question of 
where these resources originate from remains unanswered, 
that remains a major critique to the RBV (Barney et al., 2011; 
Wright and Marlow, 2012). Another source of criticism is the 
length of resource development, with the accepted norm that 
the development of resources is long-term, with the question 
of short and mid-term development of resources still not 
studied (Barney, 2001). 
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While adopting the RBV as the theoretical lens of the research 
would identify the resources needed to acquire green 
technology financing, it leaves, the question of origins of the 
resources unanswered. In light of the need to identify and 
understand the development of these resources in the context 
of the GTFS, the review now turns to the corporate 
entrepreneurship literature. This will be reviewed in the next 
section.  
2.5 Corporate Entrepreneurship 
According to Sharma and Chrisman (1999:18), “Corporate 
entrepreneurship is the process whereby an individual or a 
group of individuals, in association with an existing 
organization, create a new organization or instigate renewal or 
innovation within that organization”. The creation of these new 
ventures will involve the creation of new competencies or 
improve existing ones and can shape better competitive 
strategies (Zahra, Nielsen, & Bogner, 1999). Corporate 
entrepreneurship takes various forms such as new internal 
businesses, corporate joint ventures, corporate and university 
spin-offs and start-ups by former employees (Phan, Wright, 
Ucbasaran, & Tan, 2009).  
In order for corporate entrepreneurship to take place there are 
organizational antecedents that need to be fulfilled. This 
include rewards, top management support, resources, 
organizational boundaries and autonomy (Kuratko, Hornsby, & 
Goldsby, 2004). A recent significant development within the 
field of corporate entrepreneurship is the concept of strategic 
entrepreneurship. Strategic entrepreneurship concerns itself 
with the question on “how do firms create and sustain a 
competitive advantage while simultaneously identifying and 
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exploiting new opportunities?”(Hitt, Ireland, Sirmon, & 
Trahms, 2011:57). More and more strategic entrepreneurship 
has been viewed as a source for competitive advantage 
(Ireland, Covin, & Kuratko, 2009). According to Hitt and 
colleagues, there is a need for new competencies in order to 
embark on corporate entrepreneurship. This resonates with 
Zahra, Nielsen & Bogner (1999) that assert the need for 
competency development in corporate entrepreneurship in 
order for established entrepreneurial firms to be successful in 
their new ventures. This resonates with the context of the 
research, where the established entrepreneurial firms new 
ventures into the green space also requires new competencies 
(Worthington & Patton, 2005) 
Current corporate entrepreneurship literature highlights the 
link between competency development and knowledge (Hitt, 
Ireland, Camp, & Sexton, 2001; Lei, Hitt, & Bettis, 1996) and 
external context (Zahra & Covin, 1995) and offers frameworks 
to identify entrepreneurial competencies necessary for venture 
creation with one such framework is Hayton & Kelley (2006) 
competency based framework for corporate entrepreneurship. 
However similar to the discussion of the RBV, this still does 
not answer the origins of the competencies.  
Here Hitt et al. (2011) in their concept of strategic 
entrepreneurship suggested that the mechanism to develop 
these new competencies requires the process of resource 
orchestration with inputs from environmental factors, 
organizational resources and individual resources. Taking a 
leaf from these developments in corporate entrepreneurship, 
Rasmussen, Mosey, & Wright (2011) argued for an 
evolutionary perspective on the development entrepreneurial 
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competencies. Rasmussen and colleagues then furthered this 
research in 2014 with arguments on the influence of context to 
this evolutionary perspective and proposing an evolutionary 
competency framework. This evolutionary competency 
framework will be discussed further in the next section. 
2.6 Entrepreneurial Competencies 
Before discussing further the evolutionary competency 
framework the concept of entrepreneurial competencies should 
first be explained. The concept of entrepreneurial 
competencies is a widely used concept across various sectors 
(Mitchelmore and Rowley, 2010). The conception of 
competencies have been used interchangeably with resources, 
skills and capabilities in academic studies (Colombo and Grilli, 
2005; Rasmussen et al., 2011). There are several definitions 
of competencies that have been put forth, such as Brinckmann 
et.al (2009:224) citing Boyatzis (1982); Chandler and Hanks 
(1994); Man, Lau, and Chan (2001) offers this definition of 
competency, “the degree of fit between the demands of a task 
and the abilities of the person or group that fulfils the task”, 
while another definition is Danneel's (2002:1102) definition 
that a competency is an “ability to accomplish something by 
using a set of material and immaterial resources”.  
According to Mitchelmore and Rowley (2010) the source of 
these various definitions among scholars is a legacy of the 
study of entrepreneurship, which itself has different definitions 
and interpretations. This is also a reflection of the importance 
of entrepreneurial competencies in firm performance and has 
been supported by several authors such as Man et al. (2002) 
and Rangone (1999). For instance, recognising this importance 
to firm performance, Brinckmann et al. (2009) suggested that 
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the competency based approach be used to expand the 
research area of entrepreneurship financing. Here Brinckmann 
and colleagues focused specifically into the financial 
management competencies of companies to acquire financing. 
According to Man et al. (2002) and Martin and Staines (1994) 
both citing Mole et.al (1993) explains that there are three 
approaches to study competency; from the inputs; from the 
process or the outcomes. Even though the studies on 
entrepreneurial competencies are skewed towards 
individualism, Brinckmann et al. (2009) and Rasmussen et al. 
(2011) claim that for high-technology firms, entrepreneurial 
teams are needed. For instance in Rasmussen et al. (2014) 
the entrepreneurial team was the focus in accumulating 
relevant competencies that are necessary to gain “credibility 
threshold” (Vohora, Wright, and Lockett, 2004:164) for the 
new venture. 
As the research is focused on established entrepreneurial 
firms, the idea of competencies in corporate venturing is 
relevant to the discussion. Here, Hayton and Kelley's (2006) 
competency based framework suggest entrepreneurial 
competencies can be accumulated at the firm level from 
individuals, which would relate to Barney's (1991) assertion 
that resources are elements in the firm. This points to 
Mitchelmore and Rowley's (2010) two sets of competencies, 
entrepreneurial competencies and functional competencies 
(skills) which is supported by Teece, (2014) and Zahra and 
George, (2002). 
The combination of these various definitions and 
interpretations, the relationship between entrepreneurial 
competencies and firm performance (e.g. acquire financing), 
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the notion of building blocks of venture creation as suggested 
by Mitchelmore and Rowley (2010); Teece (2014); Zahra and 
George (2002) illustrates the dynamism of entrepreneurial 
competencies. This, and together with what has been 
discussed in section 2.1 and 2.2 gives grounds to suggest the 
competency based approach as the most suitable theoretical 
lens for the research.  
The next section will discuss the several frameworks based on 
entrepreneurial competencies that might be applied for this 
research. 
2.6.1 Frameworks 
There have been several frameworks that have been put forth 
on entrepreneurial competencies, one of the first is Man et 
al.'s (2002) conceptualization of a SME competitiveness model 




Figure 5 SME competitiveness model (adapted from Man et al., 2002:134) 
 
Focusing on the individual entrepreneur, Man et al. (2002), 
conceptualises that the characteristics of entrepreneurial 
competencies are high level characteristics. These high level 
characteristics consist of “personality traits”, “skills” and 
“knowledge” (pg.133). According to them the accumulation of 
these characteristics results in the ability to competently 
perform his job or task. Table 2 below outlines the six major 








Table 2 Competency areas (adapted from Man and Lau,2002:132) 
Competency area Behavioural focus 
Opportunity competencies Competencies related to recognizing and developing 
market opportunities through various means 
Relationship competencies Competencies related to person to person or individual 
to group based interactions, e.g. building a context of 
cooperation and trust, using contacts and connections, 
persuasive ability, communication and interpersonal 
skill 
Conceptual competencies Competencies related to different conceptual abilities 
which are reflected in the behaviours of the entrepreneur 
e.g. decision skills, absorbing and understanding 
complex information and risk taking and innovativeness 
Organizing competencies Competencies related to the organization of different 
internal and external human, physical, financial and 
technological resources, including team building, 
leading employees, training and controlling 
Strategic competencies Competencies related to setting, evaluating and 
implementing the strategy of the firm 
Commitment competencies Competencies that drive the entrepreneur to move ahead 
with the business 
 
Another notable framework is Hayton and Kelley's (2006) 
competency based framework on corporate entrepreneurship. 
In their competency based framework they discuss four 
entrepreneurial competencies necessary for established 
entrepreneurial firms to start new ventures. These four 










Table 3 Entrepreneurial competencies and attributes (compiled from 




1 Innovating function of domain specific knowledge, 
cognitive ability, creativity and openness to new 
experience 
2 Brokering combination of analogical reasoning skills, 
personal confidence, credibility, networking 
skills, curiosity, creativity and intrinsic 
motivation 
3 Championing emotional intelligence, transformational 
leadership skills, broad organizational 
experience, credibility and trustworthiness 
4 Sponsoring Deep technological and business knowledge, risk 
tolerance, persistence and passion, and 
transformational leadership 
 
Two of the most recent works on entrepreneurial competencies 
are by Rasmussen et al. (2011, 2014). The setting of their 
research is university spin-off’s (USO’s). They propose an 
evolutionary entrepreneurial competency development 
framework. This framework utilises Hayton and Kelly (2006) 
competency based framework on corporate entrepreneurship 
and the evolutionary perspective from Nelson and Winter 
(1982) to understand how competencies develop. They 
propose that the development of competencies takes place 
over time, and is influenced by their starting point, and that it 
is possible they need to break from an existing path (Ahuja 
and Katila, 2004). A significant attribute of this framework is 
that the competencies are deemed to be developed once they 
have passed a critical juncture (Vohora et.al, 2004) in the 
venture phase development.  
In Rasmussen’s et.al (2011, 2014) framework they have 
identified three significant entrepreneurial competencies in 
venture development:  
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1) developing a viable business opportunity (opportunity 
development), 
2) championing individuals that provide meaning and energy 
to the entrepreneurial process (championing), and 
3) accessing resources necessary to develop the new venture 
(resource leveraging). 
Here Rasmussen et.al (2014) observes the significance 
influence of the local environment in their case the department 
level of the universities towards the development of 
entrepreneurial competencies. However a critique of this 
framework that the framework does not provide insights on 
how to measure these competencies (Morris, Webb, Fu, & 
Singhal, 2013) 
The next section will discuss the applicability of these 
frameworks for this research. 
2.6.2 Applicability of the frameworks 
The three entrepreneurial competencies based frameworks 
that are being reviewed in this research were developed in 
various contexts. Man et al. (2002) studied SME performance, 
while Hayton and Kelley (2006) focused on corporate 
entrepreneurship and Rasmussen et al. (2011, 2014) 
considered university spin-offs while developing their 
evolutionary competency framework. The challenge is 
translating the lessons from these contexts for application to 
other contexts.  
The empirical subject of interest for this thesis is established 
entrepreneurial firms, and their success or failure to secure 
green technology financing. The justification of this topic for 
further study is supported by a gap in extant knowledge about 
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venture creation in the sustainable entrepreneurship field. The 
contextual influence in the research is quite notable with a 
multiple stakeholder involvement between government, banks 
and established entrepreneurial firms. However the research 
frames the problem as an issue of venture development which 
is in line with the framework proposed by Rasmussen et al. 
(2014). The evolutionary approach to competency 
development that their framework proposes would alleviate 
the predicament of understanding how the resources are 
developed (Barney, 2001). In their research on the influence 
of university departments on university spin-off, the context 
was taken into account, which also resonates with the current 
research.  
Therefore based on the research aims and the literature on 
both the RBV and entrepreneurial competencies literature, the 
research proposes to use Rasmussen et al.'s (2011,2014) 
evolutionary competency based framework as the theoretical 
lens of this research.  
2.7 Summary and conclusion 
The role of sustainable entrepreneurship in mitigating climate 
change has created various research opportunities. This has 
raised fundamental questions about venture creation in 
sustainable entrepreneurship (J. K. Hall et al., 2010). One 
fundamental question that the research has reviewed in this 
chapter, is the contradictory viewpoints about established 
entrepreneurial firms’ entry into sustainable entrepreneurship 
ventures (Hockerts and Wüstenhagen, 2010; York and 
Venkataraman, 2010). This divergence has manifested itself 
empirically in the context of the GTFS, with some established 
entrepreneurial firms being financed and some being non-
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financed. The entrepreneurship financing literature points to a 
difference in the financing context (Cassar, 2004) while the 
sustainable entrepreneurship literature points to institutional 
influences (Meek et al., 2010) and “distinct competencies” 
(Parrish, 2010; Worthington and Patton, 2005) to bridge the 
divergence between the context and influences. 
Therefore the research gap about how venture creation in 
sustainable entrepreneurship occurs, entwined with the 
empirical dilemma of established entrepreneurial firms not 
being able to acquire green technology financing, has been 
translated into the research question: “How do established 
entrepreneurial firms develop entrepreneurial competencies to 
acquire green technology financing?” 
As explained above, the research will use the evolutionary 
entrepreneurial competency framework (Rasmussen et al., 
2011, 2014) as the theoretical lens to investigate these 
question. In the next chapter the research will explain the 




CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes and explains the methodology deployed 
in this study and details the theories underpinning the choice 
of methods.  
This chapter is divided into seven major sections. It begins by 
restating the research aims and research questions, followed 
by an overview of the paradigms in research, justification for 
the chosen methodology, the research design, data collection, 
analysis and concludes with a summary of the chapter. 
3.2 Research aims 
The aim of the research is to explore and understand the 
conditions and policies under which established 
entrepreneurial firms are able to acquire green technology 
financing in the GTFS context. This has been translated into 
the research question: “How do established entrepreneurial 
firms develop the entrepreneurial competencies to acquire 
green technology financing in the GTFS context?” This 
research question has been divided into three sub-questions: 
(i) How does the GTFS context influence the 
deployment of competencies by established 
entrepreneurial firms? 
(ii)  What entrepreneurial competencies are necessary 
for established entrepreneurial firms to acquire 
green technology financing in this context?  
(iii) How are these competencies developed? 
69 
 
3.3 Research philosophy 
The following section discusses the concerns of research 
philosophy regarding how to define ontology: “what is the 
nature of reality?” and epistemology: “what is knowing?” and 
“how is knowledge constructed?”  
According to Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2009:107) 
research philosophy relates to “the development and the 
nature of knowledge.” This highlights the importance of the 
research philosophy, which is essential for understanding the 
creation of knowledge.  
A discussion of research philosophy is not complete without 
considering the research paradigm. So what is a paradigm? 
According to Lincoln and Guba (1994:107)  
a paradigm may be viewed as a set of basic beliefs (or metaphysics) 
that deals with ultimates, or first principles. It represents a worldview 
that defines, for its holder, the nature of the world, the individual’s 
place in it, and the range of possible relationships to that world and its 
parts, as for example, cosmologies and theologies do. The beliefs are 
basic in the sense that they must be accepted simply on faith (however 
well argued); there is no way to establish their ultimate truthfulness.  
In 1979, Burrell and Morgan introduced a paradigm typology 
consisting of the functionalist paradigm, followed by the 
interpretivist paradigm, the radical structuralist paradigm and 
lastly the radical humanist paradigm. Table 4 provides brief 
explanations of the paradigms. 
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“The functionalist paradigm is concerned with providing 
explanations of the status quo, social order, social 
integration, consensus, need satisfaction, and rational 
choice. It seeks to explain how the individual elements of 




“The interpretivist paradigm seeks explanation within the 
frame of reference of the perspective men gives meaning 
to society and institutions”. 
Radical Structuralist  
 
“The radical structuralist paradigm has a view of society 
and organisations with emphasis on the need to 
overthrow or transcend the limitations placed on existing 
social and organisational arrangements. The focus is 
primarily on economic power relationships”. 
Radical Humanist  
 
 
“The radical humanist seeks radical change, 
emancipation, and potentiality, and stresses the role that 
different social and organisational forces play in 
understanding change”. 
 
In the case of management research there are four major 
research philosophy positions the first is positivism, followed 
by realism, interpretivism and finally pragmatism (Saunders et 
al., 2009). 
In relation to the aims of the research and the exploratory 
nature of the current research, an interpretivist approach is 




Table 5 Interpretivist approach attributes (adapted from Saunders et al. 
2008:119) 
Interpretivist Approach Attributes 
Ontology Socially constructed, subjective, may change, multiple 
Epistemology Subjective meanings and social phenomena. Focus upon 
details of situation, a reality behind these details, 
subjective meanings motivating actions 
Axiology Research is value bound, the researcher is part of what is 




Small samples, in-depth investigations, qualitative 
In line with the interpretivist approach, the research will adopt 
a qualitative methodology, as discussed in the next section.  
3.4 Qualitative methodology 
Sustainable entrepreneurship is a nascent field with numerous 
fundamental issues meriting in-depth exploration. The 
research question was derived from gaps identified in the 
literature combined with prior knowledge about the GTFS 
context. The aim of the research as stated in section (3.2) is 
to explore and understand under what conditions and policies 
will established entrepreneurial firms are able to acquire green 
technology financing in the GTFS context. To further this 
understanding, the research adopts a qualitative research 
methodology.  
There are various definitions of qualitative research. According 
to Lincoln and Denzin (1994:2), the qualitative research 
methodology presents us with a picture of the investigation 
which is likely to be involved:  
Qualitative research is a field of inquiry in its own right. It crosscuts 
disciplines, fields and subject matter. A complex interconnected family 
of terms, concepts, and assumptions surround the term qualitative 
research. It is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. 
It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make world 
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visible. Qualitative research also involves the studied use and 
collection of a variety of empirical materials. 
An important characteristic of qualitative research is the 
importance of the natural settings and utilising various 
interpretive methods to comprehend thoroughly the object of 
research (Lincoln and Denzin, 1994).  
The justification for the decision to adopt a qualitative 
approach was based on the exploratory nature of the research, 
with the GTFS still being new and the multiple perspectives 
from the various stakeholders justifies the qualitative 
approach. This was further justified by recent calls  
to enhance the realism of entrepreneurship research by interacting 
with and learning from practising entrepreneurs and offering 
grounded explanations that will provide richer and more precise 
insights (Zahra and Wright 2011:73). 
The dynamism that encapsulates entrepreneurship (Neergaard 
and Ulhoi, 2007) is mirrored in sustainable entrepreneurship 
research (York and Venkataraman, 2010). The addition of an 
underexplored developing country context makes it difficult to 
offer predictions and hypothesis. Furthermore the dynamism 
of entrepreneurial competencies as explained in the previous 
chapter (see section 2.5) makes the competency development 
process difficult to predict and requires detailed descriptions. 
Therefore, a quantitative research approach at this juncture 
would not have adequately captured the dynamics of 
entrepreneurship activity in this context. Indeed a quantitative 




This argument resonates with Gartner and Birley (2002:388) 
who advocate qualitative approaches to studying the 
entrepreneurial phenomenon  
There is something missing here. Some questions simply do not get 
asked, or cannot be asked, when undertaking quantitative studies. It is 
this conundrum (What is missing?) that qualitative research might be 
better suited for. How then can these ‘‘missing’’ questions be asked?  
The field of sustainable entrepreneurship is a nascent field; 
few studies consider the intersection between sustainable 
entrepreneurship venture creation, policy and financing. This 
gives credence to qualitative research that aims to explore 
“uncharted depths” (Neergaard and Ulhoi, 2007:4). 
Numerous entrepreneurship scholars have studied 
entrepreneurial competencies (e.g. Ahuja and Katila, 2004; 
Man and Lau, 2000; Rasmussen, Mosey, and Wright, 2011, 
2014) using qualitative methods. By using a qualitative 
approach they were able to delve deeper into the 
entrepreneurial development process and better understand 
the context. As a result such studies were able to identify 
specific entrepreneurial competencies for the context 
(Rasmussen et al., 2011, 2014).  
Thus, in line with the aims of the research, the decision to 
adopt a qualitative research approach was based on the need 
to generate rich, detailed descriptions of experiences of the 
GTFS financing process from the perspectives of multiple 
stakeholders. In order to acquire these datasets, the research 
used a multiple approach to collect rich data including semi-
structured interviews, non-participant observations and 
document collection This provides the opportunity to ascribe 
actual actions in a real-life context (Gephart, 2004).  
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3.5 Theory Building 
The importance of theory to the academic realm is of absolute 
importance, to the extent that scholars like Corley and Gioia 
(2011) have termed them as “currency” of the realm. Based 
on Whetten's (1989) seminal article a theory “comprises of the 
factors that should be logically considered as part of the 
explanation of the social or individual phenomena of interest, 
the relationship between these factors and the rationale 
(psychological, economic, or social dynamics) which 
constitutes the theory's assumptions — the theoretical glue 
that seals them together” (pg.489-490). Another definition of 
theory offered by Corley and Gioia (2011:12) is “theory is a 
statement of concepts and their interrelationships that shows 
how and/or why a phenomenon occurs.”  
In research there is a dichotomy between what is termed 
theory application (deductive approach) and what is termed as 
theory building (inductive approach). The former is related to 
positivism and the latter to interpretivism with both having 
their own merits to be adopted in a research setting (Saunders 
et al., 2009). 
In general theory application is to apply an existing theory, 
develop, and testing the hypothesis (Saunders et al., 2008). 
In terms of applying theory application to the field of 
sustainable entrepreneurship, this could explain the 
relationship between existing constructs and sustainable 
entrepreneurship. Furthermore by applying a theory to a new 
setting such as sustainable entrepreneurship, adds on the 
utility of the theory (Corley and Gioia, 2011). While the theory 
also acts as a guide for new research avenues for the new field 
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(e.g. sustainable entrepreneurship). Data collection for theory 
application is centred on surveys and questionnaires. 
In the case of theory building, it concerns with developing 
theory from the data analysis (Saunders et al., 2009). Data 
collected on the phenomenon are usually qualitative in nature, 
thus giving the data set a richness that can provide a more in-
depth understanding, and a more holistic picture.  
Comparing both theory building and theory application, the 
aim of the research which is to understand and explore 
sustainable entrepreneurship (see section 3.2) is more suitable 
with theory building. This corresponds with the qualitative 
approach being adopted by the research (see section 3.4). 
Furthermore, theory building emphasise “the importance and 
uniqueness of the phenomenon at hand, the questions 
explored, and the context of the research” (Zahra, 2007:444). 
Zahra (2007) adds that by combining new theory and new 
phenomenon, gives significant opportunities for creative 
research and theory building. This is true for the current 
research setting and puts the research suitable for a theory 
building case approach (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) which 
will be discussed in the following sections.  
3.6 Research Design  
The research design process can be understood as a plan to 
design and implement the investigative tools that one uses for 
answering the research question (Yin, 2009). The research 
design process comprises of several components. In the 
following section, the key components of the research design 
will be explained which include the type of case study strategy 
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employed, the unit of analysis, case selection and reliability 
and validity issues.  
3.6.1 The Case Study Research Strategy 
Robson (2002:178) defines case study as  
a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation 
of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context 
using multiple sources of evidence.  
However, in a case study, caution should be applied because 
of the ambiguity of the boundaries between the phenomenon 
and the context, thus emphasise on the context is important 
(Yin, 2009). A case study research strategy can be based on 
both qualitative and quantitative data, therefore case study 
offers various data collection techniques be used in 
combination for example archives, interviews, questionnaires 
and observations (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
There are four types of case study strategies; first the single 
case holistic design; single case embedded design; multiple-
case holistic design; and finally a multiple-case embedded 
design (Yin, 2009:46). Figure 6 depicts the type of case study 
strategies. The difference between a single case study and a 
multiple case study is explained in table 6. 
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Figure 6 Types of case study strategy (Yin 2009:46) 
 
Table 6 Case study characteristics (compiled from Saunders et.al 
2009:146-147) 
Case study type Characteristics 
Single Case Study Represents a critical case; an extreme or unique case; 
opportunity to observe and analyse a phenomenon that few 
have considered before. 
Multiple Case Study More than one case, literal replications and theoretical 
replications. 
Holistic Design Research is concerned only with the organisation as a whole 
then you are treating the organisation as a holistic case study. 
Embedded Design Research is examining a number of logical sub-units within 
the organisation, this will involve more than one unit of 
analysis; this would be called an embedded case study. 
 
 
The research’s guiding reason for choosing a multiple case 
study was because of the research aims, the nature of the 
research questions and the contextual setting of the study. In 
explaining this decision, the research is supported by Saunders 
et al. (2009) suggestion that case studies are suitable for in-
depth explanations. Supporting this further is Yin’s (2009:8) 
and Saunders et al. (2009:146) suggestion that case studies 
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have the ability to significantly answer the “why?”, “what?” 
and “how?” questions.  
On the question of why a multiple case study was chosen, the 
justification for this decision is due to analytic power that it 
gives as put by Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007:27) suggestion 
that  
adding three cases to a single-case study is modest in terms of 
numbers, it offers four times the analytic power. Thus, theory building 
from multiple cases typically yields more robust, generalisable, and 
testable theory than single-case research. 
Supporting this further, a multiple case study approaches have 
been employed on numerous occasions in entrepreneurship 
research settings. This includes the investigation of related 
problems to the subject of resource acquisition and 
entrepreneurial competencies.  
For example, Man and Lau (2000) studied the competency-
performance relationship of SME owner/managers and their 
firms in the context of entrepreneurship in Hong Kong. 
Rasmussen et al. (2011) looked into multiple case studies of 
university spin-offs. Hallen and Eisenhardt (2012) used a 
multiple case study strategy to explore how organisations 
efficiently form inter-organisational ties. Rasmussen et al. 
(2014) studied the influence of the influence of university 
departments on the evolution of entrepreneurial competencies 
in spin-off ventures using multiple cases.  
Extant studies choose the case study approach due to the 
context of the study, the need to have a deeper understanding 
of the phenomenon and also the generalisability of case study 
research strategy via literal replications and analytic 
generalization (Yin, 2009).  
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Finally, there has been explicit concerns about the validity and 
reliability of case study research (Patton, 1987; Saunders et 
al., 2009; Yin, 2009), however the rationale behind the case 
study research is not generalisability but about reaching an 
understanding. Therefore, the criteria to assess the robustness 
of the case study research strategy should not be the same as 
for quantitative research.  
3.6.2 The unit of analysis 
In a case study it is important to define the case and the unit 
of analysis in relation to the research question. 
Based on the research question, “How do established 
entrepreneurial firms develop the entrepreneurial 
competencies to acquire green technology financing in the 
GTFS context” as the guide, the unit of analysis for each of the 
cases is the entrepreneurial competencies of the selected 
established entrepreneurial firms. This allows the research to 
consider the development of entrepreneurial competencies 
during the various stages of the financing process and to 
understand the context in which their development took place.  
On a practical note, choosing entrepreneurial competencies as 
the unit of analysis also helped to avoid sensitivity when 
discussing financing matters with financial institutions and 
program evaluation with government officials. This is because 
they were asked to discuss entrepreneurial competencies of 
the established firms in that context. If the discussion was 
primarily focused on their own competencies, it is likely the 
discussion would have been defensive (Garavan and 




3.6.3 Case Selection Criteria 
Selection of the cases was critical in the case study research 
design. In a case study research the sampling logic is not 
based on the random sampling logic utilised by survey 
research but is through theoretical sampling (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967).  
In applying theoretical sampling to select the cases, the 
research endeavoured to select information-rich cases that will 
be particularly informative to the research aims and research 
questions (Saunders et al., 2009; Yin, 2009)  
Based on Danneels's (2002) suggestion that site variety which 
includes unusual or special cases (Saunders et al., 2009) will 
offer many possibilities for comparisons and identifying 
idiosyncrasies to help to fulfil the research aim and understand 
the context better. Therefore, the case selection attempted to 
include different characteristics (e.g. financing and business 
experience) and a variety of resources and products (e.g. 
Solar, Biomass, Manufacturing) in order to enable richer case 
comparison. The selected cases included established 
entrepreneurial firms that had successfully and unsuccessfully 
obtained GTFS financing. In order to ensure this, prior 
knowledge of some of the outcomes of the firms’ initial 
attempts to obtain GTFS funding was required; this was 
available by searching the GTFS database. 
A control element was introduced in the selection of the cases, 
with the cases limited to the producers of the energy sector in 
under the GTFS and first time applicants. This was justified 
because studying a specific industry with the most similar 
characteristics enables more valid comparison of ventures. 
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This theoretical assumption is underpinned by the work of 
Hallen and Eisenhardt (2012:39) on “cohort sampling”. The 
second justification is pragmatic, in that the energy sector is 
the main contributor of carbon emissions and attracts the 
highest number of applicants in the GTFS.  
A total of 92 established entrepreneurial firms (from the 
energy sector producer category) were identified from the 
GTFS database of both financed and non-financed firms. A 
request for interview was sent to all 45 firms in the central 
region (of Malaysia). The reason why the central region was 
selected has a theoretical and practical basis. In terms of the 
theoretical basis, studies such as Feldman and Audretsch in 
1999 have shown that cities have more tendencies for more 
innovativeness, while on a practical basis it was logistically 
more viable. A positive response was received from nine firms 
but only six agreed to follow-up interviews and further data 
collection. Following a process of scrutinizing the 
characteristics of those agreeing to take part and those who 
did not respond, the characteristics of the cases were 
identified and deemed to follow Danneels (2002) and Hallen 
and Eisenhardt (2012) case selection criteria. 
3.6.4 Reliability and Validity 
The issue of reliability and validity focuses on the question of 
“how true is the data that you have acquired” (Saunders et al., 
2009:153-159). In order to ensure that the data collected is 
true, reliability and viability must be addressed in the research 
design process and during data collection. Table 7 below show 
the definitions of reliability and validity. 
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Table 7 Definition for Reliability and Validity (from Saunders et.al 
2009:600-602) 
 Definition 
Reliability “The extent to which data collection technique or techniques will yield 
consistent findings, similar observations would be made or conclusions 
reached by other researchers or there is transparency in how sense was 
made from the raw data.”(pg.600) 
Validity “(1) The extent to which data collection method or methods accurately 
measure what they were intended to measure. (2) The extent to which 
research findings are really about what they profess to be about.”(pg.602) 
 
To minimize the threat to validity the researcher followed 
Saunders et al. (2009) and Yin(2009) suggestions. The first is 
triangulation which is defined as 
The use of two or more independent sources of data or data-collection 
methods within one study in order to help ensure that the data are 
telling you what you think they are telling you.(Saunders et al., 
2009:602) 
In the case of the research, triangulation was employed by a 
multi-method approach to data collection; semi-structured 
interviews, non-participant observations, and document 
collection. In order to strengthen the triangulation, the 
research also followed King and Zeithaml (2001:80) 
suggestion to have “multiple respondents in the industry” in 
order to cross reference the data (e.g. established 
entrepreneur firms, banks and program administrators) on 
competencies in the GTFS. 
The second step was Yin's (2009) suggestion to use a case 
study protocol (preparation, information pack, questions), part 
of the protocol includes the preparation before the interview as 




Table 8 Preparation before interview (adapted from Kovacic:2008) 
 Preparation 
1 Collect relevant background about next interviewees 
2 Updating the information pack (see Appendix I,II) 
3 Review and reflect previous interviews  
4 Update interview questions 
The other important part of ensuring reliability and validity is 
to ensure that the informants are telling the truth especially 
during discussing sensitive topics, the researcher approached 
this by gaining trust by being transparent, by being humble 
and sequencing the sensitive questions later in the part of the 
interview.  
According to Yin (2011), for all kinds of research the key 
quality control is validity. He explains that a valid study is one 
that has properly (e.g. according to the participants’ view) 
collected and interpreted its data, so that the conclusion 
represents the context that was studied. Here the researcher 
also offered and discussed the preliminary findings and 
analysis with colleagues and interviewees. 
3.7 Data Collection  
Data collection serves as the basis for achieving the research 
study aims. According to (Yin,2011:129) in qualitative 
research, “data can be obtained from field based activities: 
interviewing, observing, collecting and examining (materials), 
and feeling.” 
In the case of data collection for qualitative research, the 
emphasis is on the researcher as the main research 
instrument (Saunders et al., 2009; Yin, 2011). As the main 
instrument of the research, the researcher must be prepared 
for any eventualities by planning and making contingencies. In 
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the next section, the research will explain in detail the data 
collection strategies in this research. 
3.7.1 Data Collection Strategy  
The primary consideration for data collection was to capture 
the complexity in the context of the GTFS. 
The research used several data sources: (1) semi-structured 
interviews, (2) follow-up e-mails and phone calls, (3) archives 
including media, corporate material, and the GTFS database 
(4) observations. The justification for including multiple 
sources was to enhance confidence in the accuracy of 
emergent theory by capturing multiple viewpoints (Patton, 
1987; Saunders et al., 2008; Yin, 2009). Pilot interviews were 
conducted in 2012 and again in 2013 with relevant informants 
to test the focus of the questions and gain informants’ 
feedback as highlighted in the table 9. 
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Table 9 Pilot interviews and feedback (from the researcher) 
No Group Interview/  
Personal interview 
Position Feedback 
1 Program Administrators Multi Arrangement for access, 
type of questions, type of 
documentation available 
2 Established entrepreneur 
Energy-Producer 
Executive Director The banks understanding, 
financing experience, 
difficulty to acquire 
financing-GTFS 
3 Established Entrepreneur 
Water-Producer 
Executive Director Technology understanding, 
multiple evaluation 
4 Venture Capital Managing Partner Overview of the GTFS, 
Barriers between banks and 
firms 
 
The primary data source was semi-structured interviews with 
three types of informants: (1) top level managers with key 
responsibilities for raising funding, typically the Managing 
Director/Owner of a firm, non-CEO founders of the firm, and in 
some cases the firm’s chief financial or technology officer (CFO 
or CTO); (2) participating financial institutions under the 
GTFS; and (3) GTFS program administrators. A key strength in 
the interview data was access to information about the actions 
(e.g. failed attempts, communication skills) from the 
perspectives of established entrepreneurial firms, financial 
institutions and the program administrators that are 
unavailable from other sources. A total of 29 interviews were 
conducted, including follow-ups. The duration of each 
interview was 20–90 minutes, and they were audio recorded 
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transcribed and translated into English 10 . Examples of the 
interview questions are shown in Appendix III & Appendix IV. 
The data collection strategy was designed with the intention of 
understanding the overall green technology financing 
ecosystem and to identify the development and role played by 
entrepreneurial competencies for acquiring green technology 
financing. Interviewing all the respective stakeholders also 
acted as a triangulation tool to verify accounts. This provided 
good contextual background to the research. 
To implement this strategy the research endeavoured to 
interview the major stakeholders involved in the GTFS. The 
stakeholders were divided into four groups (see Table 10): the 
established entrepreneurial firms; the program administrators; 
the financial institutions, and other related parties (business 






                                   
 
10 A majority of the interviews were conducted in a mixture of Bahasa Malaysia and 
English. The researcher transcribed and translated the interviews. 
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Table 10 Data collection and interviewee categories 
Groups of Interviewees Data collection strategy employed 
Established Entrepreneurial firms11 
 
Negotiate access to GTFS database  
Filter according to case selection  
Arrange interview via introduction 
Program Administrators 
 




Personal networking and email/letter of 
introduction 
Others (business consultants, technical 
consultants, trade associations) 
Personal networking and email/letter of 
introduction 
 
The semi-structured interviews were complemented by 
participant observations on the following occasions: when 
participating in GTFS awareness seminars, pitching sessions, 
site visits, and during document collection. 
The next session discusses how and why each data type was 
collected and how it was used. 
3.7.2 Semi-structured interviews  
Semi-structured interview were conducted with the four target 
groups stated above in table 10. 
The main source for data collection was through semi-
structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews and in-depth 
interviews were used for several reasons, primarily to give an 
opportunity for the “interviewees a chance to explain, or build 
                                   
 




on, their responses” (Saunders et.al. 2009:324). As the 
interviewees are able to use their own words or in other words 
free expression of their ideas (Autio, George and Alexy, 2011), 
the researcher can use the opportunity to probe the meanings 
and ask detailed questions which might lead to more 
interesting data (Saunders et.al. 2009). The second reason 
why the research used a semi-structured interview is because 
of the informality that the semi-structured interviews gives 
compared to structured interviews (Yin, 2011). This informality 
relaxes the interviewee and the interviewer and would 
facilitate personal contact later on to be used for further 
questioning and clarification on the interview session. The 
third reason is the flexibility of semi-structured interviews, for 
example in cases the interviewee would like to see the set of 
questions before the actual interview appointment, questions 
can be modified during the course of the interview. 
The initial interview questions and themes for the interview 
were based on the literature review. As the interview process 
progressed, the questions became varied based on new 
information from previous interviewees. It is important to 
remember that it is an iterative process. Another concern that 
the research sought to address is the need to be aware of the 
interaction with the interviewees, as some questions might 
impact the data collected through ideas-leading questions 
(Saunders et al., 2009). This was eventually addressed by 
self-discipline as experience of conducting the fieldwork grew.  
The 29 interviews were either one-to-one or involved two 
respondents at one time. The duration of the interviews 
varied. For follow-up interviews, it depended on the 
clarification that was needed from the respondents. Usually for 
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follow-up clarification it would be conducted by Facebook, 
Whatsapp instant messaging or by telephone. The place of the 
interview also varied from their construction site of the power 
plant, offices, to coffee shops. The list of interviews is shown 
in table 11. 
Table 11 List of semi-structured interviews (from researcher) 
No. Interview Person Place Length of 
audio 
recording (or 
if only notes) 
1 Biomass A Executive Director Office 59:52 
2 Manu A Managing Director and 
Executive Director 
Office 1:19:45 
3 Manu A Executive Director Office 23:56 
4 Manu B 
 
Managing Director Office 54:01 
5 Solar C Senior Finance Executive Office 53:37 
6 Solar C Managing Director Online Notes 
7 Biomass D Administration Manager and 
Project Manager 
Site Office 56:46 
8 Biomass D Executive Chairman Coffee Shop 1:15:48 
9 Biomass D Administration Manager Online Notes 
10 Solar D General Manager and Chief 
Financial Officer 
Office 43:07 
11 Solar D Senior Finance Manager and 
Business Executive 
Office 59:35 
12 Solar D Project Partner Office 1:33:40 
13 Bank 1 Head of Department Office 36:39 




15 Bank 1 Head of Department Coffee Shop Notes 
16 Bank 2 Senior Credit Officer Office 50:12 
17 Bank 2 Senior Credit Officer Online Notes 
18 Bank 3 Senior Credit Officer Office 40:14 
19 Bank 4 Senior Credit Officer Office 38:37 






























Program Administrator 6 Office 29:41 
28 Technical 
Expert 1 
Technical Expert 1 Office 51:05 
29 Technical 
Expert 2 
Technical Expert 2 Office 14:26 
The next data collection method to be discussed is non-
participant observation. 
3.7.3 Non-participant observation 
Three settings were deemed suitable for conducting 
observations. The first was the GTFS seminar12, the second 
was the pitching session and the third are site visits to the 
factories. The strategy adopted in the non-participant 
observation was to immerse the researcher in the setting. For 
the GTFS seminar and pitching session it gave the researcher 
an opportunity to observe how entrepreneurs talked about 
12 The GTFS seminar is an awareness seminar on various types of entrepreneurship 
financing schemes offered by the Central Bank of Malaysia. The GTFS is one of the 
schemes that are featured in this seminar. The seminar takes place over two days, 
the first day is for the financial institutions and the second day is for the 
entrepreneurs. The highlight of this seminar is that the second day includes a closed-
door session where bankers are invited to a pitching session by GTFS applicants who 
were unsuccessful in previous applications to the banks. 
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their competencies, projects during their pitches for finance 
and to gauge the level of interest from the financial 
institutions in terms of the GTFS. While the site visit was an 
opportunity for the researcher to observe closely the progress 
of the projects and triangulate with the data collected from the 
interviewers on the progress. This non-participant observation 
is similar to Robson’s (2002) informal observation, which 
allows considerable freedom in what information is gathered 
and how it is recorded, with the aim of capturing the 
complexity of the context. The list of non-participant 
observations is listed in table 12. 
Table 12 List of non-participants observations (from the researcher) 
 Event Venue Duration 
1 GTFS Seminar East Coast Region 1 day 
2 GTFS Seminar Central Region 1 day 
3 Pitching session East Coast Region 
(2 firms, including Biomass A) 
½ day 
Video recording 
4 Pitching session Central Region 
(5 firms, including Manu B) 
1 day 
Video recording 
5 Pitching Session Bank A  Notes 
6 Site visit Manu B ½ day 
Site photos 
7 Site visit Biomass D  1 day 
Site photos 
 
3.7.4 Document Collection  
According to Yin (2011), documentation collection represents 
another form of primary evidence that can be invaluable to 
qualitative research. Documentary evidence is a useful 
triangulation tool for verifying information from other data 
sources.  
There was abundance of available documentary evidence 
therefore it was important to only consider what was most 
relevant especially because of the geographical difference 
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between the United Kingdom and Malaysia. In addition to 
deciding which of the documents are most relevant, there was 
also the question of what documents were allowed to be 
removed from the premises. Ultimately the documents 
collected were mainly business plans, company profile, etc. as 
shown in table 13.  
Table 13 List of document collected (from the researcher) 
 Type Form 
1 Program administrator’s meeting minutes: 
Notes of the minutes; e.g. samples of decisions made on 
certification of the GTFS, certification process and issues 
about GTFS. 
 Notes 
2 Company registration and financial statements from 
Companies Commission Malaysia 
Major shareholders, yearly audited accounts, date of 
establishment 
PDF 
3 GTFS submission document 
Financing experience, technical documentation on the 
project, cash flow projection, GTFS certification 
(evaluation) 
Notes 
4 Business plan 
Marketing, cash flow, growth projections 
PDF 
5 Company profile 
Annual reports 
PDF 
6 News Reports 




3.7.5 Ethical Consideration  
Prior to carrying out the fieldwork, the planned methodological 
framework was submitted to the Business School Research 
Ethics Committee 13  at the University of Nottingham for 
approval. A favourable opinion was obtained on the 14th of 
February 2013. Interview consent was acquired from the 
participants before conducting the interview, please see 
Appendix II. 
The research was conducted in Malaysia, and approved by the 
Government of Malaysia (PhD sponsor). The context and 
culture of Malaysia is a familiar setting for the researcher. 
There was a need to access the database to identify the firms 
for the interviews. The database is used for administrative 
purposes and is comprised of and limited to the company 
background, a description of the projects for financing, and 
the funding status. Access to the database was obtained via 
the database administrator, and information released to the 
researcher was upon request as previously agreed by the 
database owner. The information and the confirmation of 
consent were provided in Bahasa Malaysia and English 
languages. All identities have been anonymised. The data was 
stored on a password protected secure PC. 
                                   
 
13 A link to the University of Nottingham Code of Research Conduct and Research 




Reflexivity according to Saunders et.al (2009:292) is a 
concept used in the social sciences to explore and deal with the 
relationship between the researcher and the object of research.  
Reflexivity also includes 
an awareness of the ways in which the researcher as an individual with 
a particular social identity and background has an impact on the 
research process (Robson, 2002: 172).  
As the researcher is the collection instrument in semi-
structured or unstructured qualitative interviews, the unique 
researcher characteristics (Pezalla, Pettigrew and Miller-Day, 
2012) influences the data collection. 
It is important to mention that the researcher worked as an 
employee for the Ministry of Energy Green Technology and 
Water (MEGTW) from 2010 to 2011 as the Principal Assistant 
Secretary for the Green Technology Policy Division. The GTFS 
is administered by an agency under the MEGTW. The 
researcher left the MEGTW in 2011 to pursue his PhD full-time. 
Because of the previous working relationship with MEGTW, the 
researcher had certain advantages. This includes a certain 
amount of trust from the program administrators to access 
confidential data (e.g. technical documents, financial analysis). 
The researcher was also given access to closed events such as 
pitching sessions with the banks. Another unique advantage 
that the researcher had was, he understood the local cultural 
context. Being aware about these unique advantages several 
step were taken to minimize potential bias. 
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The strategies were based on Robson’s (2002:173) adoption of 
Ahern’s (1999) guide on using reflexivity to identify areas of 
potential researcher bias as shown in Table 14. 
 
Table 14 Ahern's (1999) guide on using reflexivity to identify areas of 
potential researcher bias (adopted from Robson, 2002:173) 
1 Write down your personal issues in undertaking this research, the taken-for-
granted assumptions associated with your gender, race, socio-economic status, 
and the political milieu of your research. Finally consider where the power is 
held in relation to your research project and where you belong in the power 
hierarchy. 
2 Clarify your personal value systems and acknowledge areas in which you know 
are subjective. 
3 Describe possible areas of potential role conflict. Are there particular types of 
people and/or situations with or in which you feel anxious, annoyed, at ease? Is 
this publication of your findings likely to cause problems with a group of 
people? Consider how this possibly could influence whom you approach or how 
you approach them. 
4 Identify gatekeepers’ interests and consider the extent to which they are 
disposed favourably towards your project. This can help you prevent potential 
role conflicts. 
5 Recognise feelings that could indicate a lack of neutrality. These include 
avoiding situations in which you might experience negative feelings, seeking out 
situations in which you will experience positive feelings. 
6 Is anything new or surprising in your data collection or analysis? If not, is this 
cause for concern, or is it an indication of saturation? On occasion, stand back 
and ask yourself if you are ‘going native’.  
7 When blocks occur in the research process, re-frame them. For example, is there 
another group of people who can shed light on this phenomenon? Would another 
additional form of data collection, such as document analysis or diaries, give a 
greater insight? 
8 Even when you have completed your analysis, reflect on how you write up your 
account. Are you quoting more from one respondent than another? If you are, 
ask yourself why. 
9 Consider whether the supporting evidence in the literature really is supporting 
your analysis or if it is just expressing the same cultural background as yourself.  
10 A significant aspect of resolving bias is the acknowledgement of its outcomes. 
Therefore, you might have to re-interview a respondent or re-analyse the 
transcript once you have recognised that bias in data collection or analysis is a 
possibility in a specific situation. It is worth remembering that even if 
preconceptions and biases are acknowledged, they are not always easily 
abandoned.  
 
The first step was to “neutralise” by admitting the researcher’s 
former links with the MEGTW. The researcher compiled an 
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information pack detailing the research (e.g. purpose of the 
research, the focus of the research, introductory letter from 
MEGTW). The information pack offered a way for interviewees 
to seek further information from either the Academic 
Supervisor or another representative of the University. Here 
the researcher noted the researcher’s former links were not a 
critical point in terms of power relationship, 
The pilot interview was arranged months in advance, via an 
introduction from the GTFS administrators to the entrepreneur. This 
was followed up by countless phone calls and email from the UK to the 
entrepreneur to confirm and reconfirm the pilot interview. In 
Malaysia, after a two-and-a-half hour drive from the city to the see the 
entrepreneur, it did not happen and it never did. These were the first 
among many interviews that were arranged but did not happen. This 
indicated to me that even with my previous connections with the 
Ministry14 which was clearly stated in my information sheet, it did not 
trouble them to decline my request to be interviewed, which I assume 
that the entrepreneurs that I interviewed did not feel pressured to 
respond to my request for an interview. (excerpt from field notes) 
In an effort to avoid interview bias, the researcher tried to 
arrange the sequence of the interviews between the four 
groups, the established entrepreneurial firms, bankers, 
program administrators and others (e.g. technical experts) 
and to read the summary of previous interview notes. This 
                                   
 
14 This is something that I experienced as a double-edged sword, being 
both facilitating and detrimental at the same time. As part of the 




was to get a more balance view and at the same time to 
triangulate between the interviewees.  
The third strategy was to discuss the preliminary findings and 
analysis with colleagues and interviewees during the data 
collection stage, which also enhanced the reliability of the 
findings. Explanations, viewpoints and suggestions for the data 
collection were offered by former colleagues and interviewees. 
As the data collection progressed, the researcher grew into his 
role, absorbing opposite findings and viewpoints became 
calmer. 
The fourth strategy was triangulation whereby the researcher 
used other methods to collect data, including observations 
(e.g. GTFS seminar, pitching sessions) and document 
collection as another form of triangulation. 
During the analysis stage, the strategy was to critically review 
the findings and the analysis with critical colleagues and 
interviewees. All of these strategies were strengthened by 








In planning for qualitative analysis, the researcher was mindful 
that 
There is no clear and accepted single set of conventions for analysis 
corresponding [as] to those observed with quantitative data (Robson, 
2002: 456). 
As the aim of the research is to explore and understand under 
what conditions and policies will enable established 
entrepreneurial firms to acquire green technology financing in 
the GTFS context, the analysis was guided by the evolutionary 
competency development framework (Rasmussen et al., 
2014). The analysis was conducted by focusing on the 
competency development of the cases before, during and after 
the financing process and the influence of the GTFS. To avoid 
conflation during the analysis process, between the actions of 
the actors and the influence of the GTFS context, the strategy 
of retroduction was used (Leca & Naccache, 2006; Rasmussen 
et al., 2011, 2014). Retroduction is suggested by Sæther 
(1998) to be useful for research on the greening of industry 
because links to theory can be made explicit to increase our 
understanding of the relations between industry and the social 
and environmental context.  
Miles and Huberman’s (1994:4) description of qualitative data 
analysis coincides with the strategy of retroduction:  
We aim to account for events, rather than simply to document their 
sequence. We look for an individual or a social process, a mechanism, 
a structure at the core of events that can be captured to provide 
causal description of the forces at work. 
Here, Miles and Huberman (1994:10) suggest that qualitative 
analysis consists of three interwoven and parallel elements, 
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spanning the time before, during and after data collection. The 
first is data reduction which “refers to the process of selecting, 
focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the data 
that appear in written up field notes or transcriptions”; the 
coding process is an example of data reduction. The next 
element that they suggest is the data display, which is “an 
organised, compressed assembly of information that permits 
conclusion drawing as an action” (pg.11). Putting codes in a 
matrix, flow charts are an example of data display. The third 
and final element that they propose is conclusion drawing and 
verification; here they suggest “the meanings emerging from 
the data have to be tested for their plausibility, their 
sturdiness, their ‘confirmability’ - that is, their validity” (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994:11) 
In adopting the three elements in the analysis, the research 
has four stages of analysis. The first stage was the 
preparation, here the interviews were transcribed, checked for 
accuracy with the recordings and familiarised. The second 
stage was the coding; the coding was individual cases. Here it 
was an iterative process, with the codes checked against the 
literature; followed by cross-case analysis. The third stage was 
to identify themes and the last stage was to finalise those 
themes. Later the themes were sent to the respondents for 
feedback before finalizing the themes. The overview of the 
data analysis is depicted in Figure 7 below. In the next section 




Figure 7 Data analysis steps (from the researcher) 
 
3.9.1 Preparation 
In preparing for the data collection and analysis, the 
researcher attended specific courses in data analysis, this 
included training in qualitative data analysis software (Atlas.ti 
and Nvivo 10). Nvivo 10 was used because of the support 
available within the University.  
Since the type and format of the data collected varied, 
preparing the data presented specific challenges. Interviews 
were transcribed, checked for accuracy with the recordings 
and sent back to the interviewees for confirmation. The videos 
were left in MPEG format, the pictures in JPEG, and 
documentary evidence was scanned.  
The case study narrative and financing flow charts based on 
the financing process was developed using the data to form a 





During data collection a summary form was adapted from 
Miles and Huberman (1994), and was used as a tool for 
theoretical saturation and a reflection tool during the coding 
period. The form helped to recognised early patterns emerging 
during the data collection period. As the same pattern 
emerged from the multiple interviews, it pointed to theoretical 
saturation. An example of this is the bank’s learning curve, 
which was a recurring pattern in the interviews with the 
entrepreneurs, the banks and the program administrators. The 
example of this summary form is in the Appendix IV. 
The coding process was adapted from Strauss and Corbin 
(1998). In general this starts with open coding i.e. the process 
of generating initial concepts or first order concepts from data. 
This was then followed by axial coding, to develop and link the 
concepts into conceptual families, and lastly selective coding 
was applied in order to formalise these relationships into 
theoretical frameworks. 
The coding process was done in NVivo 10. The open coding 
process generated the initial concepts. The summary of the 
data collection also offered some leads. However, by intending 
to let the data speak for itself, the initial concepts were 
generated through open coding from the cases. There were 
some open codes that were expected such as the barriers and 
challenges to green technology. As the coding process 
proceeded, patterns became more apparent, idiosyncratic case 
financing process to acquire green technology financing were 
slowly emerging from the data. Some examples of these codes 
are firm background, previous financing experience, business 
experience and current competencies. This helped to refine the 
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individual cases financing process to acquire green technology 
financing, and refine financing flow charts. A concrete example 
for this code is the previous financing experience, with a 
pattern on the type of financing before this (e.g. contract 
financing, project financing, long term financing, credit 
facilitation) 
By comparing and contrasting the financing processes between 
the cases, other interesting concepts also started to emerge, 
including the distinct tension or conflict among the multiple 
stakeholders that was similar to a “blame game” when 
explaining the reasons behind established entrepreneurial 
firms’ inability to acquire green technology financing.  
Another round of coding was conducted, by which time it was 
slowly emerging how the context was influencing the financing 
process of the individual cases. This second round of coding 
also helped to further refine what the financing process of the 
individual cases were in terms of critical characteristics and 
events that influenced how the cases succeeded or failed to 
acquire green technology financing. (e.g. supplier choice, 
supplier credibility-bank evaluation techniques) 
The next stage was the axial coding; linking the concepts into 
conceptual families and linking the structure to the process. 
Through linking these, the aim is to answer the ‘why’ and 
‘how’ questions (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). In this stage, the 
first order concepts were brought together with concepts that 
offered a better explanation from other sources. Here the first 
order concepts such as firm background, previous financing 
experience, business experience and current competencies 
were explored iteratively with the literature (e.g. Ahuja and 
Katila, 2004; Sydow, Schreyögg, and Koch, 2009; Vohora, 
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Wright, and Lockett, 2004). In the data structure display in 
Table 16 (see page 175), axial codes are named second order 
themes. 
3.9.3 Identifying Themes  
The next stage of coding is the selective coding, which is the 
process of integrating and refining the theory. Emergent 
themes were slowly building up. In the data structure display 
the themes are known as the aggregate dimensions. Although 
the analysis seems to be a linear process, coding was a back 
and forth process. 
The importance of this stage of coding is to focus on variation, 
particularly to look for and explain the variations across cases; 
this is an important criterion in order to propose a better 
theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
3.9.3 Finalise themes  
Before the themes were finalised, they were sent to some of 
the interviewees (bankers, established entrepreneurial firms 
and program administrators) to ascertain if there was any 
particular objections. The feedback contained no particular 
objection to the themes. 
The aggregate dimension, second order themes and the first 
order concepts are shown in Table 16 (see page 175). In the 
next chapter the research will describe the context and the 








CHAPTER 4: THE GTFS CONTEXT AND CASES  
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes the local context and the cases. The 
interviews recorded the local context and the entrepreneurial 
firm’s interpretations of their reality as they attempted to 
acquire financing for their green technology ventures. The 
local context is in section 4.2, giving voices to the other 
stakeholders in the GTFS.  
This is followed by the six case studies in section 4.3 which 
were developed by combining the information from the 
interviews of the entrepreneurial firm’s executives, GTFS 
program administrators, bankers involved in financing the 
entrepreneurial firms, pitching observations, site visits and 
documentation such as GTFS submission forms and supporting 
documents (e.g. technical documents). 
The case description follows a similar format, with variation 
depending on the depth and breadth of information gathered 
in each particular case. Section 4.4 of the chapter focuses on 




4.2 GTFS context 
In this section, the research describes the GTFS and the 
contextual influence that surrounds the scheme from the 
viewpoints of the various stakeholders. This section also 
highlights the complexities of the relationship between the 
stakeholders. 
The green technology policy announced by the government 
resulted in various opportunities for entrepreneurial firms to 
pursue. These include opportunities such as to supply 
renewable energy to the national grid under the Feed in Tariff 
(FiT) program. These green technology opportunities have 
attracted a wide range of established entrepreneurial firms to 
venture into green technology. These established 
entrepreneurial firms include firms with various backgrounds 
and expertise entering this new green technology space. Here, 
one of the biggest challenges for new industries is to acquire 
financing for these new ventures.  
Recognising this dilemma the Malaysian government under the 
National Green Technology Policy has designed a scheme 
named the Green Technology Financing Scheme (GTFS) to 
help entrepreneurs obtain financing. According to the program 
administrators (PA): 
GTFS is been established for the purpose to provide an alternative 
financing for the SMEs’ to embark on the Green Technology 
businesses. (PA1) 
Green Technology Financing Scheme [is a] scheme […] to promote the 
development for green technology projects so under this scheme the 
government provides some incentives for example a rebate of 2% of 
the interest rate that is being offered by the banks and additionally 
60% guarantee on the loan that are given to them by the banks. (PA1)  




As explained in section 1.2 the GTFS is divided into two phases 
of evaluation. The first is the technical evaluation by the 
government committee and the second evaluation is by the 
banks. Both of the evaluation phases are important, however 
the banks evaluation is critical because of the role of the banks 
to provide financing for the scheme. Here the role and the 
expectations of the banks from the perspective of the 
government is explained by a program administrator below,  
The government […] had various discussion with various parties 
concern, the government looking at the commitment of the financial 
industry to not solely to depend on the government, it should be 
initiative shared, shared initiative in boosting the green technology […] 
the government is looking at the social responsibility of [the] financial 
institution to give back to the society. (PA5) 
These quotes illustrate the government’s expectation that the 
banks would play a socially responsible role in financing these 
green ventures. In spite of the government’s support, and 
benefits the ratio for the companies that were financed was 
only a third of the companies that had gained GTFS 
certification and benefits. This financing quagmire exposes a 
difference in terms of evaluation between the certification and 
financing process between the government and the banks as 
explained by a program administrator. 
[…] banks look at it differently. For the bank whenever they lend 
money, they expect to be paid so despite the fact the project can be 
very green if the bank thinks that it will not generate enough cash flow 
to repay loan, the bank won’t finance it. So for the bank, it doesn’t 
matter whether the project is green or brown, their agenda is 
different, they lend money that means they invest, they expect to 
make something out of it and get to be fully paid within the bank 
period, so they don’t care whether the project is green or not green. 
(PA2) 





For the established entrepreneurial firms, the banks were not 
following the government’s directive. There have been 
numerous complaints by entrepreneurial firms that banks are 
not being supportive to their financing needs. This was also 
observed in a pitching session between the entrepreneurial 
firms and the banks organised by the program administrators.  
However these arguments also reveal the established 
entrepreneurial firm’s perception that the financing would be 
easy because of the government program. Accordingly, the 
entrepreneurial firm did not sense that they suffered from a 
competency gap in terms of financing; therefore they did not 
recognise this as something to address immediately.  
While in the case of the banks, green technology is new. Here 
the head of department (HOD) of Bank 1 argued that, 
GTFS is still new. The general market has yet to fully embrace it. The 
financial institution is still (grappling) with it. (HOD Bank 1) 
Therefore the banks resorted to what they know best, as 
illustrated in the quotes below from two senior credit officers 
(SCO), 




The way that we finance green and the other projects are not [any] 
different using the 5C15. We are in the business to make money, credit 
mitigation. (SCO Bank 5) 
It’s going to be looked at on the platform of a new business. New 
business because they have no experience […] they are going to start 
from scratch so, how do you evaluate them […] you evaluate them 
[the same with] newcomers. (SCO Bank 4) 
These quotes highlight that the banks do not consider an 
established firm’s excellent track record in the financing 
application. These arguments also illustrate the method of 
evaluation by the banks to evaluate green technology projects. 
However another dimension to be highlighted here is that the 
banks and the entrepreneurial firms have a learning curve on 
green technology financing which needs to be addressed.  
To highlight this dichotomy between the bankers and the 
entrepreneurial firms, a program administrator (PA) explained: 
The other factor that GTFS need […] is to give knowledge as [in] ways 
to evaluate and access a project. I think how to convince the banks [is] 
another story. [This is] because [banks] don’t understand the 
technology. Maybe from the business plan it is [good] but what about 
the technology risk? How do we evaluate? Some projects have good 
                                   
 
15 The 5C credit criteria, is a criteria that the majority of the banks to evaluate 
financing. The 5C’s are character, capacity (cash flow), capital, condition and 
collateral. The order of the Cs is according to importance. 
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technology but the entrepreneur does not have a good business plan. 
The bank does not see this, but the government feels the project is 
viable. They cannot link the technology with the business plan, that’s 
the area we need to do train the credit officers. (PA1) 
The program administrator points out the complexity and the 
barriers behind the financing process even though the GTFS 
was designed to facilitate financing. The quotes above indicate 
that these complexities, and barriers stems from the GTFS 
context. 
4.2.1 Summary of the GTFS Context 
There are several pivotal points to be highlighted due to the 
GTFS context.  
First, since the GTFS is new there is a difference in financing 
priorities and understanding among the major stakeholders 
(program administrators, banks and entrepreneurs) about the 
GTFS. The stakeholder differences in financing priorities and 
understanding leads to a learning curve in dealing with the 
context. 
The learning curve for the banks leads to the second point 
which is the problem of knowledge asymmetry. This 
knowledge asymmetry influences the banks evaluation of 
green technology projects. This inadvertently also contributes 
to a new evaluation criteria. The creation of the new criteria 
requires an iterative process between the various stakeholders 
especially the banks and the entrepreneurial firms. 
The third point is that the GTFS with the lure of government 
support through the guarantee and benefits attracts 
entrepreneurial firms to transition from one industry to 
another (e.g. marketing to manufacturing of green technology 




products). However even established entrepreneurial firms 
face difficulties to acquire financing under the GTFS context 
due to a competency gap. This highlights some challenges to 
the effectiveness of GTFS as a policy mechanism to facilitate 
financing. 
In summary, the financing context under the GTFS is different 
and has different influence for the various stakeholders. For 
the established entrepreneurial firms it is the competency gap 
arising from the transition to a new industry, and the 
complexities of the financing process itself. In the case of the 
banks it is mainly the learning curve to a new industry. Finally 
for the program administrators it is policy making to come up 
with effective programs to facilitate green technology 
development. 
 4.3 Case Studies 
This section provides the individual case studies focusing on 
the main research question, “How do established 
entrepreneurial firms develop the entrepreneurial 
competencies necessary to acquire green technology financing 
in the GTFS context?”  
This section outlines how each case offers insights into their 
acquisition of financing under the GTFS. These insights are 
elaborated in each case by describing their background and 
financing application under the GTFS. By contrasting previous 
financing experience and financing under the GTFS, the case 
studies also reaffirms the contextual differences and 
challenges to financing, the necessary competencies and the 




development (non-development) of those competencies by the 
entrepreneurial firms.  
Here the cases are divided into non-financed and financed 
entrepreneurial firms. The first two cases, Biomass A and 
Manu A are non-financed case studies and will predominantly 
contribute to answering the first sub research question on 
competency deployment. While the next four cases, Manu B, 
Solar C, Solar D and Biomass D are financed case studies and 
will address all three sub research questions; competency 
deployment, the necessary competencies and competency 
development. 
4.3.1 Case one: Biomass A 
The case study starts from the time of the project’s inception 
and ends when the financing acquisition was aborted. The 
description of case one will explain the background of Biomass 
A in terms of their previous financing and business experience. 
A narrative of the financing application under the GTFS is also 
included as a means to compare and contrast Biomass A’s 
background with their new business venture and financing 
application under the GTFS. The case study highlights the 
contextual influences on the deployment of Biomass A’s 
competencies.  
4.3.1.1 Background 
Biomass A was established in 2005. The owners of Biomass A 
are an established Engineering Procurement Construction 
Company (EPCC) who bought Biomass A in 2010. In their past 
projects the owners were heavily involved in power 
distribution projects for the national utility. However in the 




current project under GTFS they are focused on power 
generation instead. Another significant change because of this 
new project is that they will become independent power 
producers.  
Another point of differentiation for Biomass A’s owners is their 
previous financing experience. Before this their financing 
experience had been based on contract financing. The 
financing period under contract financing is short term 
between one to two years. However, as an independent power 
producer this involves taking into consideration long term 
developmental aspects such as energy generation and 
transmission. Therefore contract finance would not be suitable 
in this case. Here Biomass A needs to apply for project 
financing, a type of financing that they are not used too. Due 
to the nature of the project, the financing process, and the 
GTFS there was a significant contextual difference for Biomass 
A. 
4.3.1.2 Financing Application  
Biomass A was seeking RM136 million to finance their 
independent power plant utilising empty fruit bunches. The 
electricity that is generated from the power plant will be 
supplied to the national grid.  
As part of their investment readiness (McAdam & Marlow, 
2011) Biomass A applied for the GTFS certification through the 
GTFS website. Subsequently to fulfil the GTFS requirement for 
certification, Biomass A presented their business plan to the 
GTFS’ technical committee to verify the technical viability and 
the environmental status of the project. Their presentation 




was technically-oriented, and easily fulfilled the technical 
requirement of the GTFS (e.g. environmentally friendly 
project). Upon fulfilling the technical criteria of the GTFS, 
Biomass A was subsequently awarded the GTFS certificate on 
the 10th of May 2010.  
To further enhance their investment readiness, Biomass A 
made a bid to acquire the quota to supply electricity to the 
national grid via a Renewable Energy Power Purchasing 
Agreement (RePPA) and successfully obtained the quota in 
2011. They further invested approximately RM20 million on 
the project infrastructure (e.g. land purchase). Concentrating 
more on the technical details of the project, Biomass A 
upgraded the technology and obtained the rights to the 
technology with a view to expand regionally. In addition, 
Biomass A secured the raw material for their power plant from 
a reputable supplier and employed a technical consultant to 
attest to the feasibility of the project.  
Biomass A then proceeded to apply for financing to various 
local and international banks under the GTFS scheme. 
However, to their apparent surprise, their application was 
rejected at the credit officer stage by all the banks to which 
they applied. This outcome occurred in spite of the investment 
readiness steps undertaken and the government guarantee. 
The banks that rejected their application included the local and 
international banks that Biomass A owner’s already had an 
excellent track record. Biomass A ended up applying to seven 
banks but all of these financing requests were rejected. The 
executive director (ED) of Biomass A in describing the 
financing journey said  




I think we have approached almost six to seven banks, and these are 
bankers who have financed me [before], and these are the same 
people who are telling me today that, “Oh, for this BIOMASS A we 
have got concerns” […] How much of convincing we have done and still 
we are not able to penetrate through their barriers or their thoughts. 
(ED of Biomass A) 
This argument illustrates Biomass A’s frustration with the 
rejection but also the concerns that the banks had about this 
venture. This either suggests that the banks were unable to 
understand the project or that Biomass A were unable to 
convince to the bankers about the viability and feasibility of 
their proposed biomass venture.  
To rationalize these rejections, the executive director of 
Biomass A lamented that the banks do not understand the 
new venture and that the government guarantee is not strong 
enough. The executive director based this assumption on the 
fact that the institutions to whom they had applied for 
financing already knew about their established track record.  
However it became apparent that Biomass A’s belief that they 
would acquire financing easily under the GTFS heavily 
contributed to the misinterpretation of the environment as 
admitted below, 
“[…] we failed to realise, we thought it was so easy because at that 
time we thought, if GTFS agree, everything will be good.” (ED of 
Biomass A) 
This misinterpretation of the environment might be further 
attributed to their previous financing experience as described 
by the executive director (ED) of Biomass A in this argument 
below, 




Financing, we are fortunate that we had the support of the local banks 
because the project is Tenaga [National Electricity Company], so 
there’s a lot of confidence from the local institution […] payment is 
never an issue. Therefore, financing was not too much of an issue 
because all the projects are contract financed. (ED of Biomass A) 
Furthering this argument the executive director (ED) of 
Biomass A said; 
[…] but if let’s say I call a bank today and say, I’m getting a 40 million 
dollar contract, can you finance? They will be [here] tomorrow, they 
will be sitting here. You know, so that’s not an issue. (ED of Biomass A) 
This argument also illustrates the influence of contextual 
differences in terms of financing. In their previous business, 
financing was not an issue however in this new venture their 
track record does not seem to support their financing 
application. Another anomaly was, even though substantial 
capital has been put into the business and the presence of 
private and government collateral, these facts did not help to 
secure the financing. This highlights a misinterpretation of the 
new financing context from the very beginning of the venture. 
This misinterpretation could be due to the influence from the 
GTFS context. Unlike the technical aspect of the project which 
had benefited from consultants inputs, the financial aspect of 
the project was conducted internally. By keeping the financial 
aspect internally they were not fully aware of the influence in 
terms of the differences in the financing context. In other 
words, they had a low input from external resources in the 
venture. 
In letting out his frustration at being rejected for the new 
venture the executive director (ED) of Biomass A added, 




The bankers themselves, being a commercial people, if they try to 
evaluate that technology, I think it’s not going to work. You know, they 
are not in a position to say whether this is viable or that is not viable. 
They are not in a position because they are not technical people. But 
they make conclusions based on market research, market analysis and 
based on that they come to a point that the project is not viable. So 
we’re having that problem. 
They go and do research on the technology provided. This is exactly 
what they did they asked me who is the supplier and I told them. They 
checked the website, then the banks asked the suppliers annual 
statement and they came back to me to say that the project is not 
viable. (ED of Biomass A) 
These two quotes exemplify how the bankers set about 
verifying information about the viability of the technology. This 
situation also highlights the tools that the banks are using to 
evaluate green technology projects. 
Biomass A’s executive director further added that  
Despite our bank balance, our books and all kinds of stuff, until today 
the bankers are not able to finance a deal yet […] we’ve been 
exhausting our revenues for the last one-and-a-half years in trying to 
secure finance. I cannot imagine how others are […] trying to move. 
Even [though] we have spent millions, we have shown them the 
receipts […] despite that there is a general perception of lack of 
confidence whether the project is viable. So the main thing with all the 
bankers is not the guarantee part [but] whether the project itself is 
viable or not. Nobody is having that confidence, and there is no… 
parties, who are able to convince the financiers that this technology is 
workable. (ED of Biomass A) 
This quote illustrates that Biomass A was caught in a 
knowledge asymmetric dilemma, where project viability is a 
major concern for the bankers however the bankers do not 
have the knowledge to evaluate the project. To express the 
hopelessness of their situation, Biomass A appeared to feel 




that nobody that could help them pass this stage; instead 
blame was attributed to the ineffectiveness of the GTFS’s role 
in financing. These highlights the need for developing new 
competencies to convince the banks; competencies that 
Biomass A did not have at the time. 
Evidence from the documentation submitted to the GTFS 
committee by Biomass A, shows the detailed account of the 
project, including the proposal for a new technology-
gasification of the empty fruit bunch (EFB) to produce energy. 
The documentation was full of technicalities and would need a 
specialist to evaluate them. This relates to the claim by 
Biomass A that the bank did not understand the nature of the 
technology and, therefore, the business. For the executive 
director of Biomass A, the fact that Greentech16 had certified 
the technology and had given the 60% guarantee on the 
technology, should have been enough assurance for the bank 
that the technology would work. 
In their final pitching session, the pitch for their project was 
very detailed; but it failed to ignite the interest of the banks. 
Observations suggest that the presentation was too technical 
                                   
 
16 The Malaysian Green Technology Corporation is commonly known as GreenTech. 
GreenTech is the administrator for the GTFS. 
 




and did not provide adequate answers to some of the panel’s 
questions. Such questions related to the supply of raw 
material and the buyers of the by-products. Even at the 
pitching session, Biomass A was still not able to sufficiently 
educate and convince the bankers. 
In the end Biomass A did not acquire financing. During the 
final interaction with Biomass A, they informed the researcher 
that they have put their new venture on hold indefinitely and 
were currently concentrating on their core business of power 
distribution. Figure 8 summarizes the financing process of 
Biomass A. 




Figure 8 Financing flowchart for Biomass A 
 
Legend 
CO: Credit officer CC: Credit Committee 
 
4.3.1.3  Case summary of Biomass A  
1. Biomass A has existing competencies, developed during 
previous projects. These competencies had helped them to 
acquire financing and implement their previous projects which 
were mainly in power distribution and based on contract 
financing. 




2. Biomass A was confident they would acquire GTFS 
financing. Overall, Biomass A believed that to acquire 
financing for their new green technology venture would be 
simple enough, especially as they had already been awarded 
the GTFS certification. Biomass A had attributed too much 
significance to the GTFS certification and benefits, the owners 
were optimistic in their assessment of the process to acquire 
financing. As a result there was this notion that financing 
would be easy. 
3. However the new venture was different both in terms of 
financing and technical aspects which contributed to a 
competency gap. Biomass A realised the existing competencies 
are not enough for Biomass A to acquire financing in the 
current context. However, the notion that financing would be 
easy influenced the deployment of Biomass A’s competencies. 
As a result Biomass A had decided to emphasis on their 
technical competencies but overlooked the importance of 
adapting/ reconfiguring their financing competencies.  
4. Even though Biomass A was an established entrepreneurial 
firm and had previous success they misunderstood the new 
context in dealing with the banks. Due to the nature of the 
new venture, the financial evaluation of the project changed. 
The misinterpretation of the environment influenced Biomass 
A’s refinement of the opportunity resulting in a financing 
rejection cycle. 
5. Finally, despite the fact Biomass A had existing 
competencies, Biomass A were not able to fully deploy their 
competencies to refine the opportunity and explained the 
project in detail to the bankers. Even though the data 




suggests some learning arose from the multiple rejections 
from the banks, Biomass A had already decided to abort the 
new venture. 
4.3.2 Case two: Manu A 
The case study starts from the time of the project’s inception 
and ends when the financing acquisition was aborted. The 
description of case two will explain the background of Manu A 
in terms of their previous financing and business experience. A 
narrative of the financing application under the GTFS is also 
included as a means to compare and contrast Manu A’s 
background with their new business venture and financing 
application under the GTFS. The case study highlights the 
contextual influences on the deployment of Manu A’s 
competencies.  
4.3.2.1 Background 
Established in 2005, the core business of Manu A is to market 
solar energy solutions, specialising in solar hybrid inverters. A 
subsidiary of Manu A acts as an integrator of these solutions. 
Under the GTFS, Manu A planned to establish a factory to 
manufacture solar hybrid inverters. The reason Manu A came 
up with the idea of establishing a factory to manufacture solar 
hybrid inverters was due to the growing demand in the region 
and the inability of their principal in Australia to supply the 
products for this growing demand. 
In terms of financing experience, Manu A’s experience is based 
on contract financing as their core business is the marketing of 
solar hybrid inverters. As a manufacturer, the new venture will 
be a significant change from Manu A’s existing core business. 




This significant change will also represent a new approach in 
terms of financing. These changes including financing under 
the GTFS context is a different context for Manu A in their 
transition from being a marketing firm into a manufacturing 
firm.  
4.3.2.2 Financing Application 
Manu A was seeking RM2.1 million to finance their factory to 
manufacture solar hybrid inverters for the South East Asian 
market. The factory was projected to have a return of 
investment (ROI) of 20%.  
Manu A had experience in marketing and contract financing. 
However, the nature of their new venture to set up a factory 
needed new plans. To help refine their new venture, the 
directors of Manu A had detailed plans for their factory, 
including technical expertise from their Australian principal. 
Manu A had also obtained a manufacturing licence from the 
government and gained special pioneer status17 which brings a 
10 year tax exemption for the factory. They had also engaged 
a technical consultant to help them with the technical details 
of the planning as shared by the managing director (MD) of 
Manu A, 
                                   
 
17 Special pioneer status is a 10 years tax exemption awarded by the Malaysian 
government to firms that manufacture new technologies. 




And then of course we have quite a number of expatriates here 
because this technology is new to Malaysia and currently we’ve got a 
couple of local engineers working with us and they’re trying to 
understand how to design and all those kind of things. So, if you look 
around Malaysia, for inverter, there’s never a product in Malaysia. 
(MD of Manu A)  
In terms of the marketing of the product, Manu A through 
their established marketing network in the industry manage to 
obtain a letter of intent from a government link company 
(GLC) for solar hybrid systems to be implemented on a wide 
scale in rural areas. Based on this there was this assumption 
by Manu A that had a captured and secured a sizeable market 
for rural electrification. In terms of financing, due to their 
established track record and the fact they already had the 
GTFS certification, Manu A was quite confident they would 
acquire financing. Therefore the financial aspect of the project 
was handled internally as expressed by the managing director 
(MD) of Manu A, 
At the moment, we’ve got an accountant with us, but…but the whole 
financial package is planned between the directors, that means D, 
myself and Steve. We are the three people doing one of many. (MD of 
Manu A) 
Here Manu A’s input from external resources were limited to 
the technical aspect of the new venture. Manu A applied for 
the GTFS certification through the GTFS website. The 
Managing Director of Manu A presented their business plans to 
the GTFS technical committee and the business review 
committee.  
In terms of the technical committee, they received good 
comments (e.g. high potential) their technical plans were 




deemed feasible and environmentally friendly. However, they 
received mix comments from the business review process by 
the financial institutions (specifically about the purchasers of 
the product). The outcome of the whole evaluation agreed to 
award the GTFS certificate to Manu A on the 13th of December 
2011. According to the Managing Director, who presented in 
front of both committees, the GTFS certification process was 
“easy”. Having felt that they had easily acquired the GTFS 
certification, Manu A assumed that financing would also be 
easy. This highlights the influence of the GTFS context on the 
financing application. 
Here they applied for financing from their main bank, a leading 
local, commercial bank. The application included various new 
sets of documentation required by the bank. Because they 
easily acquired GTFS certification, Manu A thought that the 
financing would also be as easy. Here Manu A complained 
about the documentation requirements which they deemed to 
be unnecessary documentation required by the bank. From 
Manu A’s perspective the bank was delaying the application.  
The Managing Director (MD) of Manu A described this 
documentation requirement as, 
[…] too much time is wasted. We were supposed to have set up the 
factory much earlier, but the financing is so slow. We already have 
obtained the export licence, manufacturing licence, pioneer status, tax 
free status […] but we can’t set up the factory because the financing 
part is slow. Even though GTFS has given us a letter, the bank is taking 
it as secondary. They’re more focus on other things. (Managing 
Director of Manu A) 
The quote below reveals Manu A’s intention to capitalize on 
the guarantee to mitigate any concerns about the new venture 




as part of their planning which might have contribute to their 
lax in upgrading their financing competencies. 
… the idea to make it into a manufacturing company […] [furthermore 
with] the GTFS finance says it’s guaranteed by the government, CGC.” 
This believe in the government guarantee might contribute to 
the reason why they felt that financing would be easy and 
apprehension towards the documentation request from the 
banks. 
Apart from the documentation, the managing director of Manu 
A also complained about the way the banks evaluated of the 
project. Here, he commented on the banks learning curve to 
evaluate technology based projects: 
[…] I think the banks they need to employ a mixture of people who 
understand projects, engineering. You see, if you look at most banks 
[…] they don’t understand technology. You can show the best 
technology, they just ignore. So I think it is a problem where the 
[bank’s] policy needs improvement where their people have to 
understand [technology]. (Managing Director of Manu A) 
Manu A shared their frustration at the pace of the financing 
process by venting: 
It is taking a lot of time [….] the government has got a plan but the 
government has to make sure that the plan succeeds.  
Since the day, we got the certificate, it’s been one year, no bank is 
interested. So to the bank, what the government say doesn’t mean 
anything. (Managing Director of Manu A) 
These quotes illustrate the frustration and the surprise the 
managing director of Manu A felt at the level of difficulty to 
acquire financing, even from their main bank. Manu A felt that 
GTFS financing would have been easier than their current 
projects which are value more than their GTFS venture. 




However there seems to be no bankers running to give them 
loans. 
There seems to be a competency gap on the part of Manu A as 
they could not provide what the banks wanted. It also 
highlights the misinterpretation of the financing environment 
from Manu A’s part. However for Manu A, they felt that this 
process was because of the bank’s lack of confidence in the 
government’s guarantee. The managing director and executive 
director of Manu A complained that the government guarantee 
was not respected by the financial institutions. This was 
repeatedly mentioned during the interviews:  
You see, the thing here, without looking at the detail, we put in the 
papers, right? Most banks straight away reject it. We can see that 
they’re showing minimum interest to GTFS. In fact, some of them 
propose that we should apply for normal financing, to ignore GTFS. 
(Managing Director of Manu A) 
As their application took longer than they anticipated, they 
started to apply financing from other banks. To their dismay 
these other banks also rejected them; some even rejected 
them outright without any explanation. To account for this the 
executive director exclaimed that: 
[…] when the bank turns down our application, they didn’t give us very 
concrete reasons but I called and I emailed them why […] they didn’t 
help us. They didn’t give such a concrete answer. Nothing. (Executive 
of Director of Manu A) 
This quote illustrates that due to a lack of feedback they were 
unable to learn from the experience of being rejected. This 
was later substantiated by a direct question to the executive 
director whether she learned anything from the multiple 
rejections, she replied “No”.  




One of the points for rejection was picked up by the interview. 
This point was the vagueness of the purchase of the products 
evident from the quote below from the managing director of 
Manu A and executive director of Manu A 
So the government has got a plan to electrify S** State, and that 
project is getting closer and closer. We have a lot of meetings that 
happen and our partners in these projects have also presented to the 
ministries, [and] even [the] Economic Council. So we know it’s getting 
closer. So we tied up all these facilities so that it [is] parallel [when] the 
project starts the factory is ready […] now the project is going to start, 
the factory doesn’t even exist. (Managing Director of Manu A) 
We showed to the bank, the letter of intent. They are worthless. 
(Executive Director of Manu A)  
Financing was initially approved by their main bankers based 
on the letter of intent and the threat that Manu A would take 
their business elsewhere. However the financing was revoked 
because the letter of intent did not translate into a purchase 















Figure 9 Financing flowchart for Manu A 
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4.3.2.4  Case summary of Manu A  
1. Manu A possessed existing competencies from 
implementing previous projects. These competencies helped 
them to acquire financing and implement their previous 
projects which were mainly in marketing solar hybrid solutions 
and based on contract financing. 
2. The new venture was different both in terms of financing 
and technical aspects which contributed to a competency gap. 
However having easily acquired GTFS certification they 
assumed that the financing would also be easy. Here Manu A 
misunderstood the new context and believed that obtaining 
financing would be easy. This perception was evident in their 
planning for the project, where Manu A felt that GTFS 
certification would help to absorb and mitigate the financial 
risk involved in their new venture. 
3. As a result Manu A emphasised more on the technical 
aspect of the projects by bringing consultants and outside 
expertise. However the marketing and the financing 
preparation and planning of the project were based on internal 
discussions without engaging any outside consultants.  
4. Even though the financing and technical aspect of the new 
venture was different in terms of scale and scope, the notion 
that financing would be easy influenced the deployment of 
Manu A’s competencies. As a result Manu A had decided to 
emphasis on their technical competencies but overlooked the 
importance of adapting/ reconfiguring their financing 
competencies. 
5. Furthermore, in spite of receiving multiple rejections from 
the banks, any learning from these rejections was not evident. 




In the end Manu A was not able to reconfigure their existing 
competencies to be deployed in the new context. 
4.3.3 Case three: Manu B 
The case study starts from the project inception and ends at 
the acquisition of financing from a business angel. The 
description of case three will explain the background of Manu 
B in terms of their previous financing and business experience. 
A narrative of the financing application under the GTFS is also 
included as a means to compare and contrast Manu B’s 
background with their new business venture and financing 
application under the GTFS. After several attempts to acquire 
financing under the GTFS, Manu B chose a different route and 
acquired financing from a business angel. This case study 
highlights the contextual influences on the deployment of 
Manu B’s competencies, the necessary competencies needed 
to acquire financing and how these competencies were 
developed. 
4.3.3.1 Background 
Manu B was established in 2011 by a returning Malaysian 
entrepreneur who had resided in Germany for the past 30 
years. The owner of Manu B did not have any experience in 
the manufacturing business and was formerly in the sports 
retail industry in Germany. However the management team of 
Manu B comprised of experienced professionals and 
consultants in various related business fields.  
Manu B was established to participate in the growing green 
technology market in Malaysia. Manu B envisioned to 
participate in the green technology market by manufacturing 




green technology based insulation materials. The licensing 
technology to manufacture the material is from a high 
technology German company owned by the German 
government and established German industrial firms. Manu B 
was also appointed the sole distributor for Asia (including the 
middle-east).  
The new project embarked by the management of Manu B was 
different from their previous ventures on several levels 
including the country context, the new venture itself, and the 
GTFS context. 
4.3.3.2 Financing application 
The seed funding for Manu B’s factory was internally 
generated from the owner and investors. Manu B was seeking 
further financing for their factory to manufacture an insulation 
material based on nanotechnology and green technology. The 
total financing required is RM 5,983,437 with a projected ROI 
of 87.00% for 10 years.  
The owners of Manu B had limited experience conducting 
business in the Malaysian market. Therefore they had formed 
a team consisting of multi-disciplinary business professionals 
and consultants to help them to acquire financing and run the 
factory as explained by the managing director (MD) of Manu 
B: 
We have one person, [from] an external company, through our 
networking she is a finance consultant. She placed one of her staff 
between six months to one year to help in terms of the finance. 
(Managing Director of Manu B) 




However in terms of financing and marketing decisions it still 
rest with the management of Manu B. 
Manu B also sent their engineers for training in Germany, 
We have engineers, biotechnologist, I sent them to Germany for 
training, for the last week we already pass bgfurcher, manufacturing 
certification in Germany. We can produce for the world’s navies. So we 
are the only company that can produce for the navy in Malaysia. 
(Managing Director of Manu B) 
To further fortify their investment readiness Manu B applied 
for the GTFS certification. Manu B applied for the GTFS 
certification through the GTFS website. Manu B presented their 
business plans to the technical committee and the business 
review committee. In terms of the technical committee, they 
received good comments (e.g. on the potential of the 
product). Even though they passed the business review 
process, there were some cautionary comments (e.g. 
uncertain buyers). Manu B was eventually awarded the green 
technology certificate on the 4th of June 2012. Both the 
presentations were led by the managing director. Here the 
managing director of Manu B commented that the GTFS 
certification process was easy. 
Manu B and their team of consultants were aware of the 
existence of a competency gap however they were quite 
confident they would acquire financing under the GTFS 
because of the GTFS certification benefits. Furthermore apart 
from that Manu B also had a pilot project with the Royal 
Malaysian Navy and a confirmed order from Germany. 
However to their dismay, their financing applications were 
rejected by the financial institutions. The managing director 




(MD) of Manu B expressed his frustration at this, and then 
recounted his business experience in Germany. Here he said, 
I can sell your product for Germany but I don’t have money. It is ok we 
sent the product first and then use sell. Here it’s difficult, here we are 
so difficult to start, no money to fund no money to buy machine. I 
have never seen this before maybe this is a culture. Germany is simple, 
you make a contract, I am selling some marine product, shake hand 
finish, everyone’s ok, 
Sometimes in Germany you don’t need bank money you can just use 
credit. (MD of Manu B) 
These two quotes illustrate the fact that his business ideas are 
entrenched in the German way of doing things and also in his 
previous retail business; he had not adapted to the way things 
are done in Malaysia. He also commented on the GTFS 
scheme. 
Our product is good; we think that our product is good. During the 
presentation to Greentech and [the] bank[s], everything was ok, but 
when the bank came again [they said] our company is too young, [we 
must] must have three years audited accounts. (Managing Director of 
Manu B) 
This quote illustrates the difference between the GTFS 
evaluation and the actual financing context during the 
financing application. This was further compounded by the 
assumptions by Manu B about the GTFS as illustrated by the 
quote below:  
 It is not Greentech it is the bank that decides, that was our problem. 
(Managing Director of Manu B) 
It is noteworthy, this misconception in terms of GTFS is that 
by applying through the GTFS, funding will be made readily 
available. This is apparent from the Managing Director of Manu 




B suggestion that the funds should be with GTFS instead of the 
banks. Furthermore this signals a misinterpretation by Manu B 
in scanning the environment in this case the financing context.  
When explaining the reason why they were rejected, the 
managing director (MD) of Manu B said the reason given was 
that they did not qualify for financing because they were a 
young company at that point of time. However Manu B was 
not satisfied with this answer and even went to see the CEO of 
the Bank as shown below, 
We submitted our loan application to S** bank through a consultant. 
The Shah Alam branch said it would be hard to get and rejected the 
application. We [even] went to the CEO of S** Bank. They say that the 
product is new, a one-time sale item. (Managing Director of Manu B) 
It was revealed here that the bank had an impression that the 
product was unique, and therefore had no potential for a 
recurring sale. This exemplifies not only the bank’s limited 
knowledge about the product and but it also reflects the 
knowledge asymmetry of the banks in evaluating new 
technologies. Even though Manu B had a financial consultant, 
the financial consultant could not convince the banks. 
This was evident during the business pitching session where 
one of the bankers who had attended the pitching session 
commented that Manu B had a limited track record. Even 
though Manu B claimed that the product was good, the bank 
did not want to spend time verifying the size of the market. 
Here the banker, senior credit officer (SCO) Bank 4 said: 
[…] without the track record [the] bankers, they don’t have the 
expertise to verify your technology […] [what about] the buyer, no off-
take whether they want it or not […] it’s a little bit tough, financing 




new technologies in the market without an off-take […] (SCO of Bank 
4) 
The managing director of Manu B admitted that the product 
might be new and unique as shown below, 
Maybe because of the product [is] new and unique, if I apply 
something that everybody knows, I will get [financing]. Now I am 
trying something new, [it is] hard for them to believe. (MD of Manu B) 
However he also highlights that the banks have difficulties in 
believing in the product which indicates the need to refine the 
opportunity and communicate it to the satisfaction of the 
banks which Manu B was unable at that point of time because 
of their competence gap. This quote also shows the difficulties 
to acquire financing regardless of the government guarantee 
for the technology.  
Manu B had also been soliciting financing from various sources 
outside GTFS. Even though they were rejected under the GTFS 
scheme it also offered them to understand the Malaysian 
financing context. The learning from the financing rejection 
and the external consultants was not enough to acquire 
financing under the GTFS context but it helped them to 
acquire financing from a business angel. Figure 10 shows the 





Figure 10 Financing flowchart for Manu B 
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CO: Credit officer CC: Credit Committee BA: Business angel 
vC: Venture capital VCC: Venture capital committee 
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4.3.3.3  Case summary of Manu B  
1. Manu B had existing competencies that was developed in a 
in a different context. Manu B understood the existence of a 
competency gap. Here they had with them a management 
team comprised of experienced professionals and consultants 
in various related business fields to guide them to understand 
the new venture and the new context.  
2. Even though they were assisted by consultants, Manu B had 
misinterpreted the environment, which caused a 
misconception that to acquire financing under the GTFS would 
be easy. In a way this perception was further aided by the fact 
that Manu B was awarded the GTFS certification without any 
difficulties. The notion influenced the full deployment of Manu 
B’s competencies to acquire financing. 
3. This notion also led Manu B to a financing rejection cycle in 
their financing application under the GTFS. The financing 
rejection cycle highlighted the necessary competencies needed 
to acquire financing under the GTFS. Here the necessary 
competencies were concerned with the need to refine the 
opportunity and the ability to convince and communicate the 
venture to financiers and bankers. 
4. From the financing rejection cycle and external consultants, 
Manu B managed to develop the necessary competencies. 
These competencies were later used to acquire financing from 
a business angel and not under the GTFS.  
4.3.4  Case four: Solar C 
The case study starts from the project inception and ends after 
financing was acquired. The description of case four will 
describe the background of Solar C in terms of their previous 




financing and business experience. A narrative of the financing 
application under the GTFS is also included as a means to 
compare and contrast Solar C’s background with their new 
business venture and financing application under the GTFS. 
Solar C acquired financing under the GTFS after several 
attempts. This case study highlights the contextual influences 
on the deployment of Solar C’s competencies, the necessary 
competencies needed to acquire financing and how these 
competencies were developed. 
4.3.4.1 Background 
Solar C was established in its present form in 1998. Over the 
years Solar C has established itself as an experienced energy 
service company with strong technical credentials in solar 
photovoltaic installation and renewable energy consultancy. 
Solar C is one of the first entrepreneurial firms to be involved 
in solar technology in Malaysia. They have embark on several 
notable projects such as the Malaysia Building Integrated 
Photovoltaic (MBPIV) Project, a national project that saw 
photovoltaic introduced expansively in Malaysia.  
Even though Solar C has wide experience in terms of solar 
projects, their participation in these projects is either as 
contractors or consultants. The financing experience that they 
have is on the based on these projects which is based on 
contract financing. The current project under the GTFS that 
Solar C is embarking on is a large scale solar farm. The scope 
and scale of this project is new to Solar C, especially in terms 
of their role as an independent power producer and project 
financing. 





4.3.4.2 Financing application 
Solar C was seeking RM60 million to finance a 17 acre solar 
farm located in Melaka. The project has an IRR of 15.00% and 
ROI of 8 years.  
As part of their investment readiness Solar C applied for the 
GTFS certification through the GTFS website. The Managing 
Director of Solar C presented their business plans to the 
technical committee and business review committee. Solar C 
received good comments from both the technical committee 
and the business review committee. They were later awarded 
the green technology certificate in 8 Nov 2011. The 
documentation submitted to the GTFS committee by Solar C 
was highly technical and accompanied by reports from 
technical consultants assuring the technical feasibility of the 
project. There were also financial documentations (e.g. IRR, 
cash flow analysis) to support the business case of the project. 
Overall Solar C felt that the GTFS certification process did not 
present any difficulty for them. 
To further refine the venture and strengthen their investment 
worthiness they had purchased a 17 acre plot of land for the 
solar farm. Furthermore they obtained the feed in tariff quota 
on the 1st of December 2011 and subsequently signed the 
Renewable Energy Power Purchasing Agreement (REPPA) with 
the national utility. Solar C had taken steps to address the 
technical and marketing needs. Even though the RM60 million 
is the biggest loan amount that they had taken thus far, they 
appeared to be quite confident that with the GTFS certification 




and benefits they would be well-placed to acquire the 
financing from the banks. 
For the first, second, third, and fourth attempt at financing, 
Solar C’s application was rejected at the credit officer stage. 
This included the international bank with which they had 
relationship as they had funded them for their previous multi-
million ringgit project. The reason for the rejection was that 
the project was new and the bank could not refer to any 
similar projects in Malaysia.  
Solar C persevered and continuously applied for financing, 
eventually they were called for additional assessment by three 
banks (fifth, sixth and seventh applied to). By the fifth 
attempt, Solar C managed to convince the credit officer, 
however it was later rejected at the credit committee stage 
due to the “newness” of the project. They continued with the 
other two financial institutions. Solar C eventually accepted 
the financial institution that gave the financing approval first 
from the two. 
According to the senior finance executive (SFE) of Solar C, 
they submitted their application to Bank 2 on the 5th of March 
2012. Bank 2 took almost seven months to evaluate their 
application, in between this there were several presentations 
and meetings. They finally approved the financing for Solar C 
on 6th of November 2012. Relating the financing application, 
senior finance executive (SFE) of Solar C said,  
[…] we are in this industry so we just proceed with what we have […] 
we thought that the financing application would be easy, looking back 
it took a year to acquire financing […] (SFE of Solar C) 




This quote also highlights the perceived easiness to acquire 
financing by Solar C under the GTFS. This misinterpretation of 
the GTFS context might have been contributed by Solar C’s 
environmental scanning. This contextual influence proved to 
have a considerable effect in Solar C’s deployment of their 
competencies during the financing application, especially in 
terms of financing skills. 
In a separate interview with the senior credit officer (SCO) of 
Bank 2, he explained the credit evaluation process will 
definitely differ between industries including green technology 
projects. He admitted that in terms of credit evaluation for 
green technology financing among the banks; bankers need to 
learn more and the present evaluation process was not 
sufficient for the banks to finance green technology projects. 
This argument also indicated that for established 
entrepreneurial firms to obtain green technology financing 
under the normal credit criteria be difficult. 
When sharing the reason why Solar C obtained financing, 
senior credit officer (SCO) of Bank 2 explained that Solar C 
was able to show the whole picture of their project, from the 
start to the end. They were able to present the business model 
for the project up to the understanding and comfort of the 
bank’s executives. Here he said: 
[That] one I financed; the whole thing is complete. Before you can ask 
one question, they already answered you everything. Before you can 
even ask, they will explain to you. They will do the presentation [on 
the] costing, about the durability of the product. They have all the 
evidence to show that it’s a good product. They showed everything. 
Even the component […] how is it made, what’s the layering, because 
we actually learn from them (SCO of Bank 2). 




As the evidence from the senior credit officer of Bank 2 
illustrates, Solar C managed to communicate the complete 
picture of the project up to level, where learning took place 
between the SCO and Solar C. This contributed to minimizing 
the knowledge asymmetry surrounding the green technology 
project but also the credit evaluation process for green 
technology financing. This eventually led to Bank 2 deciding to 
approve the financing for Solar C. The senior credit officer 
(SCO) of Bank 2 admitted that Solar C was the first firm that 
he financed for green technology and this had become a 
benchmark against which he could compare other applicants. 
This highlights the importance of the ability to communicate 
and educate the bankers above their knowledge asymmetry in 
order to acquire financing. 
According to the managing director (MD) of Solar C, they had 
previously obtained financing from Bank 2; however this was 
during the early stages of their business. Relating to their 
financing application to Bank2, the senior finance executive 
(SFE) of Solar C shared that Bank 2 was not the first bank in 
their mind. When explaining how they engaged Bank 2, the 
senior finance executive (SFE) of Solar C said: 
Yes, we are directly involved, [in] the presentation, we attend the 
presentation, the technical meeting, they have technical meeting, they 
want to resolve some , any questions because they do not have expert 
so we have to attend, we have to present […] 
[…] we go together with [suppliers to] the banks to convince them that 
this project is reliable is, is good for the company, is good for the, the 
industry and the country, we go together with SEDA [FiT regulators] to 
clarify every enquiries that the bankers have[...] 
(SFE of Solar C) 




These arguments illustrate the multiple presentations and 
meetings Solar C had with Bank 2. These were led by the 
founder of the company; they even brought in their suppliers 
to this meetings and presentations and on occasions for points 
of clarification they were able to bring in the Sustainable 
Energy Development Authority (SEDA) to explain to the banks. 
For Bank 2, this further strengthened the notion that Solar C 
would be able to deliver and manage this new venture 
successfully. 
This argument illustrates the extreme measures that Solar C 
took to dispel any notion of knowledge asymmetry between 
them and Bank 2. Having reassured Bank 2, they were able to 
close the gap by presenting the whole picture of the project to 
address the knowledge asymmetry that existed in their 
financing evaluation. This in turn educated the credit officer 
about the project. 
To evaluate the reasons why Solar C was financed, it was 
revealed that Solar C was being coached under the high 
potential entrepreneurship program called TERAS18. They were 
inducted to the program on the 20th July 2012. One of the key 
                                   
 
18 The TERAS programme was launched on 20 July 2011 to help entrepreneurial 
firms improve their business by supporting them through facilitating human and 
financial capital (e.g. business coaching)  




intentions of TERAS is to facilitate financing. Being coached by 
TERAS, Solar C was able to raise their level of refining the 
opportunity through the up skilling of their financing skills. 
This became evident from the statement from the Managing 
Director:  
Yes, the TERAS program provided business coaching programs. It is 
conducted by a financial expert from D auditing firm, a senior partner. 
The sharing of financial experience has helped us in reorganising our 
financial strategy and manage our taxes better. (MD of Solar C) 
This statement also offers insights on how Solar C developed 
the necessary competencies to bridge the financing gap to 
obtain financing. Apart from the GTFS, Solar C also used the 
new financing skills on other financing schemes. The outcome 
of the coaching was evident as Solar C had also obtained the 
highly competitive facilitation financing for their project under 
the government public financing initiative (PFI). This 
facilitation financing is on a reimbursable basis, specifically for 
the infrastructure of their project. This further refined the 
investment readiness of their new venture. Figure 11 shows 
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4.3.4.3  Case summary of Solar C  
1. Solar C has existing competencies developed during their 
previous projects. These competencies had helped them to 
acquire financing and implement their previous projects which 
were mainly in solar photovoltaic installation and based on 
contract financing.  
2. The new venture was different in terms of financing, 
technical aspects, scale and scope. These differences in the 
new venture presented Solar C with a competency gap. 
However acquiring the GTFS certification gave the impression 
that financing would be readily be available. Here, the GTFS 
context influenced the deployment of their competencies in the 
new venture. There was more emphasis on the technical 
aspect of the new venture with technical consultants being 
engaged to help with refining the new venture. However the 
financial aspect was an in-house matter for Solar C. 
3. As a result of the notion that financing would be easy, C 
tried to leverage on the 60% government guarantee for a 
larger amount of financing. Due to this notion and their 
existing competencies, Solar C went into a financing rejection 
cycle. The financing rejection cycle helped to identify the 
necessary competencies needed to acquire financing under the 
GTFS. Here there was a need for more refinement of the new 
venture, and the ability to convince, communicate and educate 
the bankers above the knowledge asymmetry of the banks. 
4. Initially, Solar C had difficulty bridging the competency gap. 
However, learning derived from the financing rejections and 
the TERAS business coaching program helped them to bridge 
the competency gap. Solar C managed to reconfigure their 




existing competencies from the business coaching program as 
it facilitated their learning process (e.g. new strategies, new 
funds, failure explanation) 
4.3.5  Case five: Biomass D 
The case study starts from the project inception and after the 
acquisition of financing. The description of case five will 
describe the background of Biomass D in terms of their 
previous financing and business experience. A narrative of the 
financing application under the GTFS is also included as a 
means to compare and contrast Biomass D’s background with 
their new business venture and financing application under the 
GTFS. Biomass D managed to acquire financing in the first 
attempt. This case study highlights the contextual influences 
on the deployment of Biomass D’s competencies, the 
necessary competencies needed to acquire financing and how 
these competencies were developed. 
4.3.5.1 Background 
Biomass D was established in 2008 by two established 
entrepreneurs. They recognized empty fruit bunches’ (EFB)19 
potential as a fuel source to generate electricity, but did not 
                                   
 
19 EFB are waste products from the oil palm industry after they have extracted the 
oil from the palm oil, palm oil mills would pay to get rid of this waste. 




have the financial ability to move forward. In 12 October 
2009, Biomass D signed an equity investment agreement with 
a foreign public listed company. While the original owners 
were familiar with the Malaysian business context and had 
experience in the supply of the EFB, the new equity partners 
brought with them technical and financial experience of 
implementing and managing a power plant. The infusion of 
capital from the new partners enabled them to start planning 
for the project.  
Even though this was a new venture for Biomass D, it had 
similarities with the management team previous projects; 
technically and financial. In technical terms, the management 
team had experienced being an independent power producer 
in a neighbouring country. While in terms of financing, the 
management team of Biomass D had specific power plant 
project financing experience. Therefore, in the case of Biomass 
D, based on the management team financing and business 
experience it was not a transition to a totally new venture. 
4.3.5.2 Financing application 
Biomass D was seeking a total financing of RM120 million with 
RM50 million for the green technology component. The IRR of 
the project is 14% and the payback period estimated to be 
eight years.  
As part of their investment readiness preparation, Biomass D 
had signed an agreement to supply renewable energy to the 
national grid under the small renewable energy programme 
(SREP) in 2010. However in 2011, after the Feed in Tariff (FiT) 
legislation was put in place, Biomass D migrated to the new 




renewable energy power purchase agreement (RePPA) with 
the national utility company with more competitive rates than 
SREP.  
Aforementioned in 4.3.5.1 Biomass D has relevant experience 
related to the project. However they still engaged both 
technical and financial consultants to make their venture 
investment ready. The technical consultants they engaged 
were technical consultants who had earlier commissioned the 
first biomass power plant in Malaysia known as Kina and 
Seguntor. They also put a retainer on the Managing Director of 
Kina and Seguntor as their supporting consultant. Based on 
the consultants’ advice, the major component of the power 
plant was sourced from a world renowned technology 
company, which had already established themselves in the 
field. Biomass D also brought in people that had related 
experience to facilitate various other issues such as 
development approval from the local authorities. The financial 
consultants that were engaged had experience in financing 
power plants in the South East Asian region. They also had a 
local financing consultant to assist them with their application.  
As part of increasing the investment worthiness of the 
venture, the management team prepared the detailed account 
of the project by mapping the whole ecosystem of the project 
(e.g. land, the supply of the material, the technology 
providers, cash flow analysis, by-products, REPPA etc.). Here, 
apart from supplying electricity to the national grid Biomass D 
had successfully applied to be part of the United Nations Clean 
Development Mechanism (UN-CDM) programme to enter the 
carbon market and sell their carbon credits. The opportunity 




refinement for the venture undertaken by Biomass D saw that 
they were not only supplying electricity to the national grid but 
also selling their carbon credits and by-products from the 
energy generation.  
In addition, one of the co-founders owned a sizeable piece of 
land that was centrally located within the oil-palm plantation 
zone which made it logistically feasible to transport the EFB to 
the power plant. While, another co-founder was the former 
senior director of estates in Malaysia; he brought with him the 
negotiating power to deal with the surrounding oil palm 
plantations for the raw material. This made the whole picture 
of the venture a very solid proposition for the financial 
institutions that were approached to finance the deal.  
Biomass D followed the normal application process for 
participating in the GTFS. They applied for the GTFS 
certification through the GTFS website. The Executive 
Chairman of Biomass D presented to the technical committee 
and the business presentation review. 
In terms of the technical committee, they received positive 
comments (e.g. good logistics and RePPA) from both the 
technical committee and the review process by the financial 
institutions. They received their GTFS certificate on the 4th of 
January 2011. As they started the project before the GTFS, 
their overall preparation was not influenced by the GTFS 
context.  
Therefore the GTFS was an unanticipated bonus to the 
feasibility of the venture and as such, all the previous 




preparation increased the investment readiness of their 
venture for the GTFS scheme 
Having received the GTFS certificate Biomass D applied for 
financing concurrently to two banks in Malaysia. The financing 
application to the banks began in November 2011. Biomass D 
had various meetings with the banks and made both technical 
and financial presentations. During these meetings concerns 
were raised by the banks about the supply of raw material. 
They received approval for financing from both of the banks in 
January 2012. However they accepted only one which was in 
line with their financing needs. The financing from the other 
bank that Biomass D rejected was only limited for 
infrastructure development.  
While the financing approval took only three months, the 
preparation took three years. In describing the long journey 
the executive chairman of Biomass D said: 
 We have come a long way since the early days of the project, and this 
signing of the loan agreement for the Islamic Banking Facilities 
represents the confidence of M Bank in the project and in the ability of 
the company to achieve and deliver its business objectives. (Executive 
chairman of Biomass D) 
In reference to the financing application the executive director 
of Biomass D said  
The successful signing of the Islamic Banking Facilities by BIOMASS D is 
a significant milestone in the development of the power plant project 
as part of its long term financing plan, and we are pleased that with 
this under our belt, it shall pave the way ahead for an expeditious 
completion of the said power plant. (Executive director of Biomass D) 
Both these quotes illustrate the commitment behind the 
planning and the preparation to make Biomass D investment 




ready. The significance and importance of obtaining financing 
for the project was evident as it suggests the bank’s 
confidence both in the project and the ability of Biomass D to 
manage the venture and ultimately, the ability to pay the bank 
back.  
When accounting for his thoughts about why Biomass D 
obtained the project financing, the executive chairman 
attributed it to the financing abilities of the foreign partners. 
He also acknowledged they had the team to implement the 
project and Kina and Seguntor as the reference project. This 
became a powerful example for the banks to project an image 
of the outcome of the power plant that they were building. 
This proved pivotal for convincing the bank. The executive 
chairman of Biomass D stated:  
Yes, number one is a financial ability[...] Number two, I think we have 
the people to run the show […] and [we have as reference] Kina and 
Seguntor[…][they are able] to produce electricity from Empty Fruit 
Bunches. (Executive chairman of Biomass D) 
The move by Biomass D in having the Kina and Seguntor 
power plant project as a project reference was significant. The 
Kina and Seguntor project represented a successful working 
model for an EFB based power plant project in Malaysia. 
Biomass D had used the same technical consultants that were 
involved and had the Managing Director of Kina and Seguntor 
as a supporting consultant. The technical consultant helped to 
prepare the documentation. Biomass D also sent their 
engineers for training in Kina and Seguntor. The foreign 
partners had experience of building power plants but Biomass 
D were using a different raw material. This suggests that the 




Kina and Seguntor project helped Biomass D’s learning curve; 
knowledge was transferred through the management and 
technical attachment programs between Biomass D and Kina 
and Seguntor. In a separate interview with one of the bankers 
SCO Bank 3, she described the Kina and Seguntor project as 
the most successful biomass power plant project in Malaysia. 
For the bank, the fact that Biomass D modelled their project 
on Kina and Seguntor helped them overcome the knowledge 
gap to understand how an EFB power plant functions. This, 
combined with the other credit criteria requirement, facilitated 
the decision to finance Biomass D.  
After Biomass D acquired financing, they are currently being 
courted as partners in other Biomass projects. Figure 12 
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4.3.5.3 Case summary of Biomass D  
1. The management team of Biomass D had relevant business 
and financing experiences in relation to their venture. However 
there was still a notion of a competency gap.  
2. Even though there were contextual influences from the 
GTFS context, it was not enough to influence the 
environmental scanning by Biomass D. As a result, Biomass D 
was less influenced by the GTFS context. Due to this, Biomass 
D management team had engaged both technical and financial 
consultants to help refine the opportunity. As a result the 
management team of Biomass D had extensively refined their 
business plan according to the credit criteria set by the bank.  
3. Biomass D further enhanced their investment readiness by 
linking their venture with an ongoing Biomass power plant 
which acted as a demonstration project. By engaging the 
management of the reference project as their consultant team 
they were able to learn and train from an on-going biomass 
power plant. These steps taken by Biomass D alleviated the 
concerns of the project feasibility by the banks for their 
venture and helped them to acquire financing. 
4. Activities such as on-site training in Kina and Seguntor 
power plant also became a part of the competency 
development process for Biomass D. This aided Biomass D to 
reconfigure their existing competencies and to refine the 
opportunity and acquire financing from the bankers. 
4.3.6  Case six: Solar D 
The case study starts at the time of the project’s inception and 
ends with the acquisition of financing. The description of case 
six will describe the background of Solar D in terms of their 




previous financing and business experience. A narrative of the 
financing application under the GTFS is also included as a 
means to compare and contrast Solar D’s background with 
their new business venture and financing application under the 
GTFS. Solar D managed to acquire financing in the first 
attempt. Another difference in Solar D’s case is that they 
acquired financing first before acquiring the GTFS certification. 
This case study highlights the contextual influences on the 
deployment of Solar D’s competencies, the necessary 
competencies needed to acquire financing and how these 
competencies were developed. 
 
4.3.6.1 Background 
Established in 2011, Solar D is a subsidiary of an 
environmental engineering company specialising in landfill 
rehabilitation. The management of Solar D is the same as the 
management team from their parent company. In their 
previous projects they were concessionaires for landfill 
rehabilitation. They were the first to move into landfill 
rehabilitation in the country. The rehabilitation of landfills 
needed special technical skills and project financing skills. 
The present venture that they embarking on is an integrated 
renewable energy park which compromise mostly of solar 
energy. This integrated renewable energy park is to be built on 
rehabilitated landfill. Even though there are some similarities 
with their previous project in terms of project financing, the 
scope of their new project was different and presents a new 
challenge for Solar D’s management team. 




4.3.6.2 Financing application 
Solar D was seeking financing for RM75million. The total cost 
of the project was RM 110,378,949 with an IRR of 8.92% and 
a ROI of 15 years. The project is a renewable energy park 
comprising a solar farm and biogas facilities on top of a 
rehabilitated landfill.  
Scanning the environment Solar D recognised that they 
needed to bring outside expertise (e.g. world established 
suppliers, technical and project partners). Here, Solar D 
understood that they were new to this field and to refine this 
opportunity they would need additional expertise. To do so 
they brought on board project partners who had experience in 
gaining renewable energy concessions from the government. 
To further refine the opportunity, they acquired not only 
outside technical expertise but concurrently nurtured in house 
talent. When explaining the need to nurture technical talent 
within the company, the general manager of Solar D 
highlighted the fact that the pool of expertise in the market for 
solar energy during this time was very limited.  
All these steps would strengthen their competency base and 
bridge the competency gap faster. This was explained by the 
senior finance manager (SFM) who stated that Solar D had the 
experience of taking on projects outside of their core expertise 
and internalising the expertise later on. He said that this has 
proved very beneficial for them. Here he explains,  
So, with the experience of the construction in landscaping […] we also 
venture into [landfilling]. This is when we started to do landfilling. We 
don’t do it by ourselves…we bring in some expertise…get some 
technology from overseas. So, all these are actually helping us. Then, 




we expend from there. It’s not a one, two years change. It’s actually 
taken few years before we actually become [what we are] today […] 
(SFM Solar D) 
This explanation by the senior finance manager (SFM) of Solar 
D collaborates with Solar D project partner’s explanation of 
why Solar D picked them as their project partners. Indeed, 
they explained that Solar D was aware that the process of 
financing would be lengthy and it was something that was 
beyond their existing expertise; hence they decided on a 
project partner that had relevant experience as argued below, 
[…]they have in a way significant presence in the green technology, 
green space , but our strength comes in is that we have structured so 
many concessions in the past, in fact we have done maybe two dozens 
[in] the last four, five years so they view our strength to basically be 
able to handhold them throughout the process because it’s a very 
cumbersome project, it’s a very lengthy and you know and a lot pitfalls 
and a lot of a you know challenges in the process. (Project partner of 
Solar D) 
As part of investment readiness efforts Solar D applied for the 
feed-in-tariff and were awarded the quota on 1st of Dec 2011 
and subsequently signed a Renewable Energy Power 
Purchasing Agreement (REPPA) with the national utility.  
Solar D began the financing process by approaching various 
financial institutions instead of applying for the GTFS 
certification. This was in line with Solar D’s financing strategy. 
According to the project partner the rational was that if they 
were to apply directly through the GTFS it would suggest being 
“special” in some sense. For them instead of being an 
advantage it might prove to be a disadvantaged; i.e. the belief 
was that the label GTFS would mean a more stringent the 
evaluation by the banks.  




The project partners wanted to dispel any notion that the 
project was unable to stand on its’ own two feet and had to be 
supported by a government programme to be viable. This also 
indicates that being in a “special” government programme 
may have adverse impacts instead. 
Solar D approached two banks, a leading local bank and an 
international bank. The application was advanced due to a pre-
existing relationship and the fact that the parent company was 
a public listed company also helped open doors for Solar D. 
The first part of the application included convincing the credit 
officer. This was based on the 5Cs as there was no exception 
to the rule in evaluating Green Technology projects. 
The banks deployed the same evaluation criteria set 
regardless of any government assistance targeted to lower the 
risk. In other words, it also indicates that it did not matter 
which route Solar D took, because the viability of the project 
was the primary concern of the bank. If Solar D could 
demonstrate the project viability, this would generate 
sufficient confidence for the bank to finance the venture with 
or without the GTFS certification. 
Even though Solar D was backed by their parent company, the 
financing process was lengthy. This was not only attributed to 
the rigidity of the financial evaluation that Solar D had to 
undergo. As explained by the project partner the length of the 
process was also due to the learning curve of the banks about 
green technology in terms of understanding the project and 
the understanding the financials that are specific to green 
technology projects. In other words, there was a knowledge 




asymmetry in relation to green technology projects at that 
point of time.  
Therefore it was the project partner’s task to translate all the 
technical aspects in order to bridge the knowledge asymmetry 
of the credit officer, and thus assist their understanding of the 
project’s business case. Solar D presented their case to the 
banks and they were able to communicate the whole picture of 
the project to the credit officer, thus bridging the knowledge 
asymmetry to help the credit officer understand the project 
holistically. 
Helping to explain further the process of convincing the banks, 
the senior finance manager (SFM) of Solar D said 
[…] in order to persuade the banker, we have to tell them our business 
strategies […] we have to tell them our plans for the current plant that 
we build and then we have to explain to them what is solar plant. How 
they actually generate electricity […] bring them to the site […] the 
technology supplier is also very important. We have to use the top 
notch [suppliers], the one [that are] reputable in US, Germany, Korean 
like LG and Toshiba. (SFM of Solar D) 
Recalling the project’s approval, the senior credit officer (SCO) 
of Bank 5 shared that Solar D fits the ideal green technology 
entrepreneur: 
The ideal Green Technology Entrepreneur would be somebody with a 
viable business, fits the credit criteria, have the expertise and 
experience, support from parent company, collateral, commitment, 
consultant to help with the completion of the project, able to 
understand the business without consultant by doing their own 
research. Really look at the feasibility and the ability to communicate 
the whole picture. (SCO of Bank 5) 
This clarification from the banks also illustrates the additional 
criteria placed upon green technology entrepreneurial firms to 




ensure viability and mitigate any risk. The emphasis is on the 
reliability of the project and the ability of the entrepreneurial 
firm to communicate the whole picture (e.g. reliability, the 
technology, the process etc.) of the project to ensure the 
credit officer understands and is satisfied. 
To further explain the evaluation process, the project partner 
explained that the two aspects of financing evaluation; the 
quantitative part (e.g. financing ratios etc.) and the qualitative 
part. Even if you pass the quantitative part, without the 
qualitative part obtaining financing would be difficult as the 
learning gap would not have been bridged. Here the project 
partners explained: 
So you might pass the numbers but [if] you don’t pass the qualitative 
part because [they] don’t know what [you] are talking about, there is a 
lot of unexplained and [everything] suddenly [become] efficiency, 
extraordinary…things like my IRR is 20% […] so they kick you out not 
because you are not bankable or the numbers but they don’t trust you 
as simple as that. (Project partner Solar D) 
To sum up the financing process for Solar D, the financial 
controller of Solar D explained the difficulty of obtaining 
financing was due to the learning curve, for the banks and for 
them. Here she explains: 
[…] we did, I think we, they have a learning curve, [and] we have a 
learning curve on how to deal with them as well. They, it’s their first 
renewable energy, or they say it’s their first green loan as well, even 
though this bank that we are talking about is an international bank. 
(Financial Controller of Solar D). 
Overall, there was a learning curve for the entrepreneurial firm 
and the bank, which contributed to the knowledge asymmetry 
present during the financing application. Solar D addressed 




this knowledge asymmetry with the help their project partner, 
which facilitated Solar D’s ability to communicate the “whole 
picture” of the project, which in turn, contributed to convincing 
the banks to finance this project. 
The next stage of the process was the GTFS application. After 
acquiring the approval for financing from the bank, Solar D 
applied for their GTFS certification. No significant problems 
were encountered at this stage as the purpose of the GTFS 
was to ensure the business and technology viability of the 
venture. Since Solar D had already convinced the bank of the 
venture’s viability; this made the GTFS certification process 
much more straightforward. 
Solar D then approached the financial institution that gave 
them the financing and requested that the terms and 
conditions (i.e. the benefits) of the GTFS scheme be awarded 
to them. Currently Solar D has offered their services as a 
turnkey contractors for renewable energy projects. Figure 13 
shows the financing flowchart of Solar D. 
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4.3.6.3  Case summary of Solar D  
1. Solar D’s previous business experience helped them to scan 
and identify the existence of a competency gap between their 
existing competencies and that of the new business venture. 
Based on their environmental scanning, Solar D decided to 
acquire financing first before applying for the GTFS 
certification. Because of this decision, the influence of the 
GTFS context was diverted.  
2. Because Solar D chose to acquire financing without the 
GTFS certification the technical and financial aspect of the 
project was treated on the same scale. This was partly evident 
from the external technical and financial inputs. The financing 
route taken by Solar D avoided the influence of the GTFS 
context to the deployment of competencies. 
3. Here Solar D started by refining the new venture for it to be 
investment ready. The refinement process was a tedious 
process and involved multiple parties. In convincing the banks, 
Solar D also had to convince and educate to overcome the 
bank’s knowledge asymmetry. 
4. The insight from this case study is that Solar D developed 
their competencies by collaborating with experienced project 
partners, training internal staff and acquiring external 
expertise in the area. 
4.4 Summary of the Case Studies 
The cases detailed above illustrate the influence of the GTFS 
context on the process and outcome of financing. While each 




of the case studies was situated within the same GTFS 
context, the diversity amongst the established entrepreneurial 
firm’s experiences of this scheme is noteworthy. 
Each case’s financing flowchart highlights the critical point of 
financing rejection, or success, illustrating the dichotomy 
between the GTFS certification and the financing evaluation 
process. The analysis of each case brought to light the need to 
reconfigure existing entrepreneurial competencies (and/or 
develop new competencies) to acquire financing. As detailed 
above, there are multiple routes to develop the necessary 
competencies based on the entrepreneurial firm’s previous 
paths. 
Table 15 shows a summary table of the key points across the 
cases. Appendix 5 is some of the examples of the quotes from 
the individual cases.  
 
Table 15 Summary of Key Points from the context and cases 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
FINANCING PRIORITIES       
Government directive that the banks must follow X X X    
The guarantee is worthless X X X    
Green technology loan have a high risk perception   X  X  
Conventional loan criteria X X X X   
GTFS is easy money X X X X   
Malaysian banks are traditional bankers X X X  X  
GTFS is a form of Banking CSR X X X    
BANK KNOWLEDGE ASYMMETRY       
Learning curve for the bank X X X X X  
Need to learn new evaluation technique X X X X X  
No expertise for technical evaluation X X X X X  
The banks are not interested X X X    
GREEN TECHNOLOGY FINANCIAL CRITERIA       
Financial comfort    X X X 
Whole picture concept    X X X 




Technical expertise X X X X X X 
Financial expertise    X X X 
Successful financing criteria    X X X 
PERCEIVED EASE OF ACQUIRING FINANCE       
Previous financing experience X X X X X X 
Easy GTFS certification X X X X X X 
The perception that GTFS is easy money  X X X X   
Too good an opportunity to miss  X X X    
COMPETENCY TRAP       
Financing rejection cycle X X X X   
Non-learning  X     
Multiple rejection X X X X   
OPPORTUNITY REFINEMENT COMPETENCIES       
Investment readiness steps by the entrepreneurs X X X X X X 
Engagement of technical consultants/business consultants/ 
coaches (external expertise) 
X X X X X X 
Retraining of staff with new competencies X X X X X X 
Marketing of products-secured markets X   X X X 
Business plan presentation X X X X X X 
Upgrading Technical Competencies X X X X X X 
Upgrading Financial Competencies   X X X X 
RESOURCE ACQUISITION COMPETENCIES       
Educating the bankers    X X X 
Convincing the bankers to the point of satisfaction    X X X 
Financial-Technical knowledge     X X X 
COMPETENCY DEVELOPMENT       
Firm background X X X X X X 
Previous financing experience X X X X X X 
Previous business experience X X X X X X 
Current competencies X X X X X X 
Financing Competence gap H H H H L L 
GTFS context influence H H H H L L 
Non-acquired financing  X X     
Financing rejection cycle X X X X   
External Resources/ Learning L L H H H H 
Acquired financing    X X X X 
Diversify financing sources   X    
Learning-Intervention    X   
H-High L=Low X-present   
Based on the case studies and financing flowcharts in Chapter 
4, an overview of the findings is depicted in the Figure 14 
below. In Figure 14, external resources refer broadly to “those 
assets-physical or otherwise-that are used by the firm in its 




pursuit of growth and over which the firm has no direct 
ownership” (Jarillo, 1989:135), which in the cases are the 
consultants, suppliers, and business coaches etc. 
Figure 14 Overview of findings (from the researcher) 




CHAPTER 5: CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
5.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter the detailed key aspects of the 
research context (e.g. the GTFS) and the individual case 
studies have been presented. The research now turns to the 
cross-case analysis and the research findings. Here, the 
chapter is divided into three: overview of the cross-case 
analysis, the detailed findings based on the research questions 
and a chapter conclusion. 
5.2 Overview of cross-case analysis 
Aforementioned the purpose of this research is to explore and 
understand the conditions and policies which enable 
established entrepreneurial firms to acquire green technology 
financing in the GTFS context.  
The GTFS context and case studies described in Chapter 4 
illustrate the complexities that exist under the GTFS context. 
The findings in Chapter 4 were unravelled by examining each 
case study independently under the GTFS context. In this 
section, the general overview of the cross-case analysis of the 
six case studies will be presented. 
Firstly, all the cases exhibited a competence gap. The reason 
for the occurrence of the competence gap is because of the 
transition from a different industry to the green technology 
space. The financing competence gap is more prevalent in the 
cases because of the GTFS context. Here a noted anomaly is 




that established entrepreneurial firms have found it 
challenging to acquire financing through this scheme even 
when they have a successful track record of securing finance 
through the banks, success in managing their businesses, a 
secured market and the GTFS certification. Indeed the 
influence of the GTFS context plays a huge role in the 
deployment of the entrepreneurial firms competencies. 
Secondly the insights from the financing process which 
comprise of the investment readiness stage, financing 
application, financing rejection cycle and financing success and 
failure of the cases, it was discovered that the necessary 
competencies needed to acquire financing under the GTFS is 
centred on two main attributes, the first is the ability to refine 
the opportunity and the second is the ability to communicate 
and educate with the aim to fulfil the knowledge asymmetry 
gap of the bankers.  
Finally, it was also discovered that there were four pathways 
to develop the competencies which were crucial in order to 
acquire the much sought financing, regardless of the starting 
point of the financing process. Themes derived from the 









Table 16 First order concepts, second order concepts and aggregate 
dimensions (adapted from Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton 2012:21)  
1st Order Concepts 2nd Order Themes Aggregate 
Dimensions 
 
Government directive that the banks 
must follow 
The guarantee is worthless 
Green technology loan have a high risk 
perception 
Conventional loan criteria 
GTFS is easy money 
Malaysian banks are traditional bankers 





Learning curve for the bank 
Need to learn new evaluation technique 
No expertise for technical evaluation 
The banks are not interested 
Bank Knowledge Asymmetry 
Financial comfort 
Whole picture concept 
Technical expertise 
Financial expertise 
Successful financing criteria 
Green Technology Financial 
Criteria 
Previous financing experience 
Previous business experience 
Easy certification of stage 1 of the 
evaluation 
The perception that GTFS is easy 
money  
Too good an opportunity to miss  
Perceived easiness to acquire 
financing 















1st Order Concepts 2nd Order Themes Aggregate 
Dimensions 
 
 Investment readiness steps by 
the entrepreneurs 
 Engagement of technical 
consultants/business 
consultants/ coaches (external 
expertise) 
 Retraining of staff with new 
competencies 
 Marketing of products-secured 
markets 
 Business plan presentation 





 Educating the bankers 
 Convincing the bankers to the 
point of satisfaction 
 Financial-Technical knowledge  
Resource Acquisition 
Competencies 
 Firm background 
 Previous financing experience 
 Previous business experience 





 Financing Competency gap 
 Non-acquired financing  
 Financing rejection cycle 
 Low external resources 
Entrapped 
 Financing Competency gap 
 Acquired financing  
 Diversify financing sources 
 Financing rejection cycle 
 High external resources 
Diverge 
 Financing Competency gap 
 Acquired financing  
 Financing rejection cycle 
 High external resources 
Escape 
 Financing Competency gap 
 Acquired financing  
 High external resources 
Evade 
 
The next section will detail the findings based on the research 
questions and the final themes. 
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5.3 Key Findings 
The main research question is “How do established 
entrepreneurial firms develop competencies to acquire green 
technology financing in the GTFS context?” The research 
further breaks the main research question into three sub-
research questions: “How does the GTFS context influence the 
deployment of competencies by established entrepreneurial 
firms?”; “What entrepreneurial competencies are necessary for 
established entrepreneurial firms to acquire green technology 
financing?”, and “How are these competencies developed?” 
In the research three significant findings were identified. The 
first relates to the financing competence gap. The second 
finding highlights two sets of entrepreneurial competencies 
necessary to acquire green technology financing, which are: 
(i) opportunity refinement competencies, and (ii) 
resource acquisition competencies. The third finding 
pertains to the competency development paths. Taken 
together, these three findings highlight the nexus of 
complexities that abound in this research context. The results 
of the analysis show the significance of a green tech financing 
competence gap for established entrepreneurial firms. This 
gap, in turn, influences how competencies (i) and (ii) above 
are developed in the process of trying to acquire GTFS 
financing.  
In the following subsections, the three findings will be 
explained in detail, the financing competence gap, and the two 
sets of entrepreneurial competencies: (i) opportunity 
refinement competencies and (ii) resource acquisition 
competencies and the entrepreneurial competency 
development path.  
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5.3.1 Financing competence gap 
This subsection aims to provide insights to answer the 
research question: “How does the GTFS context influence the 
deployment of competencies by established entrepreneurial 
firms?”  
To answer this question, the next subsubsections explain 
subthemes in the financing competence gap to illuminate how 
they evolved and influence each other, and then influence the 
financing competence gap, and in turn how the financing 
competence gap influences the deployment and development 
entrepreneurial competencies of the established 
entrepreneurial firms (Rasmussen et al., 2014). The first 
subsubsection will highlight the financing priority between the 
three stakeholders (Meek, Pacheco, and York, 2010), this will 
be followed by the bank knowledge asymmetry (Bonnet and 
Wirtz, 2012), the penultimate subsubsection will discuss the 
financial criteria, highlighting specific financial criteria (Cassar, 
2004) identified for green technology ventures and the last 
subsubsection will discuss two other contextual influence from 
the GTFS context. 
5.3.1.1 Financing Priority 
The different financing priorities of the government and the 
banks were highlighted by several program administrators who 
expressed their opinions: 
I think looking at the financial system, they think differently. They’re 
not [on] the same wave length [in terms of] the way of our thinking. 
They’re talking about dollar and cent only. (PA1) 
I really don’t understand how the bank thinks, to advise against the 
GTFS to simplify their own work. In the end, the entrepreneurs will not 
receive any GTFS benefits. (PA1) 
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Here another program administrator went on to explained his 
take on what the bank was prioritizing. The banker argues 
that:  
[…] most of the banks [in] Malaysia are traditional bankers to speak 
[…] the understanding [of] the industry is important […] our normal 
bankers are traditional bankers […] saving the environment is not part 
of the agenda. (PA5) 
In trying to explain the banks rejection from a credit criteria 
point of view, a program administrator argues that, 
From the feedback I got, those companies that have difficulty in 
getting financing are based by various reasons. Number one, of course, 
they have no security to offer to the bank as you know that green 
technology is new so for the bank, anything that is new is high risk so 
when is high risk, the bank will look at an alternative. The, the 
generation of the cash flow would be the primary source of repayment 
but the bank will also look at the secondary resource of the payment 
which is the collateral, security so some of these companies, there is 
no security to offer to banks. Secondly, they have no track record. This 
is based on the commercial banks criteria. They want to see track 
record, of course new companies, new set up companies don’t have 
track record and thirdly the credit history of the green technology 
entrepreneur themselves. Even though they have a viable or bankable 
project but they not have a very good past history or credit history and 
then number four would be the commitment as I mentioned, their 
capital, they are not prepared to commit to the project and expect the 
whole thing to be finance by the banks. (PA2) 
However this highlights the difficulty facing the established 
entrepreneurial firms in the research and the anomaly of the 
GTFS context stands out. Even though they have collateral; 
GTFS certification, corporate guarantee and personal 
guarantee and excellent financing track record they were not 
able to acquire financing. This is contradictory to Parker's 
(2013) suggestion that when established entrepreneurial firms 
switch industries financing would be still available for them. 
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In the case of the banks, they had other thoughts; for them, it 
was business as usual,  
Okay. The banks’ primary business is you know, our primary 
commodity is lending money. When we lend, we make money. That, 
that must be clearly understood – the bank, the primary objective [of 
the] bank is to lend out money. The moment we lend out, we make 
money. (HOD Bank 1) 
It was also cautiously stated by the banks that:  
We fully support green projects. The reason why we want to support is 
because of the incentives behind it, the 2% rebate and the 60% 
government guarantee. […] [However] green technology projects need 
experience and expertise, too risky, banks are worried, and maybe 
with a good consultant those risks can be mitigated.[…] Banks do CSR 
but not for business applications (SCO of Bank 5). 
The banks also remarked that would be hard to finance 
nascent entrepreneurs because it would cost them time and 
money to verify the technology as argued by senior credit 
officer (SCO) Bank 4 below,  
I have to get a [reputable technology firm] like SGS, I have to look at all 
the manufacturing file and this thing; so many costs involved, you 
know, time and money involved and finally, “Oh, your quality’s good” 
and then, [there is the question of the] buyers. They, SGS will only 
prove one thing… (SCO of Bank 4). 
He further argued for established entrepreneurial firms, when 
they embark on a new venture it will be looked on as a new 
business because for the banks they consider that these 
established entrepreneurial firms have no relevant experience. 
In the first instance for nascent entrepreneurs financing is 
difficult because they do not have a track record and the 
banks will not verify the viability of their technology. While for 
the established entrepreneurial firms, even if they have a 
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track record the banks will not finance them because they 
have no relevant experience.  
Contributing to this difficulty to acquire financing is also the 
notion that when there is a special program such as GTFS, the 
viability and the business case of the venture comes into 
question as highlighted by the project partner of Solar D: 
 […] [if] something [is] special, there must be something wrong with 
that, you see if you are commercial viable, why do you get a special 
program right? [...] when you say that people will become sceptical. 
Because the basis has to be on the merits and the strength of your 
organisation … all [of] this special scheme … the banks would be 
[extremely] sceptical. […] when you are like very persistent give a loan 
[for] green, I will be very sceptical you know because already […] there 
is a lot of persuasion etc. and things like that which means that maybe 
this thing is not bankable. (Project partner of Solar D) 
Furthermore, the way the government promotes the various 
green technologies by bringing in international experts that 
not only skews the market but also creates contextual 
understanding for the banks. Also contributing to this 
difference in financing priority is the of lack awareness among 
the banks about the financing scheme. From the data analysis, 
ascertaining all the causes for the difference to financing 
priorities is difficult. However, it is apparent that the 
complexity from the multiple stakeholders contributes to the 
different financing priorities.  
The established entrepreneurial firms argue that the banks 
should give them the financing as this was a government 
directive, which in their opinion absolves them from the 
usually tough credit evaluation of the banks.  
 177 
 
This perception had heavily influenced their overall planning 
for the new venture especially the ease of acquisition of 
financing. The banks also had noticed this perception: 
One, I think one major misconception was when they [the 
entrepreneurs] obtained the green technology certificate the 
proprietors thought it was their license to go and borrow. That was 
one major misconception. (HOD of Bank 1) 
However there was also another reason that led to this belief; 
the lure of easy financing and high profits admitted by 
executive director of Biomass A,  
Because it was a coincidence, I would say. I mean, it was never my 
interest per se. […] there was a lot of promotion by the government 
saying that, […] a lot of incentives, […] lucrative revenues out of that 
(ED of Biomass A). 
This impression and appeal of the GTFS will be further 
explained in 5.3.1.4.  
This subsection highlights the difference in financing priorities 
for the GTFS between the government, banks and the 
entrepreneurial firms. This difference in financing priorities 
also distorts the meaning and might influence the financing 
process of the established entrepreneurial firms. In the next 
subsubsection, the bank’s knowledge asymmetry will be 
explained in detail. 
5.3.1.2 Bank’s knowledge asymmetry 
The notion of knowledge asymmetry is similar to Bonnet and 
Wirtz's (2012:94) suggestion that “knowledge asymmetry (or 
cognitive heterogeneity) may be a source of mutual 
misunderstanding, and it even occurs in circumstances where 
information is evenly distributed”. Based on the data analysis, 
the bank’s knowledge asymmetry is exemplified by the bank’s 
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flat learning curve and the lack of interest in financing green 
technology ventures. This is illustrated below in several cases 
in the research.  
In the case of Biomass A, they had an excellent track record 
with banks. However, for the current green technology 
venture, Biomass A had problems convincing the bank, even 
though a substantial amount of capital had been invested in 
the project. The method of evaluation by the banks was a 
matter of contention for Biomass A. Here the executive 
director of Biomass A argues that:  
For example, *BC, our main banker, for a Green Technology project, 
they have to send the proposal all the way to Hong Kong, because the 
Malaysian unit cannot make a decision. That’s how the process is. 
They’ve got no people here to evaluate whether the project is [viable]. 
Hong Kong makes the decision without considering the government 
incentives. The bankers here have to follow. (ED of Biomass A) 
Adding to this argument is the senior finance executive of 
Solar C highlighting the inexperience of bankers to evaluate 
their project as shown below, 
Because their reason is this industry is new in the Malaysia and they 
are not [familiar] and there is no project to refer to. Our main bankers 
did not have the confidence and withdrew from financing the project 
(SFE of Solar C) 
Drilling down the banks’ evaluation process the project partner 
of Solar D highlights the role of the credit officer, 
[It was] nearly a year and I said “Is it a yes or a no?” […]It was not a 
“no” I think the guy doesn’t know how to take it up to the credit 
committee because […] all questions from committee [the credit 
officer] has to answer, I’m not there to be defend it, the promoter is 
not there to defend it, the credit officer has to be able to [defend it]. 
(Project Partner of Solar D) 
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Furthering how seemingly whimsical the reason for the 
rejection can be, the managing director (MD) of Manu A 
complains that, 
And we have to assemble to make our inverter. So the correct word is 
‘assemble’ but once assembled it becomes a manufactured product. 
But the bank turned us down just because of the word ‘assemble’. So 
it’s so difficult […] to make this bank understand and give this finance 
(MD of Manu A) 
Summing up his argument the managing director (MD) of 
Manu A has this to share, 
You know, maybe [their thinking is], “Oh, you’re buying a house. I also 
got a house so I know what a house is. So I [will] give you financing. 
This is technology. I don’t know so it’s too risky,” that is the way they 
think (MD of Manu A) 
 
Based on the analysis, even though the entrepreneurial firms 
had tried to explain everything, the banks were not able to 
understand because of the method of evaluation used. It is 
therefore suggested that this highlights the bank’s knowledge 
asymmetry. This is different to the notion of information 
asymmetry (Westhead, Wright and McElwee, 2011), where the 
question of whether all of the information has been provided 
to the bank by the entrepreneur, in this case, all of the 
information has been provided, however the banks are not 
able to properly evaluate the information. (See section 2.3) 
This results in frustration on the part of the established 
entrepreneurial firms because they have an excellent financing 
track record. They have invested quite a substantial amount of 
capital and time in the new venture. They have been 
successful in their previous ventures and they are not nascent 
entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the banks they were dealing with 
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are exactly the same banks with which they have an excellent 
track record. In some instances, the financed amount received 
previously is much greater than the amount that they 
requested for their new ventures:  
[The] projects run in the couple of millions […] these projects are much 
bigger than this GTFS funding, and we have managed all these projects 
all these years (MD of Manu A). 
Based on the data analysis, the bank’s knowledge asymmetry 
is prevalent across all of the banks interviewed. This is 
exemplified by an admission from the head of department of 
Bank 1:  
Although we are [one of] the lead GTFS supporters, our focus is 
primarily on our existing customers. That will be an eventuality where 
we will be sending people to acquire technical expertise on the four 
main sectors. It’s just that it has not reached that desired stage yet. 
(HOD of BANK 1) 
The bank’s knowledge asymmetry occurs at all levels of the 
banking system, from the credit officer who receives the 
financing application to the top management. There is a “wait 
and see’ attitude before the banks commit resources to green 
technology financing. As the GTFS is new, the banks admitted 
they were struggling with it and they needed new tools to 
evaluate. 
I mean, not just to lay blame only on the entrepreneurs. Sometimes, it 
is the financial institution themselves. When targets are not imposed 
you know it is human nature, when you’re not familiar with 
something, the best thing to do is avoid. […] I would not lay blame only 
on the entrepreneurs. […] the financial institution also has got to 
acquire knowledge. […] knowledge not only at the working level, it’s 
also must be right from the top down because the CEOs must embrace 
this because the credit committee must embrace, the risk 
management side must understand. But as it stands now, it’s still not 
[happening] (HOD of Bank 1)  
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The Senior Credit Officer (SCO) of Bank 2, who was involved 
in financing Solar C, confessed that the evaluation for green 
technology financing was different and that there was a 
learning curve. Here he explains that:  
I cannot compare green financing compared to normal financing. It’s 
totally different because from my experience, the ones that we have 
done are quite huge projects. We have done quite huge projects and 
it’s totally different. For me I had to learn altogether again. My 5Cs20 
and I had to add on some more… (SCO Bank 2). 
The financial controller of Solar D added that it was a learning 
curve for everybody involved; banks, established 
entrepreneurial firms and government dealing in the new 
financing process. 
The findings seem to suggest that the knowledge asymmetry 
occurs at all levels of the banks. Therefore, the bank’s 
knowledge asymmetry influences the financing process most 
likely the financial evaluation, which is a key component of the 
green technology financial criteria. The financial evaluation is 
where the evaluation of the cash flow assumptions will be 
pivotal, yet hard to understand because it will be based on 
unproven green technology. To further understand this, we 
move to the next section which will discuss the green 
technology financial criteria in detail. 
                                   
 
20 The 5C credit criteria, is a criteria that the majority of the banks use to evaluate 
financing. The 5C’s are character, capacity (cash flow), capital, condition and 
collateral. The order of the Cs is according to importance. 
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5.3.1.3 Green technology financing criteria 
The Green technology financing criteria is divided into two: (i) 
the technical criteria and (ii) the financial criteria. Based on 
documentary evidence, the technical criteria centres on the 
feasibility of the technology to: (i) minimise degradation of 
environment; (ii) have zero or low greenhouse gas emissions; 
be safe to use and promotes healthy and improved 
environment for inhabitants; (iii) conserve the use of energy 
and natural resources; and (iv) promote the use of renewable 
energy resources. In other words the technical criteria focus 
on the ‘greenness’ of the venture. The technical evaluation is 
conducted by the GTFS technical committee which includes 
government departments and external technology consultants. 
There is also a requirement for a business model presentation 
by the applicants based on an open pitching session with 
bankers. The ventures that successfully fulfil the criteria will 
receive the GTFS certification, which according to program 
administrator 4 is a guarantee of the feasibility of the 
technology: 
[The 60% government guarantee] is [for] the success of the business in 
using that technology (Program Administrator 4). 
The fact that the certification is a guarantee for the technology 
should already be a powerful equation in the financial 
evaluation of the new green technology ventures. 
Aforementioned the financial criteria are generally known as 
the 5Cs. This is the credit criterion set by the banks globally 
for conducting their financing evaluation. Even though the 
credit criteria seem rigid, based on the data analysis, much 
ambiguity exists about how the financial evaluation is 
conducted for sustainable entrepreneurship ventures. As the 
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bank’s learning curve reduces, the evaluation criteria will 
eventually be redefined to the context of green technology 
financing.  
The GTFS is a government based scheme but the funds are 
sourced from the banks that make the final decision to finance 
a venture. Rather than adopting their criteria to accommodate 
green technology characteristics the banks were found to 
resort to still use the conventional method of evaluating loans. 
Based on these criteria, the general bank criteria for green 
technology financing is generic towards any technology based 
business. That is to say, they must satisfy the “whole picture” 
That is to say, they must satisfy the “whole picture” concept 
as stated by senior credit officer of Bank 5. This indicates the 
importance for the established entrepreneurial firms to be able 
to communicate and help the banks visualise the venture’s 
launch, successful completion and operationalization. 
However, the inclusion of consultants in the criteria 
underscores the importance of technical knowledge to 
implement the project and mitigate any technical risk to the 
project (e.g. technical knowledge such as green expertise in 
carbon emission and carbon credit calculation, or empty fruit 
bunch (EFB) burning rate, etc). Further analysis revealed that 
it is not enough to have the government guarantee as 
collateral for the new venture. Overall there is an increased 
perception of risk for green technology ventures. This is in line 
with the suggestion from the HOD of Bank 1: 
Even if you come […] and tell us you are well-collateralized and we do 
not see the cash flow coming out of your end products, we will not, we 
will not take it. […] Of course, the collateral helps ease our 
commitment but we are into cash flow financing (HOD of BANK 1). 
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The senior credit officer (SCO) of Bank 4 stresses that even 
though the main issue in green technology is the technical 
knowledge, marketing skills are also important: 
[The] main issues with green tech, of course, the most important thing 
is the technology […] how capable are these people to run the 
technology on a mass scale […] and apart from that, is there a market 
for this product? […] the green products are more expensive than a 
compatible product in the market. So, it makes it difficult for them to 
sell this product… (SCO of Bank 4). 
The argument above underscores the link of the technical 
knowledge and the marketing skills, producing the product and 
to sell the product, which will generate the income to pay back 
the loan. The importance of technical knowledge as highlighted 
by SCO of Bank 4 seems to be in an agreement with the 
arguments of HOD of Bank 1 below: 
[How] I wish for one thing: technical expertise. The proponents 
themselves, instead of relying on a third-party, which are not 
shareholders, they must acquire that, […] tie them down, by giving 
some equity because these people can leave. […] If the proponents 
themselves have got technical expertise, that’s good (HOD of BANK 1). 
Banks seek assurance that technical skills are augmented with 
marketing skills, which are later combined with financial skills 
that link into the cash flow model. This is exemplified in an 
argument by the project partner of Solar D: 
[…] chloroformic (value) […] is the major assumption in their cash flow 
model, I assume my kilojoules of heat value is 2,900 because of the 
composition of waste, this will generate [how many] megawatt. I need 
to be able to relate from the composition of the waste and the mild, 
moisture […] to whatever energy that I produce[…] a bank looks at that 
when they don’t understand […] they will kick (you) out because they 
don’t understand […] (project partner Solar D). 
Analysing the statements above, it seems that financial skills 
and marketing skills are essential parts of the whole picture 
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concept. However the technical skill stands out as the most 
critical for the banks, according to SCO of Bank 5, SCO of 
Bank 4 and HOD of Bank 1. 
The banks suggest that technical expertise and the technology 
are extremely important; however in the previous 
subsubsection on the bank’s knowledge asymmetry, the 
method of the banks evaluating the technology is 
contradictory. This suggests the banks’ learning curve in 
evaluating green technology ventures as explained above in 
5.3.1.2.  
Another finding as suggested by the evidence from the 
interviews, documentary, and observation is that there seems 
to be a dichotomy between the technical and financing 
evaluation. This stems from the perceived ease of acquiring 
certification and extreme difficulty to acquire financing as 
exemplified in the case of Solar C, which gained certification 
but was then rejected by six banks. This dichotomy in terms of 
evaluation links back to the financing priorities of the 
government and the banks as explained above in 5.3.1.1. 
Therefore, the evolving nature of green technology financing 
presents an opportunity for the banks to redefine their 
financial evaluation and to re-evaluate their learning curve for 
evaluating green technology ventures. For the established 
entrepreneurial firms, this finding indicates the need for 
certain necessary entrepreneurial competencies that could 
bridge this financing competence gap. This also supports the 
notion of the difference in financing by sector according to 
Cassar, (2004) and the need for new and distinct 
competencies (Parrish, 2010; Worthington & Patton, 2005) 
which will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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5.3.1.4 Effects of the GTFS Context 
Adding on to the complexities derived from the different 
financing priorities, bank’s knowledge asymmetry and the 
green technology financial criteria is two interlinked effects: (i) 
the perceived ease of acquiring finance and (ii) a competency 
trap (Levitt and March, 1988). The perceived ease of acquiring 
finance reinforces the competency trap, which is demonstrated 
in the form of a financing rejection cycle. The section below 
explains the two effects. 
a. Perceived ease of acquiring finance 
The notion of the perceived ease of acquiring finance can be 
explained from the argument by the managing director of 
Manu B who felt it was an opportunity to acquire easy funding, 
No, there was an opportunity to go, we heard about this [from the] 
Malaysian German Chamber, we came under the Malaysian group, we 
came to know about green technology and there is a fund, why not 
apply (MD of Manu B). 
and a program administrator  
[Sometimes the entrepreneurs] feel the money is like [from an] 
Automated Teller Machine (PA 2). 
In other words, after receiving their certification from the 
technical committee, the established entrepreneurial firms feel 
as though they are entitled to the financing from the banks. 
This is exemplified by the argument from the Executive 
Director of Biomass A: 
[…] So we always tell, “Hey, come on, you see GTFS, I did this 
presentation, they agreed to give me the certificate. Otherwise, if the 
project is not viable, they will never give me this certificate. What is 
the purpose of this certificate? the project is viable, that’s why they 
give me the certificate.[…] (ED of Biomass A). 
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Adding to this argument is senior finance manager (SFM) of 
Solar D that people always think it is easy with government 
support, 
Expertise is not a problem. [The] challenge to me is whether people 
can accept an environment company in Malaysia [because] this is a 
very new [here]. Because you’re looking at this solar plant everything 
has been in overseas for so many years. But for our experience, when 
we want to do this even though with the support of the government, is 
not easy to get financing. [It] is not easy to get people to understand. 
But, we have been achieving it. But not in a very easy way like what 
you, what we always think of like, you know with Government support 
here you can get financing, no problem with the, with the, the special 
GTFS fund all this, you can get financing easily. It’s not really that way, 
you know? Because the bankers still looking at […] the project as a 
whole thing. (SFM of Solar D) 
However contrary to Biomass A, Solar D did not fall under this 
influence and acquired financing, this will be explained in 
5.3.3.4.  
The findings suggest that the perceived ease of acquiring 
financing influences the environmental scanning of the 
established entrepreneurial firms resulting in a perceived ease 
of acquiring finance. As a consequence of this effect, the 
deployment of the entrepreneurial competencies of the 
established entrepreneurial firms is significantly influenced. 
This perceived ease of acquiring finance has also been touched 
in 5.3.1.1 and will be further discussed in Chapter 6.  
b. Competency trap 
The competency trap in the context of this research is 
exemplified by the financial rejection cycle that the established 
entrepreneurial firms experience while trying to acquire 
financing from the banks using their existing competencies.  
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The financing rejection cycle is evident in majority of the 
cases. In the case of Biomass A and Manu A, they were 
rejected six times by the banks for their financing application 
before they aborted their venture.  
While in the case of Manu B, they were rejected four times by 
the banks for their financing application before diverting from 
the banks to other sources of financing. Finally, in the case of 
Solar C, they were rejected six times before escaping the 
competency trap to acquire financing from the bank. Here the 
executive director (ED) of Biomass A shared his experience 
about the financing rejection cycle, 
[…] we have done all this evaluation, and we are confident, yes, that’s 
why we are giving you this certificate now, okay? You proceed on only 
to finance the project in terms of the loan they’re asking for. It should 
be purely a commercial decision, financial evaluation, rather than 
going into all the nitty gritty of the project. See, for example, they ask, 
“Have you secured feedstock?” I show them the feedstock agreement 
with F***A. They are happy with it, and then they ask another 
question. They must know that all the risk has been covered. 
Feedstock covered, GTFS obtained, and in fact this project application, 
all dah secured, everything they’ve done, and I’ve come up with 20 
million worth of my own investment to show them…we showed them. 
I cannot run away from this project anymore, otherwise my 20 million 
is burnt. So what is their concern? What is their risk? It is a straight 
forward decision. But even with that I find it very, very tough to 
convince the bankers. We gave our corporate guarantee. We even 
went to the extent of giving our own personal guarantee. (ED of 
Biomass A) 
From the quote above it is apparent that Biomass A was 
repeating the same strategy from their previous financing 
experience for their financing application with the GTFS as an 
integral part of their financing strategy which pushed them 
into the competency trap.  
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Together the perceived ease of acquiring finance and the 
competency trap exert their influences on the GTFS financing 
process of the established entrepreneurial firms. They exert 
their influences on the deployment of the established 
entrepreneurial firms’ competencies by widening the financing 
competence gap which inadvertently hinders their competency 
development. This will be further explained in 5.3.3. 
5.3.1.5 Section Summary 
The financing competence gap revealed in this research is 
influenced by the GTFS context which comprises of the (i) 
financing priorities of the multiple stakeholders, (ii) the banks’ 
knowledge asymmetry (iii) green technology financing criteria 
and the (iv) effects (perceived ease to acquire financing and 
the competency trap). The different financing priorities 
between the government, banks and the entrepreneurial firms, 
further adds to this complexity. Indeed the government has 
their vision for mitigating climate change, but the banks argue 
that CSR does not belong in the financing application despite 
the government guarantee for the feasibility of the technology. 
The established entrepreneurial firms are thus trapped 
between these conflicting financing priorities. 
Bank knowledge asymmetry is characterised by the bank’s 
learning curve and interest in the GTFS. The green technology 
financial criteria are centred on the “whole picture” concept. In 
this concept the banks want to see that the project can be 
successfully launched, implemented and most importantly 
generate income to pay them back. There are also times, 
where the government contributes to the banks’ knowledge 
asymmetry, by bringing in international experts, thereby 
reinforcing certain standards that are not applicable to the 
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local context. The combination of the bank’s knowledge 
asymmetry and the green technology financial criteria then 
becomes a learning curve for the established entrepreneurial 
firms to deal with the banks.  
The next influence from the GTFS context is two effects on the 
financing competence gap (i) the perceived ease of acquiring 
finance and a (ii) competency trap (Levitt and March, 1988). 
The perceived ease of acquiring finance reinforces the 
competency trap which leads to a financing rejection cycle. 
These two interlinked effects influence the financing 
competence gap. Therefore the GTFS context influences the 
deployment of competencies by established entrepreneurial 
firms by influencing the financing competence gap. 
In the next section, the research will present the findings on 
the set of entrepreneurial competencies identified as critical 
for acquiring green technology financing. 
5.3.2 Entrepreneurial Competencies 
The financing competence gap and its influence on 
competency development have been explained above. This 
section now focuses on the second sub question, “What 
entrepreneurial competencies are necessary for established 
entrepreneurial firms to acquire green technology financing in 
this context?” 
Following, Rasmussen et al.’s (2011, 2014) evolutionary 
entrepreneurial competency framework, the two sets of 
competencies identified from the analysis are: (i) opportunity 
refinement competencies and (ii) resources acquisition 
competencies. The next subsubsections will explain in detail 
these entrepreneurial competencies. 
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5.3.2.1 Opportunity Refinement Competencies  
The opportunity refinement competencies are a set of 
competencies critical for refining and developing an 
entrepreneurial “opportunity into a clearly articulated, 
commercially viable business” venture with a high success rate 
(Rasmussen et.al, 2011:1327).  
Opportunity refinement competencies play an important role in 
the early stages of a venture, starting from the pre-financing 
stage (Vohora et al., 2004).  
In this research the opportunity refinement competencies are 
particularly important because these cases involve established 
entrepreneurial firms that are transitioning from their previous 
projects into new opportunities. Even for the established 
entrepreneurial firms, it will be extremely difficult to acquire 
financing if the opportunity refinement process is not properly 
conducted as argued by senior credit officer (SCO) of Bank 2 
[Even if you are a successful business man] in terms of financing it will 
still be difficult. I have seen a [successful] lawyer [requesting financing] 
for biomass. How do I look at it? Whereas, if let’s say you have been 
doing solar since 20 years ago […] now you want to do [a] big project, 
that I will consider. But if let’s you’re a lawyer […] I don’t see the value-
added thing there. (SCO of Bank 2) 
A critical part of the opportunity refinement competencies is 
the scanning of the environment. A misinterpretation of the 
business environment will be detrimental to the future of the 
venture. A part of this misinterpretation has to do with the 
divergence between the way banks and established 
entrepreneurial firms think as shared by the project partner of 
Solar D,  
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So bankers think differently than project owners, primarily because 
project owners are risk takers bankers are totally the opposite you 
know, they will think of everything that you would not think of you 
know and what if scenario is, there is always worse case, what if you 
drop dead, what if things like that [happen] by nature [that is] what 
banks are, you know you can’t force them to change (project partner 
of Solar D) 
It is this kind of understanding of how the banks work that is 
needed to develop the necessary competencies.  
In the case of Biomass A, the firm had mistakenly scanned the 
financing environment. This misinterpretation of the financing 
environment influenced their opportunity refinement process. 
As a result during the special pitching session with the bankers 
organized by GreenTech Corporation they were not able to 
answer the banks on the raw material supply and the market 
for their by-product and eventually led to non-financing of 
Biomass A. 
In contrast, for Biomass D the opportunity refinement process 
involved a long duration and different approach in thinking as 
explained by the executive chairman (EC) of Biomass D,  
I started the (venture) around 2003. [From my calculations] after the 
eight year we should be printing money. But you look at it without the 
government credit [scheme]. (EC of Biomass D) 
The executive chairman later expounded on this and explained 
the extensive planning (e.g. for raw material sourcing, RePPA) 
and reconfiguration of the existing entrepreneurial 
competencies by combining the various entrepreneurial 
competencies across the team as illustrated below,  
Managing is not a problem. Because I think we have the team. My role 
is I am concerned with the government approvals and raw material. 
George will be running the company. Tan Gan Hua is a contractor. He’s 
looking after the contract. I have a qualified mechanical engineer. I got 
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Viton [as] General Manager. Goh is a milling engineer and our project 
manager. We have both civil, mechanical and electrical engineers. We 
have consultants and the managing director of Kina and Seguntor on 
retainer. (EC of Biomass D) 
[I was the] Director of Estate, […] [involved in disbursements of] 
replanting grants. At that time [the] Empty Fruit Bunches, they just 
throw it away. They just put in the fields, or they just put it along the 
road, is of no use. […] (EFB) accumulate into small hills. So, you need to 
remove them. Now, Empty Fruit Bunch are in high demand, 
composting for fertilizers. Fibre for pillows and mattresses in China. 
Now there is also the government renewable energy policy with 
competitive rates, it started with 16 cents, 18 cents, 21 cents and now 
29 cents per kwh. (EC of Biomass D) 
Here the reconfiguration of Biomass D’s existing 
entrepreneurial competencies was apparent. The 
reconfiguration was needed to address issues specific to the 
venture, this eventually helped Biomass D to acquire 
financing.  
The necessity of the opportunity refinement competencies for 
established entrepreneurial firms can be seen in these two 
cases. Fully reconfigured opportunity refinement competencies 
will enable the opportunity to be refined and eventually 
acquire financing. Biomass A misinterpretation of the financing 
environment that the GTFS would be “easy” resulted in them 
not to acquire financing. While in contrast the case of Biomass 
D, planning the venture “without the government credit 
[scheme]”, led them to acquire financing. This was later 
proceeded by Biomass D with a detailed knowledge of the raw 
material supply chain, both technical and financial expertise 
helped them in their opportunity refinement process.  
In this respect, this research suggests that a fully developed 
opportunity refinement competencies play a critical role in 
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addressing these evaluation gaps. Apart from the importance 
of scanning the environment, the opportunity refinement 
competencies imply that established entrepreneurial firms 
have to reconfigure their existing financing, marketing and 
technical functional skills (Mitchelmore &and Rowley, 2010) 
that are found to be intricately related to address the 
specificities of the green technology financing criteria.  
The link between the three sets of functional skills and the 
opportunity refinement competencies is exemplified below in 
this argument by program administrator 2: 
I feel the thing that makes the firm good is the planning and the 
proposal. The whole proposal must be supported, for instance EFB 
projects must come with the raw material [supply], demand for their 
product, […] optimal cash flow for the banks […] They must have 
proper plans (PA2). 
Adding to the importance of refining the opportunity is the 
argument by senior credit officer (SCO) of Bank 4, 
[…] the strategy of the management is very important. How would the 
[entrepreneurs] look into [these] lose parameters? [What kind of] 
mechanisms [do the entrepreneurs] have to curb [and] handle the cost 
at their end to make it a feasible project. So, there are many […] areas 
that they fail to look at. (SCO of Bank 4)  
This argument also corresponds to the whole picture concept 
as explained in section 5.3.1.3.  
The technical skills involved in the sustainable 
entrepreneurship ventures of the respective cases differ 
according to the technology used by the venture. Indeed, the 
specifications of the green technology will directly impact on 
the type of raw material, the raw material supply (including 
alternative raw material), the technology supplier, the 
technical operations of the technology, the durability of the 
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technology. All of this must be considered by the established 
entrepreneurial firms during the opportunity refinement 
process. Based on the documentary evidence, the technical 
requirements for the ventures are critical. For example, in the 
case of renewable energy generation, the electricity supply to 
the national grid must be guaranteed, therefore mitigating the 
offline time from the national electricity grid is a critical factor 
that must be considered in the opportunity refinement 
process. This stringent requirement corresponds to the 
documentary evidence; the technical documentation for 
submission is highly technical and specific according to the 
green technology, which includes technical feasibility studies, 
etc.  
As for marketing skills, it is about ensuring that there will be a 
buyer for the green goods that are produced. For cases such 
as Solar C, Solar D and Biomass D with renewable energy 
power purchasing agreements (REPPA), there is a guaranteed 
buy back of the renewable energy that they produce. However 
in case of Manu A and Manu B, marketing skills become 
comparatively critical because they are competing on the open 
market. This highlights the variation in terms of the marketing 
skills on the type of sustainable entrepreneurship ventures 
that the established entrepreneurial firms venture are involved 
in. 
Finally, augmenting all of these skills are the financing skills, 
which in the context of this research is the ability to translate 
the technicalities and marketing aspect of the project into 
financial figures, the language that banks understand. The 
financing skills are a functional skill that transcends both the 
opportunity refinement competencies and the resource 
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acquisition competencies. This will be explained further in the 
next section. 
 5.3.2.2  Resource Acquisition Competencies (RACs) 
The other set of entrepreneurial competencies necessary to 
acquire financing is the resource acquisition competencies. The 
notion of the resource acquisition competencies is a cross 
between Hayton and Kelly’s (2006) sponsoring competencies, 
which centres on deep technological and business knowledge, 
risk tolerance, persistence and passion, and transformational 
leadership and Rasmussen et al.’s (2014:94) resource 
acquisition competencies, that “is the assembly and 
organisation to exploit the resources” 
In the context of this research, the resource acquisition 
competencies were found to be a set of competencies that 
centre on deep technological and business knowledge to 
convince and educate external investors such as the banks 
about the venture. The key aspect of the resource acquisition 
competencies is the ability to translate all the marketing, 
financing and technical details into a ‘whole picture’ for the 
banks to understand over above their knowledge asymmetry, 
making the resource acquisition competencies an extension of 
the opportunity refinement competencies.  
This is exemplified by an argument from the senior finance 
executive (SFE) of Solar C, 
[Once] we declare everything, we open everything, this looks like it is a 
high risk project, RM 56 million is a big amount. He [Credit Officer] 
cannot approve the financing just like that. That's why we have to 
entertain these people until they are satisfied that this project is 
viable, this project would be able to generate cash and we can pay 
back the financing amount because banks will normally ask can you 
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pay? […] so basically we have to educate the bank officer (SFE SOLAR 
1). 
Another key point highlighted here is that the resource 
acquisition competencies involved a learning process in which 
the established entrepreneurial firms need to educate the 
banks.  
To understand on what to educate the credit officers, the 
senior credit officer (SCO) of Bank 4 shares his thoughts, 
you may have technology on papers, it looks fine but then, you convert 
it into production, and you don’t get the required yield or 
specification. As a banker, you would not be able to verify this process. 
(SCO of Bank 4) 
Here, highlighted in the quote is a part of the resource 
acquisition competencies, which is the need for the banks to 
understand the technological process involved, which 
unfortunately as stated before this the banks does not have 
the expertise or the time to do this. 
The resource acquisition competencies were primarily 
identified during pitching sessions and meetings with the 
banks. The importance of the resource acquisition 
competencies for the bankers is highlighted by senior credit 
officer (SCO) Bank 4 while observing a pitching session, 
[…] a very good Chief Financial Officer would be able to bridge the 
business [numbers] into [something the bankers understand]. There 
was a big gap there. (SCO of Bank 4) 
Therefore based on the observational evidence during the 
pitching session, established entrepreneurial firms such as 
Biomass A were able to show their technical skills (e.g. 
explaining the detail of their product-design and production). 
However Biomass A were not able to translate the 
 198 
 
technicalities of their venture in financial language that would 
communicate and educate the banks over and above their 
knowledge asymmetry.  
This insight highlights the relationship between the technical 
skills and the financing skills, with the technical and financing 
skills present in both the resource acquisition competencies 
and opportunity refinement competencies. This notion seems 
to resonate with Mitchelmore and Rowley's (2010) notion on 
the interplay between entrepreneurial competencies and 
functional skills, which will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
5.3.3 Competency Development Path 
In the previous section the researcher explained the necessary 
entrepreneurial competencies needed in the financing process. 
This section addresses the question, “How are these 
competencies developed?”  
The analysis has shown these established entrepreneurial 
firms possess competencies from their previous ventures. 
Therefore the established entrepreneurial firm’s previous paths 
are important. In planning their new venture, the established 
entrepreneurial firms were already using their existing 
opportunity refinement competencies and resource acquisition 
competencies. However some of the cases were not able to 
fully reconfigure their competencies according to the “distinct 
competencies” (Parrish, 2010:521) needed to acquire green 
technology financing. The analysis has indicated that the 
reason for this inability to fully reconfigure their existing 
competencies is due to the influence of the GTFS context 
leading to a competency trap. This relates to Liu's (2006) 
suggestion that the path and the competency trap are 
intricately interlinked. Therefore, in order to develop the 
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necessary entrepreneurial competencies and acquire financing, 
the established entrepreneurial firms’ previous paths play a 
big role in determining if they are able to bridge the 
competency gap. In answering the third research sub-
question, this section will show how the analysis reveals 
multiple pathways to competency development. The firms 
either remains “entrapped” or managed to “divert, escaped or 
evaded” the competency trap.  
In the next section, the research will divide cases according to 
their specific path dependencies and explain their competency 
development. 
5.3.3.1 Entrapped 
The entrapped path is the path of established entrepreneurial 
firms that remain entrapped in their paths, unable to 
reconfigure their existing entrepreneurial competencies, thus 
unable to acquire green technology financing. These 
established entrepreneurial firms (Biomass A and Manu A) 
later aborted their ventures. From the analysis, the 
characteristics of the entrapped firms are that there is a high 
financing competence gap, high GTFS influence, trapped in the 
financing rejection cycle and a low external reources which 
resulted in non-financing of their venture. 
Biomass A, an energy procurement construction contractor 
(EPCC) and Manu A, solar hybrid solution provider, were 
established entrepreneurial firms that have successfully run 
their businesses and were embarking on a new venture in a 
new area. In their planned new ventures, Biomass A would 
produce renewable energy to supply to the national grid, while 
Manu A would manufacture solar hybrid inverters for the open 
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market. This represented a high financing competence gap in 
terms of technical, marketing and financing.  
Here the contextual influence of the GTFS on the financing 
competence gap is apparent. This is based on the admission 
from Biomass A that they thought to acquire financing through 
GTFS would be “easy” and the insistence of Manu A that GTFS 
was a government directive and should be adhered by the 
banks, 
GTFS […] is supported by the PM’s Department… so the GTFS is […] a 
piece of certificate to say that you can go to any bank and get a 
financing (MD of MANU A). 
This quote highlights the perception that the managing 
director of Manu A had of the GTFS and that to him the bank 
must give financing as the directive comes straight from the 
government.  
The GTFS influence was further compounded by Biomass A 
and Manu A previous business and financing successes. The 
managing director (MD) of Manu A shared that the bankers 
will be rushing to see him in his previous business ventures,  
They will come and see us [for our financing needs]. I do not have to 
go to the bank. They will be sitting around me [in my office]. (MD of 
Manu A) 
This quote highlights the business confidence that they had 
and the reason why the financing for the GTFS was handled 
internally without any external resources. 
As it is the Biomass A and Manu A path dependencies has an 
influence on the financing competence gap. The GTFS context 
influenced the widening of the financing competence gap 
which brought about a competency trap for Biomass A and 
Manu A, exemplified by a financing rejection cycle as explained 
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in 4.3.1.2. As a result this prevented Biomass A and Manu A 
from fully reconfiguring their existing entrepreneurial 
competencies.  
Regardless of the excellent track record with their bankers as 
shown, they were not able to acquire the GTFS financing. 
Biomass A had also given corporate guarantees and personal 
guarantee to the banks, exclusive of the GTFS guarantee, for 
them to convince the banks, however they were still rejected. 
In the case of Manu A, even after the multiple-rejection of 
their financing application could not understand the bank’s 
reluctance to finance them since the amount that they 
requested was far smaller than the usual amount of financing 
they acquired from the banks.  
From the analysis this is attributed to the low learning from 
the multiple-rejection of their financing application. This low 
learning was might have been attributed to low external 
resources in terms of financing and also because the banks did 
not disclose details behind the rejection. 
It was later confirmed by the Senior Credit Officer of Bank 5 
that banks do not share the details of the rejection for fear of 
encouraging fraudulent applications, as he argued below: 
We tell the feedback but not all, since there are Bank and Financing 
Act (BAFIA) and the possibility of fraud but we tell just common 
reasons (SCO of Bank 5). 
The bank’s multiple rejection left both Biomass A and Manu A 
confused and perplexed. Part of their argument was that it 
was difficult to convince the banks. From the analysis, the 
difficulty in convincing the banks is attributed to the path, and 
the widening of the financing competence gap of Biomass A 
and Manu A. In the context of the path, the change from 
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contract financing to project financing also shifted the scope of 
the loan conditions in terms of duration and also the amount, 
which intensified the need for reconfiguration of the existing 
financing skills. In the absence of learning or external 
resources to help them, they could not get out of the 
competency trap. 
Overall they could not fully reconfigure their opportunity 
refinement competencies and resource acquisition 
competencies because they remained trapped in the 
competency trap. 
5.3.3.2 Diverted 
The diverted path is the path of established entrepreneurial 
firms that were initially trapped in the competency trap. 
However they diverted the competency trap by acquiring 
green technology financing from other sources of financing 
mainly venture capitalists and business angels. From the 
analysis, the characteristics of the diverted firm is that there is 
a high financing competence gap, high GTFS influence, high 
external resources, trapped in the financing rejection cycle and 
finally diversification of financing sources which eventually 
resulted in the financing of their venture. 
Manu B was started by an established entrepreneur with a 
retailing business from Germany. Sensing a good opportunity 
to move back to Malaysia, the entrepreneur acquired licensing 
to manufacture an all-purpose insulation material based on 
nano-technology and green technology. The stark difference 
between the entrepreneur’s previous ventures and business 
environment represents a financing competence gap.  
 203 
 
Manu B sought to close this competence gap by acquiring the 
necessary entrepreneurial competencies. The documentary 
from Manu B showed that they had engaged a management 
team that comprised of very experienced business executives 
and consultants. They even had international technical 
consultants to set up the factory and sent the local engineers 
for training under a technical training agreement with the 
international technology licensor. Additionally, they had an 
agreement to supply to their licensor with the insulation that 
they manufactured. Manu B also had a financial consultant to 
assist them in financial matters. 
However this did not stop them from falling under the 
influence of the GTFS context. Here the Managing Director of 
Manu B had the misconception that financing would be easily 
acquired based on their success acquiring the GTFS 
certification. The Managing Director of Manu B admitted that 
their problem was that they assumed that the program 
administrators would make the financing decision instead of 
the bank. Even though they had good technical support from 
their technology principal, it was their financing assumptions 
that made their financing competence gap wider and led to a 
competency trap. Their apparent inability to escape from the 
competency trap appeared to be related to not only from their 
inexperience of the Malaysian context but because of the 
misconception of the funds from GTFS. 
After a series of financing rejections from the banks, Manu B 
opted out the GTFS. However through the financing process 
and high external resources that they had, Manu B did develop 
certain competencies to enable them to later acquire financing 
from a business angel.  
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This suggests that the level of opportunity refinement 
competencies and resource acquisition competencies that is 
required for bank financing is probably higher compared to 
business angel financing. This will be further discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
5.3.3.3 Escaped 
The escaped path is the path of established entrepreneurial 
firms that were initially trapped in the competency trap. 
However they were able to fully reconfigure their existing 
entrepreneurial competencies to fit the requirements of the 
GTFS and acquire green technology financing. As a result of 
this reconfiguration, they escaped the competency trap. From 
the analysis, the characteristics of the escaped firm is that 
there is a high financing competence gap, high GTFS influence, 
trapped in the financing rejection cycle, high external 
resources which resulted in financing of their venture. 
Solar C is a successful energy service company specialising in 
solar. Their new venture is a solar farm to produce renewable 
energy and supply to the national grid via a RePPA for 21 
years. Even though they had experience in solar power 
installation, with the new venture Solar C will be transformed 
into independent power producers. This new venture 
represents a high financing competence gap.  
Solar C had the technical skills and a confirmed buyback of the 
power they generated through a renewable energy power 
purchasing agreement (RePPA). However the financing amount 
they were asking for was bigger than the usual amount for 
their projects and the duration of the loan was longer. Under 
the influence of the GTFS context, Solar C assumed that 
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financing would be easy. In fact, there was an initial 
impression by senior finance executive (SFE) of Solar C, that 
the GTFS was a government grant and not a loan. 
I think in the first place we acquired GTFS certification, I in fact thought 
it was a government grant (SFE of Solar C) 
This quote highlights the assumption of how easily financing 
was to be acquired by Solar C. Under the influence of the 
GTFS context, Solar C then used the certification as a leverage 
to acquire financing from the banks. 
The first rejection was by a bank that had financed them 
before. Despite having a track record with the bank, the bank 
explained that the solar farm venture they were embarking on 
was new to the bank and they could not give the financing. 
They tried several banks, and the same answer was given. 
They were eventually caught in a financing rejection cycle, 
even though they had successfully acquired financing in their 
previous ventures, the same financing strategies for this 
venture did not bring the desired results. Furthermore from 
the data it showed that the senior finance executive (SFE) was 
two-year fresh out from University with an MBA and she was 
advising the owners on financing strategies. 
I’m already involved in this company about 2 years after graduated 
from MBA majoring in finance. I’m controlling the cash flow compiling 
all the financial record and advising the directors in terms of the 
financing strategies. (SFE of Solar C) 
This quote highlights the financing competencies of Solar C at 
the time were acquiring financing. However, in contrast to 
Biomass A and Manu A, Solar C had also enrolled in a 
government-sponsored program for high performing 
entrepreneurial firms. As part of the program, there were two 
 206 
 
components: human resource capacity building and financing 
enablement. In the financing enabler component, Solar C 
learned better fund sourcing, financing strategies and financial 
management (e.g. tax management) and why the failed in 
their previous financing attempts. The senior financing 
executive (SFE) of Solar C highlighted this: 
Yes, the business coaching […] (was) conducted by TERAS […] they 
become our business coach to raise our future potential.          (SFE of 
Solar C) 
Apart from the business coach, the countless rejections from 
the banks induced learning and contributed to Solar C 
competency development as stated by the managing director 
of Solar C. 
The feedback from the rejection made them aware of their 
shortcomings in terms of financing skills. The learning process 
was facilitated through the external resources of both the 
specialised business coaching program, and the learning from 
the multiple financing rejection cycle. This helped Solar C to 
escape the competency trap by escaping their present 
financing path and fully reconfiguring the opportunity 
refinement competencies and resource acquisition 
competencies. This later translated into financing success of 
their venture. The timing between the rejection and the 
enrolment on to a business coaching program illustrates the 
time taken for the competency development (in order to 
reconfigure their existing competencies) and points to the 
outcome of “higher-level learning” described by Alvarez and 






The evaded path is the path of established entrepreneurial 
firms that evaded the GTFS influence and fully reconfigured 
their existing entrepreneurial competencies in order to acquire 
green technology financing. From the analysis, the 
characteristics of the evaded firm is that there is a low 
financing competence gap, low GTFS influence and high 
learning, high external resources which resulted in the 
financing of their venture. 
Solar D evolved from a landscape company into an 
environmental engineering company specialising in landfill 
rehabilitation before moving into the renewable energy 
business. Biomass D started as a new venture with a top 
management team comprised of people with financing, 
technical and marketing skills in the power generation 
business. Their team members were also people who had 
multiple business experiences. The common thread for both of 
this firms were that they had experience in financing big and 
long terms concessions. Therefore compared to the other 
cases, their new financing context was similar to their previous 
financing experience. 
In terms of seeking financing from the GTFS, Biomass D and 
Solar D took a different approach. In the case of Biomass D, 
they did their opportunity refinement without thinking of the 
government guarantee scheme. While Solar D took a different 
route, they applied for the financing from the banks before 
applying for the GTFS certification. Therefore, unlike the other 
cases, they were able to evade the GTFS influence. 
For Solar D they had anticipated the difficulty of the project 
they had named their business consultants as project 
 208 
 
partners. The decision was in fact path dependent, prompted 
by Solar D financing and business experience. Solar D had 
experience embarking in new ventures different from their 
core business. They had grown from a landscape firm into a 
landfill rehabilitation-environmental engineering firm and now 
they were venturing into renewable energy. Their experience 
in government concessions for the landfill rehabilitation 
venture also shaped their “scanning” of their environment 
(Hambrick, 1981:256). Understanding the challenges for the 
new venture, the senior finance manager (SFM) of Solar D 
highlighted the competency gap and their measures to 
mitigate the risk, 
[…] with the change to a different nature of business. Definitely the 
know how [on the new business] is something that we will be lacking. 
But with the support of new staff, new expertise and also consultants 
and contractors all these can be resolved.  
In pursuing this opportunity, and the measures they took to 
close the competency gap, Solar D took on a business 
consultant/project partner which advised them to acquire 
financing first from the banks before obtaining GTFS 
certification. 
Therefore in the case of Solar D, they managed to evade the 
influence of the GTFS because of the decision to directly go to 
the banks first instead of the GTFS. According to the project 
partner, this idea of a special program is sometimes taken as a 
signal by the financial community that the project is not viable 
enough. Thus, that is the reason these projects need 
additional assistance. Taking this different financing route, 
Solar D had to reconfigure their existing financing skills to the 
banks’ credit criteria without the government guarantee. In 
terms of the technical skills, Solar D had engaged technical 
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consultants concurrently retraining their engineering personnel 
to acquire technical expertise in solar and biogas energy. They 
were also hiring experienced personnel in these two fields to 
support their technical skills. The need to reconfigure their 
marketing skills was less critical due to the secured market of 
the renewable energy power purchasing agreement (REPPA) to 
supply electricity to the national grid. As for the development 
of the opportunity refinement competencies, Solar C had a 
high involvement from external resources; technical and 
financing. Apart from that, Solar D’s experience from previous 
business ventures guided them in preparing for the new 
venture. 
In the case of Biomass D, the owners started the venture 
before the GTFS was established. Biomass D received GTFS 
certification after four years of refining the opportunity. As 
with Solar C, Biomass D also has a REPPA to supply electricity 
to the national grid. Therefore in terms of marketing, Biomass 
D had a secured market. In terms of the technical skills, one 
of the three owners, the Executive Director of Biomass D, had 
a background in power generation. He also brought with him 
his technical and financial team. To fortify the technical skills 
Biomass D also hired additional staff to support them in terms 
of technical expertise, including the Managing Director of Kina 
& Seguntor, the first Biomass plant using empty fruit bunch 
(EFB) as a raw material to generate electricity in Malaysia. 
Biomass D also engaged the same technical and design 
consultant to design the biomass plant. Another owner of 
Biomass D owned the land for the plant. The land is 
strategically situated to collect the EFB from the surrounding 
plantation and mills. The other owner, the Executive Chairman 
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of Biomass D was the former Director of Estates for the 
government, who helped to secure the contracts of the EFB 
suppliers. In terms of the financial competencies they also had 
the services of a financial consultant in advising them in terms 
of the cash flow assumptions, apart from that their Chief 
Financial Officer who had experience in energy financing as a 
business consultant. From the analysis of the financing stages 
of Biomass D, they had started the venture before the GTFS 
was launched. Therefore they had already predominantly 
developed the opportunity refinement competencies and 
refined the opportunity before applying for the GTFS which 
minimised the financing competence gap. The explanation will 
be discussed in Chapter 6.  
In the case of Biomass D, the development of the opportunity 
refinement competencies and resource acquisition 
competencies was mainly developed together with their 
foreign partner. They had a long time to develop the relevant 
competencies together, starting from 2008 to 2012 before 
they acquired financing in December 2012. This suggests, like 
Barney (2001), that competency development takes a long 
time. 
Another finding that can be highlighted from this pathway is 
that Biomass D and Solar D are now total solution providers 
for other renewable energy firms in the country, which can be 
interpreted as a sign that they had successfully developed 
their entrepreneurial competencies to be used by other 
entrepreneurial firms. Table 17 shows the evolution of 




Table 17 Contrasting the evolution of competencies between pathways 
(adopted from Rasmussen et.al 2014:100) 




Non-financed cases    
Biomass A  Biomass A used existing 
financing skills, even though 
change of financing environment 
and venture. Over emphasis on 
technical skill, used new hard to 
verify technology. 
Biomass A relied heavily on 
GTFS certification was not able 
to convince banks with their new 
technology. 
Manu A  Manu A used existing financing 
skills and marketing skills, even 
though change of financing 
environment and venture.  
Manu A relied heavily on GTFS 
certification, was not able to 
convince banks with their 
venture. 
Non GTFS Financed   
Manu B  Manu B developed new 
competencies with external 
resources but not fulfilling GTFS 
requirement.  
Manu B developed new 
competencies with external 
resources but not fulfilling GTFS 
requirement. 
GTFS Financed cases   
Solar C  Solar C developed competencies 
with business coaches, regulators, 
and multiple financing rejections.  
Solar C developed competencies 
with business coaches, regulators, 
and multiple financing rejections. 
Solar D  Solar D reconfigured their 
competencies with the help of 
technical, business consultants, 
industry partners, new personnel. 
They had started retraining new 
staff in anticipation of launching 
the new venture.  
Solar D reconfigured their 
competencies with the help of 
technical, business consultants, 
industry partners, new personnel. 
They had started retraining new 
staff in anticipation of launching 
the new venture. 
Biomass D  Biomass D took time to 
reconfigure/developing their 
competencies through mergers 
and acquisition, engagement with 
consultants, industry partners and 
acquiring the necessary expertise 
(technical, financial and 
marketing)  
Biomass D took time to 
reconfigure/developing their 
competencies with foreign 
expertise, engagement with 
consultants, industry partners and 
acquiring the necessary expertise 
(technical, financial and 
marketing) 
 
5.4 Summary and conclusion 
This research reveals the intricate link between the financing 
priorities, bank knowledge asymmetry, green technology 
financial criteria and the contextual effects which together 
make the financing competence gap. Here the deployment of 
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competencies of the established entrepreneurial firm is 
dependent on the financing competence gap. A high degree of 
financing competence gap will lead to a competency trap 
(Levitt and March, 1988). In the cases that were unable to 
escape from the competency trap, the entrepreneurial firms 
were unable to develop the necessary entrepreneurial 
competencies and were locked in the cycle of financial 
rejection. This also explains York and Venkataraman's (2010) 
and Hockerts and Wüstenhagen's (2010) apparent 
contradiction on established entrepreneurial firms embarking 
on sustainable entrepreneurship ventures, which will be 
discussed in chapter 6. 
The competencies necessary for the established 
entrepreneurial firms to acquire financing are based on 
Rasmussen et al.’s (2014) evolutionary competency 
framework. These were found to be: (i) opportunity 
refinement competencies and (ii) resource acquisition 
competencies. Based on the analysis, competency 
development is path dependent on the previous financing and 
business experience of the established entrepreneurial firms. 
This in turn will lead to different pathways for the established 
entrepreneurial firms in dealing with the impact of the 
financing competence gap, i.e. entrapped, diverted, escaped 
and evaded. These pathways will be further discussed in 
chapter 6. 
In the next chapter, the research will discuss the findings with 
the literature in detail and the contribution of the research. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter described the findings which emerged 
from the data analysis. This chapter discusses the findings in 
relation to the literature and presents the contribution of the 
research. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first 
provides the overview of the discussion and contributions. This 
is followed by a section detailing the discussion in relation to 
the findings; the penultimate section is on the contribution to 
sustainable entrepreneurship and the final section provides a 
summary and conclusion. 
6.1.1 Overview 
By considering the background of a developing country’s 
climate change mitigation program, this research has explored 
the entrepreneurial competency development of established 
entrepreneurial firms as they seek green technology financing. 
The context also offered an opportunity to explore the 
influence of multiple stakeholders from a competence gap 
perspective in sustainable entrepreneurship financing.  
The research relates to the call by Hall et al. (2010) for 
research to explore the conditions and policies that influence 
sustainable entrepreneurship. Here the focus is on green 
technology financing in a developing country context. This 
research is able to bridge the arguments of York and 
Venkataraman (2010) and Hockerts and Wüstenhagen, (2010) 
about established entrepreneurial firms embarking on 
sustainable entrepreneurship ventures by focusing on an 
entrepreneurial competencies perspective. Guiding the 
research is the evolutionary entrepreneurial competency 
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framework (Rasmussen et al., 2014) as it explains the 
influence from the context, and entrepreneurial competencies 
development by retroduction as explained in section 3.5. 
Section 6.2 will discuss the findings in relation to the three 
sub-research questions. The discussion centres on the 
financing competence gap (6.2.1). Whilst the initial conception 
of the competence gap (Danneels, 2007) is straightforward, 
the involvement of multiple stakeholders, suggests much 
complexity in relation to the financing competence gap. This 
will be followed by a discussion of the entrepreneurial 
competencies (6.2.2), and finally the competency 
development paths (6.2.3) which includes the opportunity 
refinement competencies and the resource acquisition 
competencies alongside the equifinality (Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000) of the competency development paths. 
Section 6.3, discusses the research contribution, focusing on 
the primary contribution to the sustainable entrepreneurship 
literature. Specifically this includes explaining the key 
contextual differences of sustainable entrepreneurship 
financing in a developing country context, Malaysia. A further 
contribution relates to the entrepreneurial competencies 
development literature. Here an extension to the evolutionary 
competency framework (Rasmussen et al., 2014) into the 
sustainable entrepreneurship literature is proposed. Finally in 




6.2 Discussion of the findings 
The main guiding research question is “How do established 
entrepreneurial firms develop entrepreneurial competencies to 
acquire green technology financing in Malaysia?” This main 
research question has been broken into three sub-research 
questions: 
(i) How does the GTFS context influence the 
deployment of competencies by established 
entrepreneurial firms? 
(ii) What entrepreneurial competencies are necessary 
for established entrepreneurial firms to acquire 
green technology financing in this context?  
(iii) How are these competencies developed? 
These discussions on the findings from this three sub-research 
question are discussed in the subsequent subsections.  
6.2.1 Financing Competence Gap  
The findings have highlighted the financing competence gap 
which answers to the first sub research question, “How does 
the GTFS context influence the deployment of competencies 
by established entrepreneurial firms?” Components of the 
financing competence gap are depicted in Figure 15.  
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Figure 15 The financing competence gap: components and influences (from 
the researcher) 
 
The financing competence gap builds upon Parrish's (2010) 
claim that sustainable entrepreneurship is different compared 
to conventional entrepreneurship and Cassar's (2004) 
suggestion that financing requirements are specific according 
to sector or context. Taking the above in consideration the 
researcher’s initial conception of a financing competence gap 
was based on the notion of the competence gap described by 
Danneels (2007), with the gap being the difference between 
the ideal competencies needed to venture into a new field and 
the actual competencies possessed by the established 
entrepreneurial firms.  
However, the analysis revealed a much greater level of 
complexity in relation to the financing competence gap. The 
research finds that the financing competence gap is in fact a 
nexus of complexities made up of the difference in financing 
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priorities (see 5.3.1.1.) of the stakeholders which consist of 
the government, banks and the established entrepreneurial 
firms; this is followed by the bank’s knowledge asymmetry 
(see 5.3.1.2), green technology financial criteria (see 5.3.1.3) 
and the contextual effects of the GTFS (see 5.3.1.4). These 
complexities helps to explain and understand the 
institutionalisation of barriers for sustainable entrepreneurship 
(Meek et al., 2010) in terms of financing because it lies 
outside the social norms of financing (e.g. the 5Cs). This 
supports the assertion by Linnanen (2002) and Choi and Gray 
(2008) that conventional and sustainable entrepreneurs’ 
financing are not on equal footing.  
Additional to the first three components, the research has 
discovered two distinct effects to the financing competence 
gap, the first is the “perceived ease of acquiring finance” and 
the second is the “competency trap” for the established 
entrepreneurial firms. These two effects widen the financing 
competence gap of the established entrepreneurial firms that 
two out of three of these characteristics; different core 
business, different financing experience or low external 
resources before financing. 
The “perceived ease of acquiring finance” can be attributed to 
the misinterpretation of the business environment for green 
technology (see 6.2.2) by the established entrepreneurial 
firms. This notion can be explained by the risk perception and 
how it effects the planning of a venture. Mullins & Forlani 
(2005) suggests that as long as financing is perceived to be 
available and it is externally financed, the decision to launch a 
new venture will be positive, despite of the unsuitability of the 
entrepreneur’s current skill sets.  
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Here the attraction is, less risk and more profit, which suggest 
“the opportunist” from Linnanen's (2002:78) sustainable 
entrepreneurship typology. However this may also be less 
about being “green” and more towards to the economic 
opportunities from environmental degradation (York and 
Lenox, 2014). From this insight more relevant and concrete 
programs can be formulated to develop the necessary 
competencies to embark on sustainable entrepreneurship 
ventures.  
This idea of perceived ease of acquiring finance is interrelated 
with the competency trap. The idea of a competency trap was 
introduced by Levitt and March (1988:322) which suggests 
that a “competency trap can occur when favourable 
performance with an inferior procedure leads an organisation 
to accumulate more experience with it, thus keeping 
experience with a superior procedure inadequate to make it 
rewarding to use.” York and Venkataraman (2010), hinted at 
this notion of a competency trap by describing the case of 
established entrepreneurial firms embarking on sustainable 
entrepreneurship ventures. By virtue of strong forces of inertia 
it would be difficult for them to alter their existing strategies, 
even though there is public demand for such products. York 
and Venkataraman’s (2010) rationale is that established firms 
have invested substantially in plant and personnel specialised 
in producing products and services, which can lead to a 
competency trap.  
Both the perceived ease of acquiring finance and the 
competency trap influence competency development at 
different points in time. The influence of the perceived ease of 
acquiring finance on competency development is salient to 
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efforts to scan the environment (Hambrick, 1981) during the 
opportunity recognition stage. However, the influence of the 
competency trap on competency development becomes more 
prevalent during the financing acquisition stage. The perceived 
ease of acquiring finance reinforces the competency trap; this 
is akin to the notion of self-reinforcing processes in path 
dependency (Koch, 2011; Schreyögg and Sydow, 2011; 
Sydow et al., 2012), which explains the strong influence of the 
financing competence gap on the competency development 
process. 
In summary, due to the influence of the GTFS context: there is 
a financing competence gap which influences the deployment 
and development of the necessary competencies. The 
financing competence gap consists of four elements: the 
difference between stakeholders financing priorities, bank 
knowledge asymmetry, green technology financial criteria and 
the effects (perceived ease of acquiring finance and 
competency trap). These two effects influence the financing 
competence gap. Key characteristics of these two influences 
are that the former reinforces the latter. Here the perception 
of easy financing reinforces the established entrepreneurial 
firms to believe that their existing competencies (e.g. financial 
skills) will suffice to acquire financing, and are good enough, 
reinforcing the notion of a competency trap. This leads to 
deploying the existing competencies to acquire financing. It is 
these influence that hinder the deployment and development 
of the necessary competencies to acquire financing.  
In the next section the research will discuss the necessary 
entrepreneurial competencies identified as important for 
acquiring green technology financing. This will be followed by 
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elaborating the competency development paths brought to 
light in the findings.  
6.2.2 Entrepreneurial Competencies 
To answer the second research question: “What 
entrepreneurial competencies are necessary for established 
entrepreneurial firms to acquire green technology financing in 
this context?” the research primarily utilises the evolutionary 
competency framework (Rasmussen et al., 2014). A 
consideration in this framework is the concept of the credibility 
threshold. This suggests that if an entrepreneur acquires 
financing, it indicates that they have developed the necessary 
competencies for venture success (Rasmussen et al., 2011, 
2014; Vohora et al., 2004). Extending this notion, the 
research briefly studies the entrepreneurial firms’ post-
financing acquisition activities. Thus the competency 
development path in the research takes into account the pre-
financing, financing and post-financing stages of the 
established entrepreneurial firms.  
Therefore, based on the evolutionary competency framework, 
the research has identified two sets of entrepreneurial 
competencies that are essential to acquire green technology 
financing: (i) opportunity refinement competencies and (ii) 
resource acquisition competencies.  
Based on the findings, the opportunity refinement 
competencies comprise of three functional skills (Mitchelmore 
and Rowley, 2010): the technical, financial and marketing 
skills of the established entrepreneurial firms. This notion that 
entrepreneurial competencies comprises a combination of 
skills – knowledge acquisition, assimilation, transformation, 
and exploitation – is also highlighted by Zahra and George 
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(2002)  and more recently Teece (2014). Having identified 
these technical skills are the primary skills needed for the 
venture to acquire financing, this research goes further than 
Brinckmann et al. (2009) suggestion that strong financial skills 
would be a competitive advantage to acquire financing. 
However the findings also suggest that an over-concentration 
on reconfiguring the technical skills to prepare for the new 
venture can result in adverse effects. Indeed, the result of 
such adverse effects, in the cases of Biomass A and Manu A, 
emerged as being unable to fully reconfigure their existing 
opportunity refinement competencies. 
While the resource acquisition competencies are similar to 
Hayton and Kelley's (2006) “entrepreneurial competencies of 
sponsoring” which centres around the deep financing skills and 
educating the investors. The resource acquisition is a 
continuation of the opportunity refinement competencies, with 
the financing skills as integral part of both of these sets of 
competencies. The resource acquisition competencies are a set 
of competencies that are pivotal to convince and to educate 
the bankers over and above their knowledge asymmetry to 
acquire financing.  
The idea of entrepreneurial competencies was introduced in 
the research as a means of explaining the contradiction 
between York and Venkataraman (2010) and Hockerts and 
Wüstenhagen (2010). The contradiction centers on the 
transition of established entrepreneurial firms into sustainable 
entrepreneurship ventures. Either established entrepreneurial 
firms will have difficulty in embarking on sustainable 
entrepreneurship ventures due to organizational inertia (York 
and Venkataraman, 2010) or they will outpace nascent firms 
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because of their “superior market power”, “financial resources” 
and “process innovation capabilities” (Hockerts and 
Wüstenhagen, 2010:487). 
Empirically, this contradiction exists in the GTFS, with some 
established entrepreneurial firms having acquired and some 
having not acquired green technology financing. Parrish's 
(2010:521) suggestion that there are “distinct competencies” 
in overcoming organizing tensions in sustainable 
entrepreneurship ventures alludes to a new skill set for 
designing sustainable entrepreneurship ventures.  
However Parrish's (2010) assumptions were based on nascent 
entrepreneurs. In the case of established entrepreneurial 
firms, existing entrepreneurial competencies come into play. 
Based on the findings, there is a need to reconfigure (Karim 
and Mitchell, 2000) these existing entrepreneurial 
competencies to address the financing competence gap 
aforementioned in section 5.2.1.  
Now that the research has identified the opportunity 
refinement competencies and the resource acquisition 
competencies, next the research turns to the competency 
development path in the next subsection. 
6.2.3  Competency Development paths 
The discussion about the competency development paths of 
the entrepreneurial competencies relates to the third sub-
research question, “How are these competencies developed?” 
Drawing upon Rasmussen et al.'s (2014) evolutionary 
entrepreneurial competency framework, the research was able 
to identify and explain the different developmental pathways 
for entrepreneurial competencies based on the cases’ financing 
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processes. The multiple entrepreneurial competencies 
development pathways are entrapped, diverted, escaped, and 
evaded. These pathways are independent of each other and 
influenced by the cases’ previous paths and the GTFS context. 
The pathways are labelled according to how the established 
entrepreneurial firms interact and manage the competency 
trap to develop the entrepreneurial competencies necessary to 
acquire green technology financing.  
The table 18 below shows the pathways and the established 
entrepreneurial firms.  
Table 18 Pathways and established entrepreneurial firms (from 
researcher) 
 Path  Established entrepreneurial firms 
1 Entrapped Biomass A and Manu A 
2 Diverted Manu B 
3 Escaped Solar C 
4 Evaded Biomass D and Solar D 
 
Path-dependence plays an important role in a firm’s 
competencies base (Barney and Arikan, 2001; Lockett, 
Thompson, and Morgenstern, 2009). Prior studies on path 
dependence were primarily on a technological based path (e.g. 
product development), with the QWERTY keyboard and the 
Betamax (Vergne and Durand, 2010) as frequently cited 
examples in case studies for path dependence (Sydow, 
Schreyögg, and Koch, 2009). However Sydow, Schreyögg, and 
Koch (2009) assert that there is also a need to expand path 
dependence research in other areas such as process studies 
and organisational practices. As such, this research suggests 
aspects of the financing acquisition process for sustainable 
entrepreneurship in Malaysia and details some key practices 
that established entrepreneurial firms use to acquire financing. 
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The idea of path dependence suggests that the firm is 
dependent on the technology, institutions or organisational 
forms after it has been locked in, i.e. history matters (Lockett 
et al., 2009). Therefore, in the context of this research, path 
dependence means the established entrepreneurial firms 
predominantly relying on their existing financing skills and 
business experience to embark on their new sustainability 
venture.  
This path dependence can be seen in all the cases. As 
established entrepreneurial firms the cases were quick to 
recognise the opportunities offered by green technology, and 
the GTFS. According to the findings, the decision during the 
initial stage of the venture suggests that it was influenced by 
the established entrepreneurial firms’ previous paths and the 
GTFS context especially the perceived ease of acquiring 
finance. Here, in refining their opportunities, Biomass A, Manu 
A and Solar C made the decision to concentrate on the 
technical aspects of the ventures (e.g. hiring of technical 
consultants only). In contrast Biomass D and Solar D, made a 
different decision, they decided to engage both business and 
technical consultants to help them refine their ventures, with 
Solar D appointing their consultant as project partners. While, 
in the case of Manu B, as new entrants to the Malaysian 
business environment, they too had appointed both financial 
consultants and technical consultants. 
These decisions would later be pivotal in the development of 
the cases’ entrepreneurial competencies and acquisition of 
resources (Vohora et al., 2004). Even though, the findings 
point to a strong contextual influence on the initial decisions, it 
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still supports the notion of strong path dependencies in 
competency development in this research.  
This notion is supported by the interplay between strategic 
logic, opportunity recognition, and paths (Freiling, Gersch, and 
Goeke, 2008) and scanning of the environment (Barringer and 
Bluedorn, 1999; Danneels, 2008; Freiling et al., 2008; 
Hambrick, 1981). Strategic logic is an integral part of 
opportunity recognition and is constrained by the previous 
path (Freiling et al., 2008). The strategic logic interacts with 
the environment by scanning (Barringer and Bluedorn, 1999; 
Danneels, 2008; Freiling et al., 2008; Hambrick, 1981). An 
increase in the scanning activities, increases opportunity 
identification and increases the ability of established 
entrepreneurial firms to enter new domains (Danneels, 2008). 
However, influenced by the perceived ease of acquiring 
finance, the initial scanning of the environment can have 
detrimental effects by inducing a false sense of security 
(Barringer and Bluedorn, 1999) for the established 
entrepreneurial firms, as in the case of Biomass A, Manu A, 
Manu B and Solar C. This false sense of security is distorts the 
opportunity refinement and is detrimental to the ventures. 
Sharing his thoughts on this is the senior credit officer (SCO) 
of Bank 5,  
GTFS is not government funds, big misconception […] Whatever 
money comes from the banks. The government needs to educate the 
entrepreneurs. The announcement by the government is misleading 
[…] (SCO of Bank 5) 
However the research argues that path dependence is still 
dominant, as in the case of Biomass D and Solar D, because 
their previous paths helped them to scan the environment 
during the initial stage of recognising and refining the 
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opportunity. This suggests that the efficiency of scanning the 
environment is tied to the cases’ previous paths, which is 
supported by Bingham, Eisenhardt, and Furr’s (2007:42) 
suggestion that in opportunity rich dynamic environments: 
“organisational heuristics as improvisational referents to 
provide a flexible constraint within which opportunity capture 
may unfold”.  
The four developmental pathways identified from the findings 
are independent of each other, and each follows a specific 
route in managing their competency trap to develop (or not 
develop) their entrepreneurial competencies.  
For firms Biomass A and Manu A that were entrapped in the 
competency trap, their path dependence led them to a 
competency trap. However because of their competency trap 
they were unable to break from their path dependency. This 
happened because Biomass A and Manu A only partially 
reconfigured their existing competencies. In other words, while 
still dependent on their existing competencies they tried to 
acquire financing, which led them to a financing rejection 
cycle. The cycle serves as a self-reinforcing mechanism that 
induces lock-in (Schreyogg and Sydow, 2011; Sydow et al., 
2009) between the path and the competency trap (Liu, 2006). 
Because of this lock-in, Biomass A and Manu A were unable to 
break the path to fully reconfigure the necessary competencies 
to acquire green technology financing, which led them to 
eventually abort their ventures.  
Similar to Biomass A and Manu A, Manu B, which diverted 
from the original path was trapped in a competency trap 
because of its path dependence and this led it to a financing 
rejection cycle. Unlike Biomass A and Manu A, Manu B had 
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both technical and financial consultants to help them in 
refining the opportunity. In the context of acquiring finance 
under the GTFS, Manu B did partially develop their 
competencies in refining their opportunity to achieve GTFS 
certification. However they were rejected at the next stage of 
the GTFS which is the application to banks to finance the 
venture. Learning from the rejection, they decided to pursue 
other financing options which proved successful. This indicates 
they managed to break from their competency trap by 
diverting away from the GTFS context and reconfigured the 
necessary entrepreneurial competencies under a different 
financing context. 
Similar to Biomass A, Manu A, and Manu B, the firm Solar C 
was trapped in a competency trap but managed to escape. 
Similar to Biomass A and Manu A, Solar C had only engaged 
technical consultants to help them to refine the opportunity. 
After a series of financing rejections they enrolled in a 
business-coaching program that helped to reconsider their 
financing strategies. Apart from that, Solar C also learned 
from the multiple financing rejections. The intervention by the 
business coaches and the learning from the financing rejection 
cycle helped Solar C to escape the competency trap as they 
reconfigured their existing entrepreneurial competencies to 
acquire green technology financing under the GTFS. The 
effects of the intervention by the business coaches supports 
the notion of “positive shocks” (Shepherd, Douglas, and 
Shanley, 2000:401). Positive shocks are external events that 
positively alter the degree of novelty of the venture and 
decrease the venture’s mortality risk (Shepherd, Douglas, and 
Shanley, 2000). In the case of Solar C, unlike Biomass A and 
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Manu A, where there was no similar intervention, this positive 
shock in the form of the business coaches’ assistance helped 
Solar C to break from the competency trap. Also unlike Manu 
B, Solar C had a good business and financial track record in 
Malaysia, which did not force them to seek alternative 
financing sources beyond the GTFS. 
However, in contrast to all the other cases Biomass D and 
Solar D, because of their path dependence had evaded the 
competency trap. For Biomass D, the principals had embarked 
on the venture in 2008 before the GTFS was launched in 2010, 
thus the firm had started to refine the opportunity and develop 
the necessary competencies to acquire financing before 
making the financing application. Solar D, based on their 
previous path, had engaged technical and business 
consultants, who became their project partners to guide them 
in the venture. This among others made them decide to go 
through the financing application without the GTFS 
certification.  
Based on the discussion of the pathways above, the cases 
support Rasmussen et al.'s (2011) suggestion that to develop 
new competencies there is a need to create new paths, except 
in the cases of Biomass D and Solar D.  
For the cases that support the notion that the creation of new 
paths will lead to development of new competencies, there 
seems to be a tipping point that triggers the decision (McAdam 
and Marlow, 2011) that leads to a full development or 
reconfiguration of the competencies. Based on the findings, it 
is seems to suggest that this tipping point occurs before path-
breaking (Karim and Mitchell, 2000) from the original path. In 
the case of Manu B, and Solar C which diverted and escaped 
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from their original paths, the idea of a tipping point seems to 
be true and also supports Ahuja and Katila’s (2004) argument 
that competence evolution (Rasmussen et al., 2011) occurs 
because of idiosyncratic scenarios which they attribute to 
competitive pressure and market expansion. However in the 
case of Biomass A and Manu A, the tipping point does not 
seem to occur even though the notion of idiosyncratic 
scenarios (Ahuja and Katila, 2004) are present. In explaining 
this difference, the notion of “positive shock” (Shepherd, 
Douglas, and Shanley, 2000:401) was present in Manu B and 
Solar C, in contrast to Biomass A and Manu A. This made the 
difference to help Manu B and Solar C break from their path 
dependency. This helps to support Rasmussen et al.'s (2011) 
suggestion for new path creation to develop new 
competencies. 
Aforementioned, in contrast to all the other cases, the need to 
create a new path to reconfigure or create new competencies 
does not occur in the case of Biomass D and Solar D because 
of their previous path that has similarities with their present 
venture. The similarity of the path might also attribute to the 
low degree of variation in terms of the necessary 
competencies to embark on the present venture. Another 
plausible explanation could be because of the similarity in 
terms of the path, the scanning of the environment gave them 
a better picture in terms of the resources and knowledge 
(Vohora et al., 2004) and did not result in a false sense of 
security (Barringer and Bluedorn, 1999) as in the other cases 
which warranted the need for Biomass A, Manu A, Manu B and 
Solar C to break from their existing paths. In other words the 
path difference between the previous and present venture will 
 230 
 
attribute to a variation in terms of needs assessment of the 
new project and will affect the deployment and development 
of the established entrepreneurial firm’s competencies in their 
new venture. This is consistent with Rasmussen et 
al.(2011,2014) work on the need for new paths to develop 
new competencies and expands it by highlighting the influence 
in terms of the variation in the path difference between the 
previous path and the new venture path. 
Another finding that emerged from the research is the 
duration of the competency development based on different 
paths. The preparation for acquiring finance starts in the very 
beginning of the venture, thus it is important that both of 
these competencies are developed as early as possible. The 
findings of the research show that both of these competencies 
were being developed before financing was acquired. It also 
indicates that a key difference between the firms is the 
development time and at which stage they were able to fully 
reconfigure their competencies. Barney (2001) mentions that 
the development of competencies has always been assumed to 
be time consuming because it was not clear how competencies 
are developed in the short or mid-term. Therefore this 
research argues, depending on the level of the existing 
competencies and the learning process during the financing 
rejection cycle, the reconfiguration of the competencies as 
new entrepreneurial competencies can be relatively quick to 
develop or reconfigure. This notion occurs in Solar C that 
escaped from the competency trap. Solar C had a high degree 
of technical skills and backed by a secured market because of 
the renewable energy power purchase agreement (RePPA), 
which meant that they only had to reconfigure their financing 
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skills as part of their opportunity refinement competencies. 
Solar C was able to reconfigure the necessary entrepreneurial 
competencies to acquire green technology financing because 
of the specialised business coaching and the learning process 
from the financing rejection cycle. As a result they escaped 
from the competency trap and fully developed (reconfigured) 
the necessary entrepreneurial competencies and finally 
acquired financing.  
The combination of the business coaching and the learning 
from the financing rejection cycle helped them to reconfigure 
their existing competencies in a relatively short time. The 
business coaching and consultants helped Solar C to “connect 
the dots” (Baron and Ensley, 2006:1341). The presence of 
intermediaries in this case is similar to the launch of new 
ventures (McAdam and Marlow, 2011; Vohora et al., 2004). In 
this case the business coaches helped them to re-evaluate 
their financing strategies based on their failure, which is 
important in learning especially when the failure is pinpointed 
(Holcomb, Ireland, Holmes Jr., and Hitt, 2009). In helping to 
pinpoint the problem, the business coaches had already 
reduced the time in identifying the problem. Indeed, business 
coaches have a role in competency development through 
enhancing knowledge transfer by learning (Bingham, 
Heimeriks, Schijven, and Gates, 2014) 
The change in financing strategies by Solar C points to the 
notion of higher-level learning. Cope (2005) highlights that 
higher-level learning (Alvarez, 2001; Cope, 2003, 2005, 2011; 
Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Lei, Hitt, and Bettis, 1996) is based on 
“critical events that generate a renewed understanding or 
redefinition of organisational processes and 
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strategies.”(Cope,2005:383). In the case of Solar C, the 
critical event is the financing rejection cycle. As such failure, 
or in this case the financing rejection cycle, triggered the 
higher-level learning (Cope, 2003), the outcome for Solar C 
was to redefine the strategies of the firms, and their approach 
to financing.  
By pinpointing the problem, the reconfiguration of the 
competencies became faster; another complementary 
explanation is that the concept of higher-level learning 
involves heuristics. Heuristics are simple (Alvarez & Busenitz, 
2001; Bingham et al., 2007), and with the help of coaching to 
connect the dots (Baron and Ensley, 2006), facilitating 
knowledge transfer, and adjusting to idiosyncrasies (Bingham 
et al., 2014), the learning occurs at an increased rate 
(Holcomb et al., 2009), thus shortening the duration for 
reconfiguring the competencies. Further to this, starting from 
2014, Solar C is offering their services as a total solution 
provider for solar projects with financing options, which 
illustrates that the sustainability threshold (Vohora et al., 
2004) had been achieved and that the competencies had been 
reconfigured. 
In the case of Biomass A and Manu A as they remained 
trapped in the financing rejection cycle, their ventures were 
later aborted. Without any “positive shocks” (Shepherd, 
Douglas, and Shanley, 2000:401) to assist them identifying 
the problems in their financing rejection, and re-strategizing 
their financing strategies, regardless of the presence of 
idiosyncratic scenarios (Ahuja and Katila, 2004) the tipping 
point that leads to decision to break from their path and 
reconfigure their competencies does not occur. On the 
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assumption that Biomass A and Manu B realigned their 
pathways according to either diverted or escaped paths, it 
would be theoretically possible they would be able to fully 
reconfigure their existing competencies to acquire green 
technology financing from the GTFS. 
In summary the established entrepreneurial firms possess 
entrepreneurial competencies that have proven to be relevant 
in their previous business success. However, when established 
entrepreneurial firms enter into a new environment (i.e. a 
green financing context) there is a need for “distinct 
competencies” (Parrish, 2010:521) which in these cases are 
reconfigured from their existing competencies to make the 
sustainable entrepreneurship venture a success.  
Based on the findings, the previous paths of the established 
entrepreneurial firms remain dominant in influencing the 
ability for them to fully reconfigure their existing 
entrepreneurial competencies. This remains the case until the 
intervention of positive shocks that leads to a tipping point to 










Table 19 Evolution of the opportunity refinement competencies and 
resource acquisition competencies (adopted from Rasmussen et.al 
2014:104) 




Main source of 
competency 
Reconfiguration of existing 
ORCs with external 
resources 
Reconfiguration of existing 
RACs with external 
resources, after 
reconfiguration of ORCs 
Nature of competency Refining business case 
according to new venture 
specifications 
Convince and educate the 
banks the whole picture 
concept for the new 
venture business case 
above the knowledge 
asymmetry 
Context of FCG Influence 
on the evolution of 
entrepreneurial 
competencies 
Perceived ease of 
acquiring finance. 
Competency trap. 




6.3 Research Contribution  
The research contributes to both the sustainable 
entrepreneurship literature and the entrepreneurial 
competencies development literature. 
The research contributes to the sustainable entrepreneurship 
literature in two interconnected ways. Firstly, it fleshes out 
details about how sustainable entrepreneurship activity is 
shaped by policy (J. K. Hall et al., 2010). Secondly, it offers a 
means to explain how existing entrepreneurial firms can 
translate their experience as they enter the sustainable 
entrepreneurship space. 
The next contribution relates to the evolutionary competency 
literature. Firstly by supplying this framework to a new 
context, it offers detailed insight into the two sets of 
competencies necessary for green technology financing (i.e. 
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sustainable entrepreneurship). Secondly the research is able 
to demonstrate the equifinality nature of the competency 
development paths; this suggests that entrepreneurial 
competencies evolve differently according to decisions made 
about financing. 
The next subsection will discuss these contributions and will 
offer some propositions. 
6.3.1 Sustainable entrepreneurship literature 
The research contributes to the sustainable entrepreneurship 
literature by elaborating upon Hall et al.’s (2010) questions 
“under what conditions and policy will sustainable 
entrepreneurship ventures thrive?” By focusing on established 
entrepreneurial firms transition into sustainable 
entrepreneurship ventures in the context of the GTFS also 
provides insight into the contradiction between York and 
Venkataraman's (2010) and Hockerts and Wüstenhagen's 
(2010) arguments about how established entrepreneurial firms 
are placed to embark upon sustainable entrepreneurship.  
The research findings indicate that for established 
entrepreneurial firms to embark on sustainable 
entrepreneurship ventures, concentrated effort is needed to 
reconfigure their existing competencies (Hitt, Ireland, Sirmon, 
& Trahms, 2011). It is only through doing so that firms were 
able to acquire GTFS financing. Reconfiguring the 
entrepreneurial competencies is necessary due to different 
requirements and contextual considerations for green 
technology financing. The manifestation of these differences is 
the financing competence gap. To reconfigure their existing 
entrepreneurial competencies the established entrepreneurial 
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firms need to follow three pathways either by diverting, 
escaping or evading the competency trap. 
This reconciles York and Venkataraman's (2010) and Hockerts 
and Wüstenhagen's (2010) arguments about established 
entrepreneurial firms embarking on sustainable 
entrepreneurship ventures by proposing that distinct 
competencies (Hart, 1995; Parrish, 2010; Worthington and 
Patton, 2005) are needed for them to embark on sustainable 
entrepreneurship ventures. The reconfiguration of the 
established entrepreneurial firms to these distinct 
competencies according to green technology financing also 
supports Cassar's (2004) suggestion that financing is 
according to sectors and is industry specific. The findings also 
suggest that the notion of a competency trap influences the 
reconfiguration process. Therefore, the research proposes the 
following proposition,  
Proposition 1: Established entrepreneurial firms are more likely to 
acquire green technology financing contingent on their ability to 
develop distinct competencies according to green technology 
financing under the conditions of a competency trap. 
Thus, to answer Hall et al.’s (2010) call about what conditions 
and policy will help established entrepreneurial firms to pursue 
sustainable entrepreneurship ventures in the context of the 
GTFS, the research proposes that established entrepreneurial 
firms ability to acquire green technology financing, is 
contingent on their ability to reconfigure their existing 
competencies into distinct competencies according to green 
technology financing under the conditions of a competency 




6.3.2 Financing competence gap and competency development. 
The next contribution centres on the financing competence 
gap and the GTFS context. As mentioned in 6.2.1, the 
financing competence gap is influenced by the context. This is 
similar to Leca & Naccache (2006) and Rasmussen et al. 
(2014) suggestion about the influence of context in their 
respective articles.  
In this section, the research extends our knowledge on the 
influence of context on competency development (Barney et 
al., 2011; Rasmussen et al., 2014; Zahra and Wright, 2011). 
This in turn adds on the existing knowledge on competency 
development for sustainable entrepreneurs (Parrish, 2010; 
Worthington & Patton, 2005). 
Under the GTFS context, the research has observed the 
variation in financing performance of established 
entrepreneurial firms. The variation of their financing 
performance is due to certain contextual factors that effects 
and influences more on certain established entrepreneurial 
firms more than the rest. However this might be limited to the 
Malaysia/ GTFS context only. 
To highlight this variation, the research adapts Kerr & Nanda's 
(2011:97) “two dimensional space for entering business” 
matrix as a graphical expression of the empirical results. This 
is shown in the Figure 16. 
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Figure 16 Financing competence gap and perceived ease of acquiring 
finance (from the researcher) 
In Figure 16, the vertical axis is the financing competence gap 
(see 5.3.1 and 6.2.1), while the horizontal axis is the 
perceived ease of acquiring finance (see 5.3.1 and 6.2.1).  
As shown in Figure 16, a high perceived ease of acquiring 
finance corresponds to a high financing competence gap. While 
a low perceived ease of acquiring finance corresponds to a low 
financing competence gap. By mapping the cases to the 
quadrants, the cases that are in the upper right hand quadrant 
represent cases that did not initially acquire financing. In Kerr 
and Nanda's (2011:97) “two dimensional space for entering 
business” matrix this quadrant is known as the valley of death 
for green technology financing.  
From the analysis, the four cases that are in the quadrant 
exhibited certain commonalities during their pre-financing 
period such as perception that the GTFS is easy money, 
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different financing and business experience with their new 
venture.  
From the research the inability to acquire financing is due to a 
competency trap thus hindering the cases to develop the 
necessary entrepreneurial competencies which is supported by 
Danneels (2002, 2007). The competency trap does occur in all 
of the cases in the valley of death quadrant, inducing this 
competency trap is the contextual influence from the GTFS 
(Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008). In turn this competency trap 
hinders the development of the necessary competencies to 
acquire financing. This notion is similar to Autio, George, & 
Alexy (2011) competency development for entrepreneurs from 
an internationalization context. Here Autio and colleagues 
suggest that the context induces competencies development. 
However the analysis shows that this can also work in reverse 
with contextual influence, hindering the development of 
competencies development (Rasmussen et al., 2014). 
The research believes, based on Forlani and Mullins (2000) 
and Mullins and Forlani (2005) conceptualization of risk that 
the “perception of GTFS will be easy money” has more impact 
than the other known contextual influence on competencies 
development. This gives rise to the notion that there are 
certain contextual factors impact firms more as in the case of 
Biomass A and Manu A. This supports and also expands 
Rasmussen et.al (2014) work. While from the perspective of 
financing performance this resonates with Mullins & Forlani 
(2005) suggestion on risk with the notion of “other people’s 
money” among entrepreneurs.   
As highlighted in chapter 2 of the literature review, there is a 
contradiction in the sustainable entrepreneurship literature 
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between York and Venkataraman (2010) and Hockerts and 
Wüstenhagen (2010). Here the cases mirror the contradiction 
in the sustainable entrepreneurship literature between York 
and Venkataraman (2010) and Hockerts and Wüstenhagen 
(2010). York and Venkataraman (2010) suggested that 
established entrepreneurial firms’ will experience difficulty to 
embark on sustainable entrepreneurship ventures due to 
organizational inertia. While Hockerts and Wüstenhagen 
(2010) agree, they further assert that once established 
entrepreneurial firms have decided on sustainable 
entrepreneurship ventures, they will outpace nascent firms 
because of their ‘superior market power’, ‘financial resources’ 
and ‘process innovation capabilities’. 
The research findings supports York and Venkataraman (2010) 
suggestion on the notion of a competency trap as seen in 
cases which failed to acquire financing. However the same 
findings also supports Hockerts and Wüstenhagen (2010) 
assertion that established entrepreneurial firms will also be 
successful because of their existing competencies. From the 
mapping of the cases, the firms that initially acquired financing 
and did not suffer from a competency trap exhibited certain 
common characteristics; high external resources and a low 
difference in financing experience between ventures. Therefore 
to explain the contradiction between these scholars, the 
research offers this explanation. The interplay between the 
established entrepreneurial firm’s characteristics and certain 
contextual factors influences the ability of established 
entrepreneurial firms to deploy and reconfigure the necessary 




In line with this explanation, the research proposes: 
Proposition 2: The GTFS contextual influence will have a strong 
positive influence on the financing performance (acquisition) of 
established entrepreneurial firms that have high external resources 
and relevant financing experience. 
6.3.3 Entrepreneurial competency development pathways 
This research has identified two entrepreneurial competencies 
needed for established entrepreneurial firms to acquire 
financing (see 5.3.2) transitioning to sustainable 
entrepreneurship: the opportunity refinement competencies 
and the resource acquisition competencies.  
In this section the research firstly supports the work of 
(Rasmussen et al., 2011, 2014) by using the evolutionary 
entrepreneurial competency framework to reaffirm these two 
competencies within a different setting and supporting the 
notion that there are multiple pathways of competency 
development (Barney et al., 2011; Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000b; Rasmussen et al., 2011, 2014). 
Under the GTFS context four pathways have been identified. 
Based on the credibility threshold (Rasmussen et al., 2011; 
Vohora et al., 2004) three of these pathways lead to the 
acquisition of financing and the fourth one leads to the 
discontinuation of the project. As these entrepreneurial firms 
are already established, it was assumed that they would 
possess existing entrepreneurial competencies (Brinckmann et 
al., 2009). Competency development for these established 
entrepreneurial firms is the reconfiguration (Karim and 
Mitchell, 2000) of their existing competencies to adapt to the 
context of green technology financing.  
 242 
 
The four paths are as follows: entrapped, diverted, escaped 
and evaded. From the analysis these pathways have specific 
characteristics as shown in the table 20 below. 
Table 20 Pathways and characteristics 
 Pathway Characteristics 
1 Entrapped High Financing Competence Gap 
High GTFS influence 
Financing rejection cycle 
Low external resources involvement 
Non-acquisition of financing  
2 Diverted High Financing Competence Gap 
High GTFS influence 
Financing rejection cycle  
High external resources involvement 
Diversify financing sources 
Acquired financing 
3 Escape High Financing Competence Gap 
High GTFS influence 
Financing rejection cycle 
High external resources involvement 
Acquired financing  
4 Evaded High Financing Competence Gap 
High GTFS influence 
High external resources involvement  
Acquired financing  
The common denominator for these pathways is their path 
dependencies (Barney, 2001; Beckman & Burton, 2008; 
Schreyogg & Sydow, 2011; Sydow et al., 2009). The path 
dependencies play an important part in determining the 
financing competence gap (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001; 
Danneels, 2002). Based on the established entrepreneurial 
firm’s previous paths, the level of the financing competence 
gap can be relatively estimated. If the business and financing 
experience of the established entrepreneurial firms is totally 
different, it is more likely that the financing competence gap is 
high. However if their business and financing experience is 
similar, it is more likely that the financing competence gap is 
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low. In the context of the research the financing experience is 
assumed to be more important. 
The next critical stage of the competency development 
pathways is the interplay between the financing competence 
gap (Danneels, 2007) and the context (Autio et al., 2011; 
Rasmussen et al., 2014). Here the influence from the effects 
of the perceived ease of acquiring finance might influence the 
financing competence gap of the established entrepreneurial 
firms based on the firm’s scanning of the environment 
(Hambrick, 1981). Depending on the level of influence from 
the effects of the perceived ease of acquiring finance it will 
either widen the financing competence gap (high) or maintain 
the financing competence gap (low) as explained in section 
6.3.2. The widening of the financing competence gap will lead 
the established entrepreneurial firms into a competency trap 
which is manifested by a financing rejection cycle. Breaking 
away from the competency trap will be dependent on the 
established entrepreneurial firm’s strategy (Danneels, 2002; 
Hitt et al., 2011) to remain entrapped or divert, escape or 
evade the competency trap.  
In the case of Biomass A and Manu A that followed the 
entrapped pathway, they were caught in the competency trap. 
Under the influence of the perceived ease of acquiring finance, 
Biomass A and Manu A were unable to escape the competency 
trap thus incapable to fully reconfigure their existing 
entrepreneurial competencies to acquire financing. The idea 
that a self-reinforcing mechanism that induces lock-in 
(Schreyogg and Sydow, 2011; Sydow et al., 2009) between 
the path and the competency trap (Liu, 2006) explains this 
dilemma. Here the research expounds further by identifying 
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the trigger (Vergne & Durand, 2011) behind this dilemma 
which is the widening of the financing competence gap 
because of the contextual influence, and Biomass A and Manu 
A’s reliance on internal resources (Kathuria & Joshi, 2007) 
even though in idiosyncratic situations (Ahuja & Katila, 2004).  
In the case of Manu B and Solar C both had utilised a path-
breaking strategies to acquire financing. Even though the 
financing context is the same with Biomass A and Manu A, the 
impetus for Manu B and Solar C to use path breaking 
strategies is a reflection of Karim & Mitchell (2000:1068) 
“expansion incentives and competitive pressures outweigh 
path dependence”. This pushed Manu B and Solar C after 
failing several times to acquire financing to seek external 
resources to help with their financing. 
Refining this further, since Manu B is relatively young 
compared to the other cases, the banks were very strict, thus 
increasing competitive pressures (Karim & Mitchell, 2000). 
They were more willing to diversify their financing sources 
(e.g. venture capitalist, business angels) and diverting from 
GTFS to expand their venture. When Manu B opted out of the 
GTFS, the benefits that come with certification were also 
nullified. By diverting from the GTFS and diversifying their 
financing resources they also changed the environment (Hitt et 
al., 2011; Zahra and Covin, 1995) from GTFS to alternative 
financing. Aided by past failures from the GTFS experience and 
a high involvement of external resources (e.g. technology 
principal, consultants) they diverted from the competency 
trap, developed the necessary competencies and were able to 
finally acquire financing but with equity sharing 
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In the case of Solar C, they had been involved for a long time 
in the solar industry which imbued them with technical 
expertise, expanding their venture was the next logical step 
for them (Karim & Mitchell, 2000). However they faced 
financing difficulties to expand their venture. Difficulties in to 
acquire financing under the GTFS resulted in a financing 
rejection cycle. Aided by high involvement of external 
resources (e.g. business coaches, special entrepreneurial 
program) this helped Solar C to rescan the environment 
(Hambrick, 1981) and learn from their financing failures 
(Cope, 2011) to escape their competency trap and developed 
the necessary competencies to acquire financing without 
equity sharing. 
Lastly, for Biomass D and Solar D that followed the evaded 
pathway, they were not caught in the competency trap due to 
their previous path that has some similarities with their 
present venture. Because of the similarity in terms of the 
path, the scanning of the environment gave them a better 
picture in terms of the resources and knowledge (Vohora et 
al., 2004). Aided by a high involvement of external resources 
(e.g. consultants, suppliers) they were able to reconfigure 
their existing entrepreneurial competencies to acquire 
financing. 
The four pathways illustrate the multiple routes to competency 
development that can be used to develop the necessary 
entrepreneurial competencies to acquire financing. This finding 
is consistent with Eisenhardt and Martin's (2000) notion of 
equifinality of the paths in the entrepreneurial competencies 
development. However it also gives credence to Zahra, 
Sapienza, and Davidsson (2006) assertion that the chosen 
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route and the speed of which established entrepreneurial firms 
reconfigure their existing entrepreneurial competencies is a 
form of competitive advantage.  
Another observation from these pathways is that the emphasis 
is not only on the environmental context and the influence 
that it has on the development of the entrepreneurial 
competencies but also the path breaking strategies to change 
the environmental context (i.e. alternative financing). By 
changing the environmental context it effects the resource 
orchestration of entrepreneurial firms (Hitt et al., 2011). This 
was illustrated by the importance of different factors such as 
the point of intervention (e.g. business coaching) (Cope, 
2011) in the entrepreneurial competencies development 
process.  
In summary, the analysis and findings demonstrate the 
changing complexities for the established entrepreneurial 
firm’s journey in response to its challenges to develop their 
entrepreneurial competencies in relation to the financing 
competence gap. Figure 17 summarizes the pathways and the 
different routes of the cases.  
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Figure 17 Summary of four pathways of entrepreneurial competency 
development (from the researcher) 
 
6.4 Summary and conclusion  
The chapter discussed the financing competence gap and its 
components. This was followed by the entrepreneurial 
competencies that are necessary to acquire financing. The 
discussion also touched on the multiple pathways to 
competency development in relation to the competency trap: 
entrapped, diverted, escaped and evaded. 
The research contributes primarily to the nascent sustainable 
entrepreneurship literature by answering Hall et al.’s (2010) 
question regarding the conditions and policies for sustainable 
entrepreneurship ventures to thrive. Here the research 
proposes that, in the context of Malaysia specifically and 
government green financing initiatives generally, established 
entrepreneurial firms ability to acquire financing, is contingent 
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on their ability to reconfigure their existing competencies into 
distinct competencies according to green technology financing 
under the conditions of a competency trap. 
Secondly, the research extends our knowledge on the 
influence of context on competency development (Barney et 
al., 2011; Rasmussen et al., 2014; Zahra and Wright, 2011). 
This in turn adds on the existing knowledge on competency 
development for sustainable entrepreneurs (Parrish, 2010; 
Worthington & Patton, 2005). 
The research also contributes to the entrepreneurial 
competencies literature by extending Rasmussen et al.'s 
(2011,2014) evolutionary competency framework to a 
different context: established entrepreneurial firms in a 
developing country. This furthers the utility of the framework 
and highlights the influence of the context on the financing 
competence gap and the effects on the competency 
development. 
Finally, the research also identifies multiple pathways to 
develop the necessary entrepreneurial competencies to 
acquire financing, consistent with Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000) conceptualisation of equifinality in competency 
development (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). From these 
multiple pathways the research has also illustrated that 
through path breaking strategies the environmental context 
(i.e. alternative financing) can be changed and that the chosen 
route and speed of reconfiguration influences competency 




Chapter 7: CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
From the outset, this research aimed to contribute to the 
sustainable entrepreneurship literature by focusing on the 
conditions and policies (Hall et al., 2010; Hockerts and 
Wüstenhagen, 2010) that may facilitate or hinder sustainable 
entrepreneurship ventures. To this end, the research focused 
on a financing scheme in Malaysia (GTFS) to unpack how 
sustainable entrepreneurship ventures might obtain financing. 
Financing is a key barrier facing all new ventures (Cassar, 
2004; Colombo and Grilli, 2005, 2006). So by explaining how 
it is acquired, it was anticipated that knowledge could be 
generated to better understand government financing in 
facilitating sustainable entrepreneurship. 
Theoretically the research builds upon prior work by Ahuja and 
Katila (2004) that suggests the evolutionary emergence of 
competencies, to orientate the research theoretically and 
augments Rasmussen et al., (2011,2014) evolutionary 
entrepreneurial competency framework. Thus the research 
also seeks to contribute to this stream of literature, by 
advancing the evolutionary competency framework through its 
application to a new setting, sustainable entrepreneurship in 
developing countries. 
The findings and contribution of the research also offer 
insights to financing green technology projects in a developing 




Below the highlights of the key findings and contributions will 
be presented, followed by policy recommendations, limitations 
of the research and implications for future research. 
7.2 Key findings and contributions 
7.2.1 Financing Competence Gap 
The first key finding answers the sub-question, “How does the 
GTFS context influence the deployment of competencies by 
established entrepreneurial firms?” 
The GTFS context induces a financing competence gap that 
influences the development of the necessary competencies. 
The financing competence gap consists of four elements: the 
different financing priorities of stakeholders, bank knowledge 
asymmetry, green technology financial criteria and the effects 
from the context. Here the financing competence gap hinders 
the deployment and development of the necessary 
competencies to acquire financing.  
7.2.2 Entrepreneurial Competencies  
The second key finding answers the sub-question: ‘What 
entrepreneurial competencies are necessary for established 
entrepreneurial firms to acquire green technology financing in 
this context?’  
Following Rasmussen et al.'s (2011, 2014) evolutionary 
entrepreneurial competency framework, the research has 
identified two sets of entrepreneurial competencies that are 
needed to acquire financing, the first is opportunity refinement 




The opportunity refinement competencies (Rasmussen et.al, 
2011) are a set of competencies critical for refining and 
developing an entrepreneurial opportunity into a clearly 
articulated, commercially viable business venture with a high 
success rate. In the context of this research, the opportunity 
refinement competencies, involve three functional skills 
(Mitchelmore and Rowley, 2010) that are found to be 
intricately linked: financing, technical and marketing skills. 
These functional skills represent the concept of the whole 
picture that the bankers seek from established entrepreneurial 
firms.  
While the resource acquisition competencies (Rasmussen et 
al., 2011, 2014) are a set of competencies to convince and 
educate the banks about green technology in detail, the 
financial assumptions being used, project constrains from 
various perspective (e.g. raw material, technology) and to 
convince the bankers of the success of the venture by both 
visualising the projects and implementation planning. 
7.2.3 Competency development path 
The third key finding answers the sub-question: “How are 
these competencies developed?” 
The established entrepreneurial firms have existing 
entrepreneurial competencies that have proven relevant in 
their previous business successes. However they are entering 
a new environment and a new financing context. Instead of a 
need for establishing or developing distinct competencies 
(Hart, 1995; Parrish, 2010; Worthington and Patton, 2005) 
this transition calls for reconfiguring (Karim and Mitchell, 
2000) the existing competencies to develop, the sustainable 
entrepreneurship venture.  
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The path-dependence of the established entrepreneurial firms 
will influence their ability to initially reconfigure their existing 
entrepreneurial competencies. This is because their path has a 
causal relationship with the competency trap (Liu, 2006). This 
research has identified four pathways to competency 
development under this context: entrapped, diverted, 
escaped, and evaded. Each pathway implies a different 
strategy for attempting to manage the competency trap and a 
different approach to reconfiguring their entrepreneurial 
competencies. 
7.3 Contributions and research implications  
The transition of established entrepreneurial firms into 
sustainable entrepreneurship ventures is difficult regardless of 
their “superior market power”, “financial resources”, and 
“process innovation capabilities” (Hockerts and Wüstenhagen, 
2010:487) and government incentives (York and Lenox, 2014; 
York and Venkataraman, 2010).  
As a part of this transition, the research has illustrated the 
difficulty to acquire financing, from managing the contextual 
differences in terms of financing, to the reconfiguration (Karim 
and Mitchell, 2000) of their existing entrepreneurial 
competencies according to green technology financing criteria. 
Here, the research contributes primarily to the nascent 
sustainable entrepreneurship literature by answering Hall et 
al.’s (2010) question regarding the conditions and policies for 
sustainable entrepreneurship ventures to thrive. Here the 
research proposes that, in the context of Malaysia specifically 
and government green financing initiatives generally, 
established entrepreneurial firms ability to acquire financing, is 
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contingent on their ability to reconfigure their existing 
competencies into distinct competencies according to green 
technology financing under the conditions of a competency 
trap. 
Secondly, the research extends our knowledge on the 
influence of context on competency development (Barney et 
al., 2011; Rasmussen et al., 2014; Zahra and Wright, 2011). 
This in turn adds on the existing knowledge on competency 
development for sustainable entrepreneurs (Parrish, 2010; 
Worthington & Patton, 2005). Under the GTFS context, the 
research has observed the variation in financing performance 
of established entrepreneurial firms. The variation of their 
financing performance is due to certain contextual factors that 
effects and influences on certain established entrepreneurial 
firms more than the rest. However this might be limited to the 
Malaysia/ GTFS context only. 
The research also contributes to the entrepreneurial 
competencies literature by extending Rasmussen et al.'s 
(2011,2014) evolutionary competency framework to a 
different context: established entrepreneurial firms in a 
developing country. This furthers the utility of the framework 
and highlights the contextual difference influencing 
competency development in the form of a financing 
competence gap.  
Finally, the research also identifies multiple pathways to 
develop the necessary entrepreneurial competencies to 
acquire financing, consistent with Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000) conceptualisation of equifinality in competency 
development. From these multiple pathways the research has 
also illustrated that through path breaking strategies the 
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environmental context (i.e. alternative financing) can be 
changed and that the chosen route and speed of 
reconfiguration influences competency development and the 
acquisition of green technology financing. 
7.4 Policy recommendations 
Climate change mitigation is an issue that cuts across national 
borders, with implications for both developed and developing 
countries. Programmes to address climate change operate on 
multiple levels, from international to local programmes ranging 
from awareness generating programmes to new technological 
innovations.  
One of the essential factors for furthering the agenda of 
climate change mitigation is financing for sustainability 
projects. Thus at the international level, during the Conference 
of Parties (COP) 17 in Durban, 2011, a fund of USD 100 billion 
was launched to help mitigate climate change. In developed 
countries like the UK, the Green Development Bank was 
launched in 2011 with an allocation of GBP 3 billion. While in 
Malaysia the GTFS was launched in 2010 in lieu of the 
commitments made in COP 15 in Copenhagen to reduce by the 
year 2020 Malaysia’s carbon emission by 40% against 
business as usual levels in 2005. Apart from Malaysia, there is 
a multitude of developing countries that have launched similar 
financing initiatives such as ENCON in Thailand, while in China, 
Bangladesh and Indonesia these green financing initiatives are 
spearheaded by state owned banks.  
Given the importance of financing to climate change 
mitigation, the research offers insights to local policy makers 
in terms of managing multiple stakeholders’ expectations in 
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financing sustainable entrepreneurship in developing 
countries. In translating these insights to concrete and 
comprehensive policy-based programmes, the research 
recommends the following: 
(i) Based on the finding of the financing competence gap, 
the first action that can be taken is to reinforce the 
business case via opportunity refinement programmes 
for new sustainable entrepreneurship ventures. One of 
the ways this can be fulfilled is to mitigate contextual 
influences (i.e. the perceived ease of acquiring finance). 
This can be implemented with awareness programmes 
targeting the entrepreneurs, highlighting the fact that to 
acquire financing will not be easy and step by step 
guides as to what exactly entails to acquire GTFS or 
similar projects/schemes. This can also include dedicated 
incubation programmes or business clinics at different 
levels for both nascent entrepreneurs and for established 
entrepreneurs who are currently, or considering 
embarking on sustainable entrepreneurship ventures. 
(ii) The second action that can be taken is to restructure the 
GTFS programme by streamlining the financing priorities 
of the government and the banks, which include a 
review of current practices and benchmarking best 
practices, including the establishment of a dedicated 
Green Development Bank such as in the United 
Kingdom. 
(iii) The third action is to alleviate bank knowledge 
asymmetry by training key employees within the banks. 
The target group should be a mixture of junior to senior 
officers. This can be conducted through executive 
 256 
 
courses by higher learning institutions or the Malaysian 
Green Technology Business Association. However from 
the findings of the research, training should also include 
reviewing case studies of green technology ventures. 
Imposing a quota for the banks to finance green 
technology ventures will help to speed up learning 
curve; 
(iv) It is necessary to create stronger demand for green 
technology related products from the public, private and 
the government sector. This can be implemented by 
awareness campaigns and public, private and 
government procurement activities; and finally  
(v) Finally, gradually opening the green technology market 
by promoting and not limiting equity participation from 
international entities including international funds and 
international firms. This will further develop the green 
technology market by exposing the local market to new 
ideas, building capacities of local players to eventually 
go to the international stage. 
7.5 Research limitations and future research 
The research has illustrated that established entrepreneurial 
firms transitioning to sustainable entrepreneurship ventures 
need to reconfigure their existing entrepreneurial 
competencies in the GTFS context. In light of this future 
research is needed to understand further the conditions and 
polices needed after the GTFS expires. This resonates with 
Muñoz and Dimov (2014) research to understand further 
supportive (non-supportive) environments for sustainable 
entreprneurship ventures.  While another future research in 
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the present context would be to also explore the influence of 
multiple stakeholders involvement in the other process of 
sustainable entrepreneurship. 
The research draws from the evolutionary entrepreneurial 
competency framework (Rasmussen et al.,2011,2014) and 
expands the credibility threshold to include the post-financing 
activities. As a result, the research briefly touches on the 
sustainability threshold (Vohora et al., 2004) of the new 
sustainable entrepreneurship ventures. Further research into 
this area will extend the scope of the evolutionary 
entrepreneurial competency framework (Rasmussen et al., 
2011,2014) and further refine competencies identification. 
The context of the research focuses on acquisition of financing 
for sustainable entrepreneurship ventures, two sets of 
entrepreneurial competencies and three functional skills were 
identified. Future research could ascertain more functional 
competencies in different context and also the interplay 
between these skills in the evolution of these entrepreneurial 
competencies (Mitchelmore and Rowley, 2010; Teece, 2014).  
The financing competence gap was derived from the 
combination of four elements: financing priorities, bank 
knowledge asymmetry, green technology financing criteria and 
the contextual effects. Although the research has identified 
these four elements, there might be other contributing 
elements involved. By reframing financing as an evolutionary 
process (Vanacker et al., 2014) a future research that can be 






This endeavour has advanced the understanding of the 
conditions and the policies for sustainable entrepreneurship 
ventures with a focus on financing within the context of 
Malaysia. Overall, the GTFS has helped to further Malaysia’s 
agenda in fulfilling their carbon emission reduction targets. 
Now there should be more concentrated efforts from the key 
stakeholders especially the government and banks to push this 
agenda forward by implementing the recommendations 
proposed in section 7.4. 
Finally, the research argues that in Malaysia, established 
entrepreneurial firms are likely to develop the necessary 
entrepreneurial competencies to acquire green technology 
financing. However this is contingent on their ability to 
reconfigure their existing entrepreneurial competencies to 
adapt to the contextual differences emanating from the GTFS 
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Appendix I: Information for Research Participants 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in the research project. 
Your participation in this research is voluntary, and you may 
change your mind about being involved in the research at any 
time, and without giving a reason. 
This information sheet is designed to give you full details of 
the research project, its goals, the research team, the 
research funder, and what you will be asked to do as part of 
the research. If you have any questions that are not answered 
by this information sheet, please ask. 
What is the research project called? 
The Green Technology Financing Scheme (GTFS) in Malaysia 
Who is carrying out the research? 
The principal investigator for this research will be Mr.Mohd 
Azlan Zaharudin.  
He was formerly attached to the Ministry of Energy, Green 
Technology and Water. He is currently on study leave and now 
is a PhD Candidate from the University of Nottingham Institute 
of Entrepreneurship and Innovation (UNIEI) under the 
supervision of Professor Simon Mosey, Director of UNIEI and 
Dr.Isobel O’Neil, Lecturer in Entrepreneurship and Innovation.  
His doctoral research is sponsored by the Government of 
Malaysia through the Public Service Department as part of the 
Government Management Training Program.  
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What is the research about?  
The purpose of the research is an attempt to study and 
understand the role of entrepreneurial competencies within 
sustainable (green technology) entrepreneurs in 
obtaining financing in Malaysia. The aim of the research 
objectives are as follows: 
 
(i) to outline the entrepreneurial competencies within 
sustainable entrepreneurs in Malaysia ; 
(ii) to understand the barriers to financing from the 
sustainable entrepreneurs perspectives; and 
(iii) to understand the factors needed to support 
sustainable entrepreneurs in Malaysia for them to 
thrive. 
 
Primarily the feedback and the output from this study will be 
utilised as inputs for the purpose of fulfilling the requirements 
of the Nottingham University Business School Doctoral 
research program. However these inputs are hoped to also 
help in the continuous improvement of sustainable (green 
technology) entrepreneurship development in Malaysia. 
 
What groups of people have been asked to take part, and 
why? 
Individuals from the following categories will be participating: 
(i) GTFS applicants (founding member and/or senior 
managers) of entrepreneurial business. 
285 
(ii) Banks providing financing under the GTFS
(iii) Ministry/GTFS Official
These groups have been selected to obtain a holistic view of 
the value and significance of entrepreneurial competencies 
within sustainable (green technology) entrepreneur 
businesses. 
What will research participants be asked to do? 
Take part by face to face interviews/telephone/follow-up email 
Interviews will last for about an hour, and will be audio taped 
(only with permission). 
Observation of the “pitching process” (only with permission). 
You have the right to withdraw from the research study at any 
time if you need to. 
What will happen to the information provided? 
Interviews will be transcribed. 
The information will be used as inputs for the study. 
Data storage-voice recording, stored in password protected 
personal pc 
Data will be confidential and anonymous. All aspects of the 
study, including results, will be strictly confidential and only 




What will be the outputs of the research? 
The research outputs will be for the thesis in fulfilling the 
requirements of the Nottingham University Business School 





(i) Mohd Azlan Zaharudin     
Doctoral Researcher      
Entrepreneurship and Innovation Division 
University of Nottingham Business School 
Jubilee Campus 
Nottingham NG8 1BB 





(ii) Professor Simon Mosey 
Professor of Entrepreneurship & Innovation 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation Division 
University of Nottingham Business School 
Jubilee Campus 
Nottingham NG8 1BB 





If you wish to complain about the way in which the research is 
being conducted or have any concerns about the research then 
in the first instance please contact (see above). 
Or contact the School’s Research Ethics Officer:  
Adam Golberg 
Nottingham University Business School 
Jubilee Campus 
Nottingham NG8 1BB 








Appendix II: Interview Consent Form 
 
 The research is being carried out on behalf of 
Nottingham University Business School. 
 Interviews will last for about an hour, and will be audio 
taped (with your permission). 
 Interviews will be transcribed. You may request a copy 
of the notes.  
 Interview notes will be analysed only by researchers 
employed on this project. This analysis will only be used 
in publications associated with this particular research 
project. 
 All aspects of the study, including results, will be strictly 
confidential and only the researchers will have access to 
information on participants.  
 While the entire transcripts will not be used, selected 
quotations will be used in publications associated with 
this research. In written material associated with this 
research project, your identity will be disguised by the 
use of a pseudonym. Any direct quote will be published 
using this pseudonym. 
 Please indicate any quotes you wish to keep off the 
record, we will ensure these are not included in any 
published material. 
 You have the right to withdraw from the research study 
at any time if you need to. 
I have read and understand this consent form, and any 
questions I have asked have been answered to my 
satisfaction. I understand that my participation is voluntary 
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and I agree to participate in this research, knowing that I may 














Appendix III: Example of semi-structured questions:  
Entrepreneur 
A. Business Background 
1. When was this company established? 
2. Tell me about how long have you been with this 
company? 
3. What is your role in the company? 
4. Could you please explain the company’s core 
business?  
B. Management Practice 
1. How is the business run?  
2. How did the company develop since starting up? 
3. How have things changed overtime? 
4. How did management/you cope with these changes? 
5. Could you describe the toughest experience in this 
company? 
6. What would you say to be the major contributing 
characteristics that brought this company to the 
current stage? 
 C. Financing 
1. Who is in charge of financial matters in the company? 
How long have you/ they been dealing with financial 
matters? What kind of financial evaluation and 
assessment do you use? Has these changed?  
2. What do you think about access to financing for 
entrepreneurs in Malaysia?  
3. How does the company usually finance projects?  
4. Is this the first project that you are asking under the 
GTFS? What did you view as the benefits of GTFS?  
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5. How did you present your business case to the 
committee and the banks in particular?  
6. What contributing factor made the impact for you to 
obtain financing from GTFS? 
7. Any recommendations to improve the GTFS from your 
point of view? 
 Final Comment 
1. What advice would you give to somebody who is also 





1. Can you please tell me about yourself? 
2. How long have you been in the Banking Industry? 
3. What is exactly your role in the Bank? 
4. Can you please share with me about the financing 
landscape in Malaysia? 
5. Can you tell me your involvement with GTFS? How 
do you feel about GTFS? 
6. How many green technology financing has the 
banks approved? 
7. What are your comments on the entrepreneurs 
seeking green technology financing? 
8. Any advice to entrepreneurs seeking final 
comments? 
9. Any advice for the government on GTFS? 





Appendix IV: Summary Form 
Figure 18 Summary Form (adapted from Miles and Huberman,1994:53) 
  
 




Appendix V: Example of Quotes from Cross Case Analysis 
































“With all these guarantees, whatever we say, they still 
want to look at the entire account in the group. I think 
the government has to tell the bank, This is a directive 
whereby you have to honour.” (MD of Manu A) 
“(The 60% government guarantee) is (for) the success 
of the business in using that technology. (PA4) 
 
“Since the day, we got the certificate, it’s been one 
year, no bank is interested. So to the bank, what the 
government say doesn’t mean anything.” (MD of Manu 
A) 
 
“Nobody is having that confidence, and there is no 
parties, who are able to convince the financiers that this 




The program administrator argues that the Malaysian 
banks are traditionalist and the climate change 
mitigation should be part of the banks social 
responsibility. While the banks argue otherwise, that 
business applications should not be treated on the 
basis of CSR, regardless of the guarantee, regardless 
of the previous success; established business should be 
treated as nascent entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs’ 
suggests that since this is a government program, the 
banks should be more supportive and to some extent 
the guarantee is not honoured by the bank. The 
financing priority contributes to the financing 
competence gap and influences the entrepreneurs’ 
competency development via a perceived ease of 
acquiring finance and a competency trap (Levitt and 
March, 1988) which is illustrated in a financing 







loan will be 









GTFS is a 
form of Bank 
CSR 
“The way that we finance green and the other projects 
are not (any) different (we still use the) 5C. We are in 
the business to make money, credit mitigation. 
[…]Banks do CSR but not for business 
applications”(SCO of Bank 5) 
“It’s going to be looked at on the platform of a new 
business. New business because they have no 
experience, […]. They are starting from scratch so [we] 
evaluate them the same with newcomers […](SCO of 
Bank 4) 
“Malaysian are traditional bankers […] the energy 
saving, saving the environment is not part of the 
agenda.[…] the government, (PA 6) 
“The bank does not see this, but the government feels 
the project is viable”.(PA3) 
 [in] my opinion the government is looking at the social 
responsibility for the financial institution to give back 
to the society.”(PA 6) 
Competency Development 





curve for the 
bank 
“GTFS is still new. The general market has yet to fully 
embrace it. The financial institution is still (grappling) 
with it.” (HOD Bank 1) 
“[…] I think we, they have a learning curve, (and) we 
The learning curve of the bank will affect the ability to 
understand the green technology venture even though 
all the relevant information has been presented to 
bank, this phenomenon in the research is a similar 
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have a learning curve on how to deal with them as well. 
They, it’s their first renewable energy, or they say it’s 
their first green loan as well, even though this bank that 
we are talking about is an international bank.” 
(Financial Controller of Solar D). 
“I cannot compare green financing compared to a 
normal financing you know. It’s totally different 
because from my experience, the ones that we have 
done are quite huge projects. We have done quite huge 
projects and it’s totally different. For me I had to learn 
altogether again. My 5Cs and I had to add on some 
more…” (SCO Bank 2) 
“The other factor that GTFS need […] is to give 
knowledge as [in] ways to evaluate and access a 
project. I think how to convince the banks [is] another 
story. Because [they the banks] don’t understand the 
technology. Maybe from the business plan it is ok but 
what about the technology risk? How do we evaluate? 
Some projects have good technology but the 
entrepreneur does not have a good business plan. 
The bank does not see this, but the government 
feels the project is viable. They cannot link the 
technology with the business plan, that’s the area we 
need to train the credit officers.” (PA3) 
concept of the knowledge asymmetry concept 
suggested by Bonnie and Wirtz (2012) 
See Link: 
Competency Development  
Opportunity Refinement Competencies 
Resource Acquisition Competencies  
























“Most credit officers either not equip or they do not 
have the confidence to actually do it so, what they do is 
just (shelf) it” (Project partner of Solar D) 
“[…] they (Banks) think, you’re buying a house. I also 
got a house so I know what a house is, so I give you 
financing. This is technology. I don’t know…it’s too 
risky...”(MD of Manu A) 
“They (Banks) go and do research on the technology 
provided. This is exactly what they did they asked me 
who is the supplier and I told them. They checked the 
website, then the banks asked the suppliers annual 
statement and they came back to me to say that the 
project is not viable” (ED of Biomass A) 
 
“Although we are (one of) the lead GTFS supporter, 
our focus is primarily on our existing customers. That 
will be an eventuality where we will be sending people 
to acquire technical expertise on the 4 main sectors. It’s 
just that it has not reached that desired stage yet.” 













Even if you come, if you come back and tell you are 
well-collateralized and we do not see the cash flow 
coming out of your end products, we will not, we will 
not take it. […] Of course, the collaterals help eases our 
clean portion but we are into cash flow financing. 
(HOD of BANK 1) 
 
The financing criteria from the banks emphasis the 
financing skills (e.g cash flow-technical assumptions), 
technical skills and marketing skills are of importance 
to the bank. These skills make up the opportunity 
refinement competencies (Rasmussen et.al, 2014) 
See Link: 
Competency Development (Path) 
































“…one more thing; why we were a bit sceptical 
because we were not able to see a complete picture. 
[…] they want to produce something, we’re not able to 
see the potential because if you are able to sell, they 
will get money when they get money, in all probability, 
pay the banks but in most of these cases, we are not 
able to see a complete picture.” (HOD of BANK 1) 
  
“To receive certification from the GTFS and qualify for 
the benefits the firms must show the carbon emission 
reduction”-GTFS website  
“how I wish the one thing technical expertise. The 
proponents themselves, instead of relying on a third-
party which are not shareholders, they must acquire 
that, […] tie them down, by giving some equity 
because these people can leave. […] If the proponents 
themselves has got technical expertise, that’s good” 
(HOD of BANK 1) 
 
“[…] chloroformic (value) […] is the major 
assumption in their cash flow model, I assume my 
kilojoules of heat value is 2,900 because of the 
composition of waste, this will generate (how many) 
megawatt. I need to be able to relate from the 
composition of the waste and the mild, moisture […] to 
whatever energy that I produce[…] a bank looks at that 
when they don’t understand […] they will kick (you) 
out because they don’t understand […]” (Project 
Opportunity Refinement Competencies 













partner Solar D) 
  
“The ideal Green Technology Entrepreneur would be 
somebody with a viable business, fits the credit criteria, 
have the expertise and experience, support from parent 
company, collateral, commitment, consultant to help 
with the completion of the project, able to understand 
the business without consultant by doing their own 
research. Really look at the feasibility and the ability to 
























“Financing, we are fortunate that we had the support of 
the local banks because the project is (National 
Electricity Company), so there’s a lot of confidence 
from the local institution… payment is never an issue. 
Therefore, financing was not too much of an issue 
because all the projects are contract financed.” (ED of 
Biomass A). 
 
 “…but if let’s say I call a bank today and say, “I’m 
getting a 40 million dollar contract, can you finance?” 
They will be (here) tomorrow, they will be sitting here. 
You know, so that’s not an issue.” (ED of Biomass A) 
“I think we have approached almost six to seven banks, 
and these are bankers who have financed me [before], 
and these are the same people who are telling me today 
that, “Oh, for this Biomass A we have got 
concerns”…How much of convincing we have done 
The perceived ease of acquiring finance influences the 
financing competence gap, it makes the entrepreneurs 
feel that this will be easy financing and big profit. This 
feeling is at the start of the venture before the 
financing process. (Opportunity recognition-
environment scanning).  
 
See link 
Financing Competence Gap 
Competency Trap 
Opportunity Refinement Competencies 
Resource Acquisition Competencies 



























that GTFS is 




and still we are not able to penetrate through their 
barriers or their thoughts.” (ED of Biomass A) 
“You see, the funds from the facilities we’ve done it all 
our projects. Some our own money, and some are 
through the facilities, right, because the projects run in 
the couple of millions […] and these projects are much 
bigger than this GTFS funding, and we have managed 
all these projects all these years. So this is only a small 
portion, why they’re reluctant I don’t understand.” 
(MD of Manu A) 
 
“[…] So we always tell, “Hey, come on, you see 
GTFS, I did this presentation, they agreed to give me 
the certificate. Otherwise, if the project is not viable, 
they will never give me this certificate. What is the 
purpose of this certificate? the project is viable, that’s 
why they give me the certificate.[…] [its] affecting 
people like us because we cannot come on board fast. 
We secured the land more than eight months.”( ED of 
Biomass A) 
 
“(Sometimes the entrepreneurs) feel the money is like 
(from an) Automated Teller Machine”( PA2) 
 “[…] we failed to realise, we thought it was so easy 
because at that time we thought, if GTFS agree, 
everything will be good.” (ED of Biomass A) 
 
“Because it was a coincidence, I would say. I mean, it 




Too good an 
opportunity 
to miss 
was never my interest per se. […] there was a lot of 
promotion by the government saying that, […] a lot of 
incentives, […] lucrative revenues out of that.” (ED of 
Biomass A) 
 “No, there was an opportunity to go, we heard about 
this Malaysia German Chamber, we came under the 
Malaysian group, we came to know about green 
technology and there is a fund, why not apply.” (MD of 
Manu B) 
“I’m sure there a lot of other businessman out there, 
who are producing something that are good to the 
environment. But they are not focusing on being Green, 
but they’re just focusing on making money. I’m sure.” 













I think we have approached almost six to seven banks, 
and these are bankers who have financed me [before], 
and these are the same people who are telling me today 
that, “Oh, for this Biomass A we have got 
concerns”…How much of convincing we have done 
and still we are not able to penetrate through their 
barriers or their thoughts. (ED of Biomass A) 
  
A direct question to the executive director of Manu A 
whether she learned anything from the multiple 
rejections, she replied “No”.  
  
A competency trap is indicated as a financing rejection 
cycle. This financing rejection cycle occurs with the 
banks that have financed these established 
entrepreneurs in their previous projects with even with 
bigger amounts of loans. The entrepreneurs do not 
understand why they are being rejected because they 
were successful using the same financing strategies 
before this. This competency trap is influenced by the 
financing competence gap of the entrepreneurs. 
 
See link 
Financing Competence Gap 
Opportunity Refinement Competencies 
Resource Acquisition Competencies 









 “I feel the thing that makes the firm good is the 
planning and the proposal. The whole proposal must be 
supported, for instance EFB projects must come with 
the raw material (supply), demand for their product, 
[…] optimal cash flow for the banks.[…] They must 
have proper plans. “ (PA 2) 
 “by design although the target return is about 11%, 
you have to structure a proposition that gives you at 
least about 15%, there’s some, there’s ample buffer and 
then when it’s translated into their calculation of debt 
service coverage ratio it will probably hits about 1.5 
you know so that’s where the creativity of the promoter 
has to comes into play, it cannot be a straight forward 
process because when Sustainable Energy 
Development Authority (SEDA) release the quota, it 
was a straight forward process.”(Project partner of 
Solar D) 
 
“[…]my background, I was Director of estates (for the 
government)” (EC of Biomass D) 
 
“because a shareholder, he’s a local, owner of the 
land(location)[…]this C Energy got the knowledge of 
the power […] another partner they know a lot of palm 
oil mill (raw material sourcing). Our consultants, they 
are, they, they have this experience. And they’re 
pioneer; they are pioneer of the trial two plants in 
Sandakan. Already tried it.(technical)” (GM of 
The opportunity recognition stage is where scanning 
the environment is important, this followed by the 
opportunity refinement stage. In this research, the 
opportunity refinement competencies are comprised of 
three functional skills financing, technical and 
marketing and all of this is intricately linked. The 
financing skills, takes into consideration the financing 
strategies including the cash flow assumptions and 
design. The technical skills are important and will 
differ according to the technology being used, which is 
then linked to the financing skills because of the 
assumptions that are involved. The marketing skills 
will complete the cash flow model. 









 “ there is a qualitative side to the valuation …they 
(will) kick you out not because you are not bankable or 
the numbers but they don’t trust you as simple as 
that[…]because (of) how you come out with the 
figures” (Project partner of Solar D) 
  
“…once we declare everything, we open everything 
(and) this looks like it is a high risk project, RM 56 
million is a big amount. He [Credit Officer] cannot 
approve the financing just like that. That's why we have 
to entertain this people until they are satisfied that this 
project is viable, this project would be able to generate 
cash and we can pay back the financing amount 
because banks will normally ask can you pay? …… so 
basically we have to educate the bank officer.” (SFE of 
Solar C) 
 
“[…] that one I financed; the whole thing is complete. 
Before you can ask one question, they already 
answered you everything. Before you can even ask, 
they will explain to you. They will do the presentation 
[on the] costing, about the durability of the product. 
They have all the evidence to show that it’s a good 
product. They showed everything. Even the component 
[…] how is it made of, what’s the layering, because we 
The Resource Acquisition Competencies are centred 
on bringing the whole picture to the bankers (e.g. give 
them a new picture and explain to them until they 
understand or give a picture that conforms to their 
understanding) and educate the bankers on the 
venture/technology to their satisfaction. 




actually learn from them.” (SCO of Bank 2) 
 
 “[…] in order to persuade the banker, we have to tell 
them our business strategies. We have to tell them our 
plans for the, the current plant that we build and then 
we have to explain to them the, what is [a] solar plant. 
How they actually generate electricity by just putting a 
lot of panel on top of a landfill. […] you need some 
explanation.” (SFE of Solar D) 
 
 […]How much of convincing we have done and still 
we are not able to penetrate through their barriers or 


















Solar D was a environmental engineering firm 
specialising in landfill rehabilitation 
 
“Way back in, way back in 2004, we were the only one 
who were doing it [landfill rehabilitation], but 
obviously during the past few years, since we did the 
first project people are looking into […] their approach 
is let them be the first mover, let us learn from them, 
[…] see whether they can make money, once they see 
that we can make money[…] [they jump in].(GM of 
Solar D) 
 
Yes, number 1 is a financial ability[...] Number 2, I 
The competency development path is dependent on the 
financing experience (e.g. contract financing, facilities 
financing) and the business experience (e.g. first 
mover experience) of the established entrepreneurs 




competencies think we have the people to run the show…and then we 
have people to run the show[…] and [we have as 
reference] Kina and Seguntor[…][they are able] to 
produce electricity from Empty Fruit Bunches. 
(Executive chairman of Biomass D) 
 














Biomass A applied GTFS financing from 6 banks and 
were rejected. 
 
Biomass A and Manu A did not acquire financing 
 
 
Manu A applied GTFS financing from 6 banks and 
were rejected 
“No […] I did not learn so much because they just 
turned off like that and not giving me what is the 
reasons why..” (ED Manu A) 
 
Financing was handled internally  
 
[…] when the bank turns down our application, they 
didn’t give us very concrete reasons but I called and I 
emailed them why […] they didn’t help us. They didn’t 
give such a concrete answer. Nothing. (ED of Director 
of Manu A) 
 
The established entrepreneurial firms were caught in a 
financing rejection cycle, but were not able to learn 














They applied from various sources. They multiple 
consultants to help them.  
They acquired financing from a business angel. 
They were also rejected by a series of banks. They 
applied from banks, special Rural Ministry based funds 
and solicited business angels 
They were rejected by several banks. 
Manu B business plan: management team comprised of 
multiple business executives and consultants. 
The established entrepreneurial firm employed a path 
breaking strategy, by diverting to other financing 











They applied to several banks, in-house expertise. 
They acquired GTFS financing. 
We applied from seven banks and were rejected by six” 
(SFE of Solar C) 
Yes, the business coaching […] (was) conducted by a 
“Teras company is a high performance high pontential 
The established entrepreneurial firm employed a path 
breaking strategy, by escaping from the competency 
trap with help from business coaches and learning 
from the financing rejections. 




Bumiputera company , they become our business coach 
to raise our future potential” (SFE of Solar C) 
 
financial expert from D audit firm by a senior partner. 
The sharing of financial experience has helped us (to) 
reorganise our financial strategy… 
 
Yes, I have learned a lot of lessons from each bank 
rejection. (Managing Director Solar C) 
 
“Our people is very young people, we have very 
young, from fresh graduate until me, like me and then 
and we have a strongest, we cooperate each other.” 
(SFE Solar C) 
 







“ We have a strong team” (EC of Biomass D) 
 
They acquired GTFS financing.  
 
 
Technical and Financial Consultants, including 
demonstration project in Kina and Seguntor. 
 
Business consultant as project partner to guide in new 
business venture  
 
 
The established entrepreneurial firms were able to 
evade the competency trap to acquire GTFS financing. 
  
 




Appendix VI: Green Technology Policy Malaysia 
Background 
Technology is an invention or tools that would improve the 
lives of human kind. The term ‘technology’ has a Greek origin 
of “technologia”. The inventions, developments and uses of 
technology have progressed tremendously over the last 
century, starting from the industrial revolution in the 18th 
century. However, the excessive exploitation of our natural 
resources through these technologies, have led to the 
production of unwanted by products such as waste and 
pollution. Consequently, we are now facing bigger challenges 
in finding solutions to overcome the problem of depleting 
natural resources, climate change, energy supply, and food 
security. Today, the world is more circumspect. Green 
Technology application is seen as one of the sensible solutions 
which are being adopted by many countries around the world 
to address the issues of energy and environment 
simultaneously. Green Technology is a technology that allows 
us to progress more rapidly but at the same time minimizes 
the negative impact to the environment. However, the world 
needs to find more efficient and effective ways to adopt Green 
Technology against other technologies which have been widely 
used and though cheaper, not necessarily benevolent. As a 
rapidly developing nation, Malaysia is not excluded from the 
challenges. Malaysia, too has initiated strategies to minimize 
the negative environmental impacts in the energy supply 
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chain. In 1979, the National Energy Policy was formulated to 
ensure adequacy, security and cost-effectiveness of energy 
supply, as well as to promote the efficient utilization of energy. 
This was further emphasized in the Ninth Malaysia Plan where 
efforts in the utilization of renewable energy (RE) resources 
and efficient use of energy were further promoted. The 
establishment of the Ministry of Energy, Green Technology and 
Water reflects Malaysia’s seriousness in driving the message 
that ‘clean and green’ is the way forward towards creating an 
economy that is based on sustainable solutions. The National 
Green Technology Policy will provide guidance and will create 
new opportunities for businesses and industries to bring a 
positive impact to our economic growth. It will also be the 
basis for all Malaysians to enjoy an improved quality of life, in 
line with the national policies, including the National Outline 
Perspective Plan, where the growth objectives for the nation 
will continue to be balanced with environmental consideration. 
Definition 
Green Technology is the development and application of 
products, equipment, and systems used to conserve the 
natural environment and resources, which minimises and 
reduces the negative impact of human activities. 
Green Technology refers to products, equipment, or systems 
which satisfy the following criteria: 
It minimises the degradation of the environment; 
It has a zero or low green house gas (GHG) emission; 
It is safe for use and promotes healthy and improved 
environment for all 




forms of life; 
It conserves the use of energy and natural resources; and 
It promotes the use of renewable resources. 
Policy Statement 
Green Technology shall be a driver to accelerate the national 
economy and promote sustainable development. 
Four Pillars  
The National Green Technology Policy is built on four pillars: 
Energy 
Seek to attain energy independence and promote efficient 
utilisation; 
Environment 
Conserve and minimize the impact on the environment; 
Economy 
Enhance the national economic development through the use 
of technology; and 
Social 
Improve the quality of life for all. 
Objectives 
The National Green Technology Policy embodies elements of 
economic, environment and social policies, as reflected in the 
five (5) objectives as follows: 
To minimise growth of energy consumption while enhancing 
economic development; 




To facilitate the growth of the Green Technology industry and 
enhance its contribution to the national economy; 
To increase national capability and capacity for innovation in 
GreenTechnology development and enhance Malaysia’s 
competitiveness in Green Technology in the global arena; 
To ensure sustainable development and conserve the 
environment for future generations; and 
To enhance public education and awareness on Green 
Technology and encourage its widespread use. 
National goals 
The national goals of the Green Technology Policy is to provide 
direction and motivation for Malaysians to continuously enjoy 
good quality living and a healthy environment. 
Short-Term Goals-10th Malaysia Plan 
Increased public awareness and commitment for the adoption 
and application of Green Technology through advocacy 
programmes; 
Widespread availability and recognition of Green Technology in 
terms of products, appliances, equipment and systems in the 
local market through standards, rating and labelling 
programmes; 
Increased foreign and domestic direct investments (FDIs and 
DDIs) in Green Technology manufacturing and services 
sectors; and 
Expansion of local research institutes and institutions of higher 
learning to expand Research, Development and Innovation 




activities on Green Technology towards commercialisation 
through appropriate mechanisms. 
Significant progress and major improvements in the following 
four (4) key areas: 
Energy Sector 
Energy Supply Sector: 
Application of Green Technology in power generation and in 
the energy supply side management, including co-generation 
by the industrial and commercial sectors; and 
Energy Utilisation Sector: 
Application of Green Technology in all energy utilisation 
sectors and in demand side management programmes. 
Buildings Sector 
Adoption of Green Technology in the construction, 
management, maintenance and demolition of buildings. 
Water and Waste Management Sector 
Technology in the management and utilisation of water 
resources, waste water treatment, solid waste and sanitary 
landfill; and 
Transportation Sector 
Incorporation of Green Technology in the transportation 
infrastructure and vehicles, in particular, biofuels and public 
road transport. 
Mid-Term Goals-11th Malaysia Plan 
Green Technology becomes the preferred choice in 
procurement of products and services; 




Green Technology has a larger local market share against 
other technologies, and contributes to the adoption of Green 
Technology in regional markets; 
Increased production of local Green Technology products; 
Increased Research Development and Innovation of Green 
Technology by local universities and research institutions and 
are commercialised in collaboration with the local industry and 
multi-national companies; 
Expansion of local SMEs and SMIs on Green Technology into 
the global market; and 
Expansion of Green Technology applications to most economic 
sectors. 
Long-Term Goals-12th Malaysia Plan and beyond 
Inculcation of Green Technology in Malaysian culture; 
Widespread adoption of Green Technology reduces overall 
resource consumption while sustaining national economic 
growth; 
Significant reduction in national energy consumption; 
Improvement of Malaysia’s ranking in environmental ratings; 
Malaysia becomes a major producer of Green Technology in 
the global market; and 
Expansion of international collaborations between local 
universities and research institutions with Green Technology 
industries. 
Strategic Thrust 




Strategic Thrust 1- Strengthen the institutional 
frameworks  
In nurturing the adoption and growth of Green Technology, it 
is critical to have strong institutional arrangements to promote 
Green Technology applications through: 
Formation of a Green Technology Council chaired by Y.A.B. 
Prime Minister or Y.A.B. Deputy Prime Minister for high-level 
coordination among Government Ministries, agencies, the 
private sector and key stakeholders for effective 
implementation of the Green Technology Policy; 
Establishment of a Cabinet Committee on Green Technology 
chaired by Y.A.B. Prime Minister or Y.A.B. Deputy Prime 
Minister; 
Establishment of the Malaysia Green Technology Agency for 
the effective coordination and implementation of Green 
Technology initiatives and programmes; 
Review and establish legal mechanisms to foster an 
accelerated growth of Green Technologies in line with National 
Objectives and Goals; and 
Enhancement of institutional clarity so that all agencies are 
aware of their respective roles and responsibilities. 
Strategic Thrust 2-Provide Conducive Environment for 
Green Technology Development 
The growth of the Green Technology industry, either in 
manufacturing or service sectors, is critical towards fulfilling the 
objectives of the Green Technology Policy. 




This industry would supply the Green Technology to the local 
and global markets, create jobs, and contribute towards the 
national economy. This could be achieved through: 
Introduction and implementation of innovative economic 
instruments, supported by the necessary monetary and fiscal 
measures to foster an accelerated growth of Green Technology 
in line with the National objectives and goals; 
Strengthening the understanding of local players in Green 
Technology industries and their value chain, including the 
supporting industries through various industries’ enhancement 
programmes; 
Promotion of foreign direct investments (FDIs) on Green 
Technology which foster domestic direct investments (DDIs) 
and local industry participation and development; 
Establishment of strategic Green Technology hubs throughout 
Malaysia, expanding from the core value chain to the 
upstream and downstream of the industry; and 
Establishment of Green Technology funding mechanism. 
Strategic Thrust 3-Intensify Human Capital 
Development in Green Technology 
Skilled, qualified, competent and productive human resources 
are crucial to Green Technology development. 
This could be achieved through: 
Design and enhancement of training and education 
programmes to improve human resource capacity related to 
Green Technology; 




Provision of financial and fiscal incentives for students to 
pursue Green Technology disciplines at undergraduate and 
postgraduate levels; 
Implementation of retraining programme and apprenticeship 
scheme to enhance competency of semi-skilled labour to meet 
the demands of the Green Technology industry; 
Formulation of grading and certification mechanisms for 
competent personnel in Green Technology; and 
Exploitation of brain gain programmes to strengthen local 
expertise in Green Technology. 
Strategic Thrust 4-Intensify Green Technology Research 
and Innovations 
Research, Development, Innovation and Commercialization 
(RDIC) is very crucial in creating new technologies, techniques 
and applications which would be able to reduce the cost of 
Green Technology and promote its usage. Research, 
Development and Innovations (RDI) could be enhanced 
through: 
Provision of financial grants or assistance to public and private 
sector in RDIC; 
Implementation of Green Technology foresight; 
Establishment of an effective coordinating agency for RDI and 
Centre of Excellence or new research institute for Green 
Technology development; 
Enhancement of smart partnerships between the Government, 
industries, and research institutions; and 




Establishment of strong linkages between local research 
institutions and regional and international centres of 
excellence in Green Technology RDI. 
Strategic Thrust 5-Promotion and Public Awareness 
Effective promotion and public awareness are two of the main 
factors that would affect the success of Green Technology 
development. This is particularly significant as such adoption 
requires the change of mindset of the public through various 
approaches including: 
Effective, continuous promotion, education and information 
dissemination through comprehensive roll-out programmes to 
increase public awareness on Green Technology; 
Effective involvement of media, non-governmental 
organizations and individual stakeholders in promoting Green 
Technology; 
Inculcation of a culture that appreciates Green Technology 
among students at all levels through the development of 
effective syllabus in the education system; 
Demonstration programmes of effective Green Technology 
applications; and  
Adoption of Green Technology in all Government facilities and 
Government-linked entities. 
National Key Indicators 
The National Key Indicators are a set of criteria to measure 
the success of Green Technology Policy and its initiatives. This 
would provide the Government a feedback mechanism and the 
opportunity to improve or strengthen the initiatives as 




necessary. The National Key Indicators below would be further 
refined into quantitative and qualitative key performance 
indicators (KPIs) for each Malaysia Plan, and annual plan for 
various Government ministries and agencies. 
Environment 
Initial reduction in the rate of increase of GHG emission, and 
subsequently progressing towards reduction in the annual GHG 
emission; 
Progress of the rise in ranking of environmental performance 
by 2030; and Improvement in air quality and river water 
quality. 
Economy 
The Green Technology industry contributes a significant value 
and percentage to the National GDP; 
Sizeable amount of investments are made in Green 
Technology industry through foreign direct investments (FDIs) 
and domestic direct investments (DDIs); 
Increased number of certified Green industries and revenue in 
the country; 
The Green Technology industry creates increasing number of 
jobs in the manufacturing and services sectors, as well as 
SMEs/SMIs; and 
Increasing values of spin-off and supporting industries from 
the Green Technology industry. 
Social 
More cities, townships and communities are embracing Green 
Technology and are being classified as Green Townships; 




More Malaysians appreciate Green Technology and Green 
Technology culture becomes a part of their lives; and 
Improved quality of life in Malaysia. 
 
